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Editor: Leopold Labedz

Guest Editor: Michel Heller

Perestroika, Current trends and Soviet history

Aleksandr Nekrich · Alain Besançon
Michel Heller · Marc Raeff · Branko Lazitch

Nationalities · Polish Church
Emigration – old & new

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New Thinking?

Current Politics and Current Historiography

Michel Heller

History is politics projected into the past.

M. N. Pokrovsky

ATTITUDES TO the past in today's USSR are neatly summed up by the saying: "We were born during the era of the cult of personality, we grew up in the period of voluntarism, and had our own children in the period of stagnation." We have had everything here even the period of Lenin's "leap into Communism", which is still taboo. Germany, Italy and Japan are all now settling their accounts with history: people there are arguing about a past which led to totalitarian rule and defeat. But the Soviet Union is the only country among the victorious which has never stopped painfully reliving its past, searching for its history. This is not surprising, for nowhere has history been so completely nationalized as in the Soviet Union. As Yury Afanasev says, "There is probably no country in the world with such a falsified history as ours."[1]

History as a tool of politics; control of the past so as to control the future; total control and shameless falsification—yesterday's immutable truths can now at last be criticized. This is what Gorbachev feared. In June 1986, when talking to a group of Russian writers, he explained, "If we began studying the past, we would use up all our energies and set the people at loggerheads. . . We'll get the past sorted out." The course that the power struggle has taken has clearly demonstrated what a powerful weapon history is. Stalin was well aware of this, as was Khrushchev when he threw *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* into the ring; Gorbachev has now taken up the same weapon. The land of *perestroika* is beginning to come to grips with its past under the slogans of "Filling in the blank spots" and "historical truth". So, much of what Boris Souvarine wrote back in April 1938 has now received official confirmation. Commenting on the "Moscow trials", he said: "The USSR is the home of the lie, the absolute lie, the pervasive lie. Stalin and his subjects lie ceaselessly, every minute and in every situation, and, because they are lying, they have even ceased to be aware that they are lying. They float in an atmosphere permeated by untruth. And when everybody lies, nobody is not lying, because they all keep on lying. The

[1] Yu. Afanasev, "Perestroika i istoricheskoe znanie", in Yu. N. Afanasev, ed., *Inogo ne dano* (Moscow, 1988), p. 498.

USSR is one whole lie, from top to bottom. Each initial of the abbreviation USSR contains at least one lie. Every article of the Constitution contains lies. Lying is the natural element of pseudo-Soviet society. . . The rights of the nationalities, democracy, freedom—everything is lies. The five-year plans, the statistics, the results, the achievements, all are lies. Texts and numbers—lies. Meetings and congresses are pure theatre. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a gigantic deception. The enthusiasm of the masses is nothing but careful stage-management. Left-wingers, right-wingers—everything is lies. The joyful life—nothing but a black comedy. The new man—nothing but the same ape-man of old. Culture is nothing but philistinism. The genius-leader is a stupid tyrant. Socialism is a shameful lie. . ."[2] Openly in the popular press, privately in journals and books destined primarily for export, doubts are now being expressed about the genuineness of the socialism that has been built and brought to maturity. Meanwhile some of Stalin's crimes have been named, the mendacity of the Stakhanovite movement has been recognized, and improvements have been promised in the lie denoted by the four initials USSR.

But until now the "struggle with the past" has been more like the public washing of dirty linen than the study of the history of the last 70 years. One momentous fact, however, deserves attention: in the Soviet Union today the past is being written about by everyone except professional historians. This is understandable, for, as T. Zaslavskaya writes, "The majority of those engaged in the social sciences and ideological education are held back by what they said and published in the past . . . now that the error of their ideas is becoming increasingly apparent, many social scientists are in a state of genuine crisis and are trying to prove the rightness of at least some of the ideas they had argued for earlier."[3] Those historians who do speak out are generally those who, like Yu. Afanasev or L. Batkin, have never worked on Russian or Soviet history. The virgin territory of the Soviet past is being staked out and dug over like the Klondyke goldfields on a first-come first-served basis, by men like the playwright Shatrov, the novelist Rybakov, or the political general Volkogonov.

The numerous Soviet publications about the past are conspicuously reluctant to go beyond the framework of the history of the CPSU. Sensational discoveries, intimate revelations, new facts (new to the Soviet reader, but long since familiar of course to Western historians) relate only to events connected with the Party and its leaders. A desperate search is on for heroic opponents of Stalin from the 1920s through to the 1950s. But the search does not go beyond the confines of "the family", "the top brass".

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[2] Boris Souvarine, "Aveux à Moscou", in Boris Souvarine, *A contre-courant. Écrits 1925–1939* (Paris, 1985), p. 339.

[3] T. Zaslavskaya, "O strategii sotsialnogo upravleniya perestroikoi", in *Inogo ne dano*, p. 29.

The rehabilitation and elevation of Nikolai Bukharin are linked up with the yearning for a leader-hero, which only serves to illustrate how the blanket ban on research into the life and work of the father of the Party, Lenin, can bring about a surprise outcome—namely a glittering come-back by Trotsky.

Characterizing Stalin as the source of all evil, and his becoming leader of the Party and the country as an aberration, forces us unavoidably to turn to Trotsky. Dmitrii Volkogonov recognizes this: "Whatever one thinks of Trotsky, who allowed many mistakes, he was unarguably one of the few who did not defer to Stalin and was aware of the approaching threat of autocracy."[4] Trotsky has turned out to be the focal point of the debates current among Soviet publicists simply because the agenda is restricted to the subject of "Stalinism". This term, which only a few years ago was being flatly rejected by Soviet ideologists, has now been called upon to help keep people away from analysing the origins of the Party and the state, and to replace the proper study of history with unmasking exercises against "the personality cult", or "voluntarism", or "stagnation".

The Trotskyite conception of Stalinism as "historical abnormality", and Leninism as "historical necessity", has become today a routine "truth of history". A great deal of popularity has been won by the Trotskyite thesis of "Thermidor", understood as Stalin's revolutionary departure from the Leninist NEP. Many writers, in their attempts to link the "old" with the "new", insist that "Thermidor" consisted in the implementation by Stalin of Trotskyite ideas, and that trouble arose because Stalin had become a Trotskyite. The first General Secretary is likewise accused of Caesarism (though if that analogy is to be used, it might be more exact to talk of Caesaro-Papism), of counter-revolution, and Bonapartism. Whatever the case may be, discussion of the past is confined to disputes around the dead bodies of the Bolshevik leaders, and does not extend to the programmes and activities of the other Russian parties of the 20th century. It even excludes analysis of the factional platforms within the Bolshevik Party. The leaders of the Workers' Opposition, Shiyapnikov, Kollontai, and Medvedev, have been formally rehabilitated, but their programmes are still unknown. They belong to the forbidden "Lenin era".

The taboos on the history of the civil war and the White movement are easily understandable, since the excursion into the Russian past somewhat resembles the search for an alibi for the present crisis. The backwardness of Russia and the size of the peasant majority are now put forward to explain and justify the wrong turning taken by the Bolshevik Party after Lenin's death. The first sentence of the *Short Course of the History of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, "Tsarist Russia embarked on capitalist

[4] Dmitrii Volkogonov, "Triumf i tragediya. Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina", in *Oktyabr*, No. 11, 1988, p. 77.

development later than other countries", is repeated over and again in the debates about the Soviet past as a definitive explanation for the appearance of Stalin.

Everyone agrees that Stalin took a wrong turning. Opinions differ as to the date: was it 1934, as Khrushchev said; or 1929, as some say now; or perhaps 1925; or was it 1922, as the boldest now think, the year that Stalin was elected General Secretary; or only 1923, when Lenin's *Testament* was suppressed? The debating arena will, however, only admit those who agree that in the beginning everything was right and proper and that Lenin knew the direct route to the Goal. The refusal to publish Solzhenitsyn (an "enemy of socialism" according to Central Committee Secretary, Vadim Medvedev, styling himself as Chief Ideologist) defines the limits for the search for "historical truth". And Dmitrii Volkogonov, author of the first Soviet biography of Stalin (reviewed in this issue of *Survey*), quotes non-Soviet sources extraordinarily rarely and always without attribution, thereby illustrating how he subordinates sources to political considerations. While reluctantly agreeing with Robert Conquest's opinion about the aims of collectivization, he stresses that that judgement originates from an enemy of socialism.[5]

Yet the period of sensational discoveries, of wandering around the map of the past in search of "blank spots" is coming to an end, and the situation is "coming back to normal". A period of "codification" of history is beginning. The postponement of the 1988 summer exams in history was a signal that new textbooks were imminent. In October 1988 the newspapers carried a Central Committee announcement about sessions, chaired by Mikhail Gorbachev, of a commission preparing a "Concise History of the CPSU". The "History" is supposed to describe "the real course of events after the October Revolution",[6] i.e. to serve as a model for all other historical works.

Concrete guidance for Soviet social scientists is also supplied by recent reference works. In the popular reference dictionary *Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina 1941–1945* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1988), of the ten members of the Ministry of Defence, only six have biographical entries, one (G. Malenkov) is merely listed, while two (L. Kaganovich and L. Beria) have vanished completely. In addition, V. Grishin, G. Romanov, and G. Aliev, who were naturally included in the 1985 edition, have now been removed. To take another example: the statistical demographic handbook *Naselenie SSSR 1987* (Finansy i statistika, Moscow, 1988), is significantly richer than its predecessors in containing previously "restricted" information about birth-rates and death-rates. But the table "Number and Composition of the Population" has left a gap between 1926 and 1939. The entry for 1939 gives a population of 170

[5] Ibid., p. 75.
[6] *Pravda*, 13 October 1988.

million for the USSR, not counting the territories incorporated after the partition of Poland with Germany in September 1939, a figure which nowadays is regarded with scepticism by many Soviet demographers.

The various options available for correcting the past can be judged in the series *Kratky politichesky slovar* (Politizdat, Moscow), whose Andropov edition of 1983 was followed by the Gorbachev edition of 1987. The main body of its articles has been preserved. The only ones to have vanished are those few which evidently could not be adapted to the new era, for instance "Counter-propaganda" (Andropov's brainchild), and "The Moral Code of the Builder of Socialism" which nowadays is only good for a laugh. For other articles, a bit of gentle re-touching was enough. For instance, in 1987 the entry for "Anti-Sovietism" has dropped the 1983 sentence "the Anti-Soviets unleashed an unprecedented propaganda campaign to discredit the concrete achievements of socialism". The 1987 entry for "Trotskyism" has dropped the paragraph listing Trotsky's mistakes and crimes from 1912 to 1928 when "Trotskyism in the USSR ceased to exist as a political force". At the same time, the 1987 edition has retained, in the entry for "Lenin's Co-operative Plan", the assertion that "Collectivization of agriculture in the USSR was the embodiment of Lenin's co-operative plan, and a necessary stage in socialist construction". One may speculate whether this sentence will still be there in the next edition.

Worries about the past are a faithful reflection of worries about *perestroika* and they illustrate the insuperable difficulties of squaring the circle: changes without radical change, initiative from the masses without loss of total control, "socialist pluralism" in the context of one-party rule, and a cult of personality in the context of "democratization". Soviet historians reasonably enough require access to archives which, as before, are locked and bolted against them. No historian would question the importance of primary sources and documents, but the present debate in the USSR about the past has revealed the amazing fact that independent Western historians have managed to "tell it as it really was" (as Ranke defined history), even without access to closed archives. Without their work, even debate in the Soviet Union about the past would have been out of the question and, whether or not they name their sources, Soviet participants rely principally on work done in the West by "enemies of socialism". If the subject is collectivization or the Great Terror, Robert Conquest's books are indispensable. Boris Souvarine was quoted in the celebrated conflict between Nina Andreyeva and *Pravda*. Otto Latsis, when he wished to prove that the Mensheviks (Vyshinsky, as well as Zaslavsky, Maisky, and others) served Stalin with particular zeal, referred to *Survey*'s publication, in 1971, of a chapter from Iosif Berger's memoirs.[7]

[7] Otto Latsis, "Perelom", in *Znamya*, No. 6, 1988, p. 171.

Fifty years ago Boris Souvarine ended his article about the "confession in Moscow" with a prophecy: "For Russia, a new era will dawn only when the lies of the trials are followed by the great trial of the great lie."[8]

There is still some way to go.

[8] Boris Souvarine, op.cit., p. 344.

Historians and History in Emigration

Marc Raeff

A FEW GENERAL REMARKS on the relationship between émigré historians and the study of Russian history in the West after World War II may be in order. The Great Emigration had only the most tenuous contacts and associations with the societies and academic establishments of the European countries of asylum. They were of interest to their hosts only when and to the extent that there was concern about Soviet power in international affairs.[1] In the early 1920s, when there was still some belief in the émigrés' return to another Russia or the possibility of beneficial relations with a non-dogmatic Communist régime, the émigrés were seen as a potential source of expert information on their country. Thus one of the several motives that brought about the "Czech Action" was the belief that in granting asylum and academic facilities to émigré students, the Czechoslovak government was helping to prepare the future cadres of Russia. As this expectation and belief faded, support for the émigré institutions faded as well. In Germany, too, with the onset of active economic and military contacts with the Soviet Union after Rapallo (and later when Hitler started preparing for conflict with Bolshevik Russia) there was an inclination to use émigré expertise, though naturally historians ranked low in priority in this respect.[2] The fact that there was much less interest or need for émigré expertise in France or elsewhere helps to account for the isolation experienced by scholars of the Great Emigration there.[3] This was true also of the United States before 1941, as the inferior academic status enjoyed by Vernadsky at Yale and Karpovich at Harvard shows. The situation changed radically during World War II when knowledge about the Soviet Union was necessary for the Allied governments and after 1945 when a clear public interest in that country became manifest. Of course, the ease with which foreigners were integrated into the academic establishments in the United States stood in stark contrast to the aloofness, nay

[1] The interest that Communists and fellow travellers had for the Soviet "experiment" never involved the émigré community; on the contrary, it only contributed to the latter's sense of isolation from the host environment.

[2] For the sake of completeness, one should mention that the Germans had another pool of Russian expertise at their disposal: the Baltic Germans who had fled the USSR and the new Baltic states, and the so-called "German Russians" whose families had settled in Russia in the 18th or 19th centuries but maintained a German cultural and political loyalty.

[3] This did not exclude occasional personal ties, for example, through the agency of a Russian-born wife as illustrated by Ferdinand Lot's receiving M. Lot-Borodine's émigré acquaintances, but only after a period of reserved distance.

hostility, of European countries before 1939. In a sense, the precedent of the integration of German scholars who had fled Hitler helped pave the way for those Russian émigrés who came to the United States just before or during the war in greater numbers. The latter did find associations with American government and university institutions and helped to train the next generation of historians of Russia in the West.

The years before the outbreak of the First World War had seen an extraordinary intellectual ferment and spurt of creative energy in Russia. It is, of course, not possible to put all of this fermentation under the heading of "Silver Age" (which in truth applies only to art, music and literature, and more specifically to poetry)—there was a new departure in all fields, and history was no exception. The inadequacies of 19th century traditional positivism were felt more and more acutely; Klyuchevsky himself, while holding on to its methodological assumptions, was in fact breaking out of their strait-jacket in his *Course* by the way in which he let his literary gifts shape the material. In many ways Klyuchevsky's *Course* became the historian's counterpart to impressionistic painting and symbolist poetry. In this way, too, Klyuchevsky publicly called attention to the role psychological factors and political and cultural symbols played in shaping the nation's history.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the work of the younger historians, whatever their political or philosophical preferences, was revisionist, critical of many traditional interpretations and methods. This was particularly noticeable in the domain of medieval history, but other periods did not remain untouched either. For example, A. Presniakov and S. Veselovsky were revolutionizing the traditional perspective on the formation of the Muscovite centralized state, while Marxist historians were questioning the current interpretations of the social and economic aspects of modern Russia. Moreover, archaeology on the one hand, and fascination with the non-Russian world on the other, were gradually having their impact on historical scholarship. The philosopher-poet V. Soloviev and the poet A. Blok (later imitated by A. Bely in his novels) had taken up and popularized the notion of a "yellow peril" and an apocalyptic end to the modern world coming from Asia. This had sparked off renewed interest in Russia's Central Asiatic and Caucasian possessions and the period of Mongol domination. These were the harbingers of themes that would be taken up and developed further in the historiosophy of the Eurasians. But we should add—and emphasize—that on the eve of the revolution the "revisionism" in historical scholarship had neither reached the broader public nor affected the outlook of the mature professional historians. This explains why the scholars in exile did not pursue the innovative lines taken by Presniakov and Veselovsky, or Pavlov-Silvansky for that matter, though, admittedly, lack of access to the necessary archival documentation stymied all efforts in that direction.

The Religious Renaissance

YET ANOTHER ASPECT of the Silver Age's cultural scene needs to be mentioned, although its main influence on the émigrés will be touched upon elsewhere. The Silver Age was also a period of great spiritual-religious renaissance among the educated classes of Russian society. The laity was becoming increasingly concerned about the moral-spiritual and metaphysical dimensions of religious life, while the clergy (at least some influential members) had recognized the official Church's need to be more involved in the social-economic circumstances of the people's life and to establish closer ties with the intelligentsia. The discussions in the religious-philosophical societies of St Petersburg, Moscow, and elsewhere and the social activism of individual clergymen, such as Ioann of Kronstad (not to speak of Gapon) have to stand for the many instances that cannot be listed here. Religious interest and spiritual revival also affected scholarship—and not only in theology—in that they created a broader audience interested in books and studies dealing with the Church and its past and present socio-cultural role. This development was brusquely halted in Russia when the Bolsheviks seized power and pursued an aggressive anti-religious policy. Little wonder that all those who had religious and ecclesiastical commitments endeavoured to emigrate after the defeat of the White Armies. Furthermore, in 1922 the Soviet government expelled a number of personalities who had been actively involved in the philosophic-religious renaissance of the pre-war years, chief among them Berdiaev, Frank, Novgorodtsev, Karsavin and other *dii minores*.[4]

The tragic experiences of war, revolution, and civil war, however, as well as the disorientation accompanying the first stages of exile, led many émigrés to return and recommit themselves to traditional religious life. As well as the personal tragedies that accompanied their path to emigration, there was also the feeling that, in the midst of anarchy and the disintegration of all values and rules, only religion—more specifically, Russian Orthodox Christianity—offered an anchor and this consolation led the exiles back to the Church. Only faith, they came to believe, endowed the existential horror and vacuity that had overwhelmed the Russian people with some transcendental meaning. In exile, too, faith, church and religious practice facilitated the preservation of group solidarity and cohesion by providing material, spiritual, and cultural-educational assistance. The émigrés flocked to and sought refuge in their churches, even though the clergy were not

[4] See M. Heller, "Premier avertissement: Un coup de fouet (l'histoire de l'expulsion des personnalités culturelles hors de l'Union soviétique en 1922)", *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, XX-2, avril–juin 1978, 131–72.

always up to the challenges of their new circumstances and tasks. Committed laymen had to help by example and creative efforts wherever possible.

Two Historians: Florovsky

THE RENEWED and heightened concern for religion and the life of the Church brought about not only a new interest in Church history but also a reassessment of the religious dimensions in Russian history, more specifically in its intellectual and cultural life. The historians, and their work, brought about this reorientation of historical scholarship in emigration, for Soviet Russia could no longer provide either facilities or support for such a concern. It is true, neither of the two magisterial books in the field that came out had a direct impact on the Great Emigration, or on "Russia Abroad", before its end in 1939. One was published on the eve of the war and most of the copies were destroyed in a bomb attack. The other, though matured throughout the 1930s, was published only after 1945 and in a foreign language. Strictly speaking, therefore, neither is part of the cultural history of the Great Emigration; but it is also true that neither can be omitted from this account, for both are the product of the existential and intellectual experience of emigration. It also should be noted that both authors, G. Florovsky and G. Fedotov, came to Russian history from the outside, so to speak. They also belonged to the "younger generation" of émigré scholars who received the final touches to their professional formation after the Revolution.

George Florovsky, the younger of the two, was born in 1893 and left Russia after only his first years of university training. Upon the solid base he had acquired in Russia he continued to develop on his own. Early in his intellectual development he decided to devote himself to the study of the patristic heritage of the Russian Church in order to understand better the latter's cultural-intellectual, as well as ecclesiological and theological, tradition. His interest in patristics led to an invitation to join the faculty of the St. Sergius Theological Institute in Paris in 1926. He remained on the faculty of the Institute until the outbreak of the war when he found himself stranded in Belgrade. After much difficulty, by way of Prague, Florovsky managed to return to the Paris Institute after the war's end. In 1948 he was appointed dean of the St. Vladimir Theological Seminary in New York and in 1955, largely as a result of policy disagreements with both his superiors and his colleagues, Florovsky accepted an appointment to the faculty of the Divinity School at Harvard; upon his retirement from there he moved to Princeton University where he taught courses in Russian intellectual history until his death in 1980. In the United States he was also very active in the ecumenical movement, as well as a prolific writer in English on theological issues.

After a brief flirtation with Eurasianism, Florovsky concentrated on both patristics and the intellectual history of Russia. It is the latter that will concern us here.[5] To understand Florovsky's contribution in this field it is necessary to recall the ways in which Russian thought had been studied before 1917 and by liberal historians. Traditionally, Russian intellectual history meant the history of *obshchestvennoi mysli*, that is, of all those social and political ideas that were critical of the existing Muscovite and imperial order and establishments. Disregarding the rare antecedents in Muscovite times, it meant the study of those ideas, based on Western intellectual and ideological trends, which, on the basis of a critique of the ways and conditions of imperial Russian society and government, advocated reforms and transformation. In the final analysis, such a history merged with the history of revolutionary movements and ideas and their effect on Russian public life up to the revolution. In the period immediately preceding 1914 this kind of history was based on materialist, positivist philosophical assumptions; and it was teleological in its main thrust, for it aimed to show that ideas and movements had served to develop those revolutionary or radical ideologies that would prepare the ground for the upheaval which in turn would renovate Russian social, economic and political life. A trenchant critique of this radical-progressive tradition had been made by the contributors to the collection *Signposts* (*Vekhi*) in 1909 and had generated lively and acrimonious debate. The debate was naturally resumed under the impact of the revolutionary events of 1917–18, but the collection *De profundis* that contained the main statements remained unknown to the public at large.[6] The main criticism of the traditional historiography on this subject was directed at its materialistic and teleological (deterministic) bias, but also at its ignoring the metaphysical and spiritual seekings of Russian intellectuals throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.

This was the challenge that Florovsky took up. He had had a predecessor, M. Gershenzon, a contributor to *Vekhi*, who had written sympathetically on the Slavophiles and the generation of 1810–20, paying particular attention to their spiritual yearnings and seekings. But Gershenzon had steered clear of specifically religious issues and he had not been interested in uncovering the patristic and Russian spiritualist sources of inspiration for his heroes. Nor had he been fully aware of the potential implications of their philosophical assumptions. In addition to Gershenzon, Florovsky drew inspiration and his philosophic "tool kit" from the writings of Soloviev,

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[5] For a biography and bibliography of G. Florovsky, cf A. Blane, ed., *Russia and Orthodoxy*, Vol. I, forthcoming.

[6] Now available in English: M. S. Shatz & J. E. Zimmerman, transl. & eds., *Signposts: A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia*, (Irvine, CA, 1986); and W. F. Woehrlin, transl. & ed., *Out of the Depths (De profundis): A Collection of Articles on the Russian Revolution*, (Irvine, CA, 1986).

C. Renouvier, H. Bergson and the American pragmatists Pierce and William James. Combined with his own historical experience of revolution and civil war, this extensive and solid philosophical background enabled Florovsky to reinterpret the traditional (and Gershenzon's) view of Russian intellectual history. In several essays dealing with F. Tiutchev, V. Soloviev, N. Fedorov, and L. Tolstoy, Florovsky laid bare the metaphysical assumptions contained in their ideas. He concluded that their major "mistake" consisted in accepting an evolutionary framework and, more important still, in following the lure of utopia as the end product of the historical process.

Florovsky illustrated the consequences of these two guiding presuppositions in an essay on the "metaphysical presuppositions of utopianism". In addition, in an article on Herzen he showed how the lures of *Naturphilosophie*, utopianism, and spiritual-religious seekings outside the Christian framework, affected Herzen and made for his basically negative and historically tragic *Weltanschauung*. Florovsky presented his study on the nature of Herzen's religious seekings as a dissertation to the Russian University in Prague. It was accepted, but not without stirring up a lively and not always friendly discussion at its public defence in which such luminaries as Miliukov took part. Florovsky's thesis did not have the impact it deserved, for it was not published—except for a brief summarizing article—by the émigré periodical press that was dominated by traditionalist positivist and "liberationist" viewpoints.

Florovsky's major innovative contribution to Russian historiography came in the *Puti russkogo bogosloviya* ("The Ways of Russian Theology"). It appeared late in 1937, but, printed in Belgrade from where it was distributed, it received practically no notice—except for a polemically critical review by Berdiaev in the religious journal *Put* which he (Berdiaev) edited in Paris. The *Puti* had to wait the revitalization of interest in Russian history in the United States after World War II to become the classic in the field—and it was only in 1982 that a second edition in Russian appeared (the destruction of the publisher's stock in the bombing of Belgrade had made it a bibliographic rarity); an English translation, after many false starts, is only at present in process of publication.

The *Puti* marks a radical departure from the traditional way of writing Russian intellectual history. In the first place, Florovsky firmly believes that ideas are the product of an individual, of a creative and living personality. To understand this personality's ideas one has to know as fully as possible everything that has contributed to the formation of specific concepts and presuppositions, and their formulation. The living, seeking personality is embedded in his world, for man "does not build, does not give birth to and does not posit his world—he finds it"; he is thus engaged in a creative process of finding and discovering the world as well as reacting to it. Such a process is an act of "ascetic creation" (*podvizhennicheskoe delanie*)

and only in studying and understanding this process in every individual instance, within the specific context of the thinker's time and place, can one truly understand the ideas that result from this act of "ascetic creation"; it is then that one can also assess the ideas' dynamic impact and consequences. To this kind of investigation Florovsky brings a thorough knowledge and profound empathetic understanding of the metaphysical and theological presuppositions that underlay all of Russian (nay, Christian European) intellectual creativity and speculation. By bringing together both the specific historical factors and the underlying religious (in the broadest sense) presuppositions, Florovsky sheds new light on the intellectual history of Russia, on its process that consisted in a series of "enticements" and "rifts". In so doing he not only explains—in a way that had not been done previously—the immanent elements of the vicissitudes of Russia's recent cultural history, but he also suggests the alternatives that existed in the past which had not been taken, and which might contain lessons for the future if past intellectual errors ("enticements") and failings ("rifts") are well understood.

The seminal nature of Florovsky's book—it has stimulated renewed interest in many areas of Russian history and significantly affected the approach to them (Church, clergy, theology, Slavophilism, 18th century Europeanization, Silver Age)—requires that we attempt to characterize its main features. Its chronological limits are specific and circumscribed: the Kiev and appanaged periods are omitted and it starts with the neo-Byzantine influences at the end of the 15th century, during the religious and spiritual crisis that coincided with the triumph of Moscow over all its competitors. At the other end, Florovsky breaks off brusquely in 1917, even though some of the trends and figures he has been discussing continued their creative work and had a significant impact in emigration. Thematically, too, the book is also selective: it deals less with the history of theological ideas *sensu stricto*, which, admittedly, played practically no role in Russia, than with the history of modern Russian thought. Even here Florovsky picks and chooses, for he eschews discussing all strictly social, economic, and political ideas, unless they directly reflect some basic philosophic conception and religious or spiritual inclination.

Finally, the book discusses the particular features and role of the systems of education—clerical and lay—that not only produced the leading intellectual personalities, but also explain the specific philosophic predilections and basic mental sets which were imparted to these thinkers. On this basis Florovsky argues that every thinker and every generation had a set of basic psychic traits and shared philosophic assumptions which gave coherence and significance to their *Weltanschauung*. It also enables him to point out the inner chinks, that is those elements that introduce disharmony and account for the ultimate failure ("rifts") of the world view adopted.

Florovsky draws the intellectual group portrait of each significant generation—for example, the educated élites of the 18th century in their efforts to create a new Russian cultural synthesis with Western secular and religious ideas, the spiritual seekings of the reign of Alexander I, the nihilistic positivism of the 1860s with its particular lure of materialist utopia, and the apocalyptic mood of the first years of the 20th century.

It is important to stress that Florovsky is interested only in the "high culture" of Russian religious life and thought. Only very occasionally does he refer to the people's religious attitudes or beliefs. As we shall see, this particular gap was to be filled, in part at least, by the other innovative émigré historian, Fedotov. Emphasizing the history of Russian philosophic and religious ideas, Florovsky had to make a large part subject to foreign, exclusively Western, influences: Graeco-Byzantinism in its origins; Latinism that made itself felt in the 16th and reached a high point—in neo-scholastic Protestant garb—in the 17th and thereby affected the entire 18th century; Protestant inner religiosity and Leibnizian metaphysics in the early 18th century that made for the reception of Idealism and Romanticism with their lure of *Naturphilosophie* and utopianism. The latter receive a materialist garb and interpretation under the impact of Western positivism and scientism on the generation of the 1860s; and finally Neo-Kantian philosophy and symbolist aesthetics go a long way in accounting for the ideas of the Silver Age, although they mark a return to native traditions in culture and spirituality. But let us quote at length Florovsky's understanding of "influences", for it was a radical turning away from the notion of a mechanical transfer of ideas that had been the explanatory scheme in Russian positivist intellectual history, and because it affected directly subsequent work on the history of ideas in Russia by Western scholars:

> Similarity [writes Florovsky] should not be taken for influence, of course . . . Generally speaking, the question of the genesis of a system or a world view cannot be substituted by the question of influence. Not every influence means dependence, and dependence does not mean direct borrowing—an influence can be a push and a stimulus (*pobuzhdenie*), an influence may also stem from the contrary. In any case one should not cover up the initiative of the thinker by reference to influence. The question of influence can be raised correctly and solved reliably only in the case when the genetic process can be reconstructed in its entirety and followed through the sequence of all its stages. At the same time, of course, it is most important to identify (*razpoznat*) and seize upon the basic intuition, to find the starting point of the development—otherwise it will be difficult to speak of influences . . . (p. 274)

As we see, Florovsky is not interested in merely listing the foreign elements

but in accounting for the way in which the Russians picked out and then transformed in a new environment specific elements from the body of ideas available to them. This kind of approach to intellectual history was universally adopted after the war; it also bears a strong resemblance to the contextualist method presently dominant in the field of the history of political ideas. Florovsky was particularly effective and suggestive in using this approach to account for the "enticements" of Romanticism and *Naturphilosophie* which he traced to an unquenched thirst for spiritual fulfilment; an enticement that the immanent logic of Romanticism led to the "rifts" embedded in utopianism, in either its idealist or materialist philosophic assumptions.

In order to explain as fully as possible the particular circumstances that made Russian intellectuals select and reinterpret their ideas—both foreign and native—Florovsky gave a masterful description and analysis of the clergy as a social group. For indeed it was the clergy that was the main provider, first of ideas and then of the personnel, of Russian philosophic, religious, and scientific thought. Its particular upbringing and education, its special social status and economic circumstances—all the results of Peter's reforms—go a long way to explain its special role in Russian life and thought from the 18th to the 20th centuries. In tracing the social and educational history of the Russian clergy Florovsky did not make any new discoveries, but he did make the fruits of earlier scholarship available to a wider audience which had been totally ignorant of the clergy's history and role in shaping modern Russian culture. His was not a social history in the contemporary, quantitatively oriented, sense—this was to be the accomplishment of Gregory L. Freeze who was much inspired by Florovsky, precisely in his need to revise the "master". In any event, Florovsky's attempt to trace a picture of the realistic existential circumstances of the clergy introduced a new social dimension in the history of Russian thought.

The preceding pages should make clear that Florovsky's *Puti* marked a new departure in the history of Russia's culture and intellectual evolution. One may say that, consciously or not, approvingly or critically, all subsequent work in Russian intellectual history had to take the *Puti* as point of departure; it explains the importance and originality of Western contributions to the field in contrast to the hidebound methodological conservatism of Soviet writings to this day. Florovsky's impact was no doubt in no small measure due to the fact that, after 1945, he was able to exert a personal influence as well under circumstances that were no longer those of the Great Emigration. Yet it should be stressed that much of his influence lay also in his roots in the transformation of the Russian cultural and intellectual scene wrought by the Silver Age and on which he built while living in the "Russia Abroad" of the 1920s and 1930s. The émigré condition enabled him to develop his talents to the fullest and to absorb

Western methodological trends, while also pursuing another intellectual concern, namely patristics and philosophy, both of which contributed to the originality of *Puti*.

Fedotov

GEORGE FEDOTOV'S contribution also lay in the realm of Russia's religious life, but not so much in its intellectual as in its existential cultural aspects. Born in 1886 his studies were first interrupted by prison and exile for belonging to a socialist student group. Upon his return from abroad, Fedotov received serious historical training in the seminars of N. Kareyev at St. Petersburg University. His speciality was the French Middle Ages, more specifically he was interested in the hagiographic sources of the Merovingian and Carolingian periods. These sources attracted him because through them he hoped to penetrate to the realities of religious norms and experiences in order to gain a better understanding of the life and spirit of these ages. Actively involved in political agitation and ecclesiastic concerns in the early years of the Bolshevik régime, he was forced to emigrate in 1925. He settled in Paris where he remained until the German occupation and was active as journalist and teacher at the St. Sergius Theological Institute (he taught hagiographic literature); he was also deeply involved in Church and social organizations which aimed at easing the lot of the poor and at elaborating the principles and programme of a Christian socialism. His idiosyncratic and often unpopular opinions on ecumenism and current events (for example, his preferring Dolores Ibarruri, La Pasionaria, over Franco) got him into difficulties with ecclesiastic authorities and the émigré community. In 1941 he escaped to the United States and was appointed to the St. Vladimir Theological Seminary where he taught, without giving up active journalism and scholarship, until his early death in 1951.

Fedotov's publicistic writings belong elsewhere; here I shall deal only with his contributions to Russian historiography. In the 1920s and 1930s, following upon several articles on French medieval history that appeared in Russia and abroad, Fedotov published a number of studies on Russian religious history that marked a new approach to the field.[7] They served to prepare for a broadly conceived study of Russian religiosity to which he had given thought and for which he had gathered material in both France and England before 1939; but he managed to push it forward only in his last years in the United States. The first volume of his *The Russian Religious Mind* (which had been preceded by a valuable anthology of Russian

[7] For a bibliography of Fedotov's (unfortunately not quite complete) work, *Bibliografiia trudov G. P. Fedotova 1886–1951* (private printing). A biographical sketch appears in a collection of his essays, *Litso Rossii*, (YMCA Press, Paris, 1967), pp. i–xxxiv.

spirituality) appeared in 1946, but the second volume was left unfinished at the time of his death. It was published many years later, in 1966, as a set of fragments and notes edited by J. Meyendorff. While *The Russian Religious Mind* is not only Fedotov's major but also his most original contribution to Russian historiography, a few words need to be said on his earlier work, for it gives the key to the innovations found in that magisterial book.

Inspired by new trends in French and German historiography on the Middle Ages which resorted to sources other than chronicles and charters, as well as in response to his own deep religious commitment, Fedotov turned to studying religious life, its concepts and its practices in the early centuries of Christianity in Roman Gaul and the Frankish kingdoms that succeeded it. What interested him most particularly was the interplay between pre-Christian notions and values (whether religious pagan or institutional "barbarian") on the one hand, and the Church as an institution and the secular authorities of Merovingian and Carolingian kings on the other. This entailed reading well-known texts and documents, in particular lives of saints, with a fresh eye, paying attention to what was left unsaid as well as understanding the actual words in their true historical "context". While still in Russia and in the first years of his exile in Paris, Fedotov published several articles dealing with this set of questions, using the careers of St. Martin of Tours and the first Merovingian kings and bishops as his illustrative material.

His findings put the relationship between Church and kingship in a novel light, as he pointed out that it was not simply a case of the Merovingian rulers subjecting the Church to their whims. It was rather that the ideals and practices of the Church and of its main representatives—which also appealed to the faithful—created a distance and served to isolate the clergy from the rulers' misdeeds in order to proclaim and preserve the true Christian values. For example, Fedotov noted that many of the miracles reported in Merovingian (and early Carolingian) hagiography dealt with the "liberation" of prisoners, slaves, etc. At the demand, or upon the direct intervention of a saintly person, prison doors or walls would be shattered or bodily fetters fall off. And if the ruler did not take the hint immediately, the saint forced him to do so by producing other miraculous occurrences. The conclusion, argued Fedotov, was obvious and of particular relevance in a period of revolution, civil war, and the early years of the Soviet régime: namely, the true Christian ideal of personal freedom does not recognize the superior claims and power of the secular establishment.

In the first decade of his émigré life in Paris, Fedotov applied the same method and insights to his studies of Russian sainthood. Again his source was the lives of saints, the hagiographic literature. No doubt inspired by the work of Abbé Brémond (not cited at the time, but referred to in *The Russian Religious Mind*) he analysed the hagiographic literature in order to

understand better the nature of Russian religious values and, by extension, the ideals of Russian social life they expressed. In his book *Sviatye drevnei Rusi* ("Saints of Old Russia") Fedotov follows this literature from the 11th into the 18th centuries and on its basis establishes a typology of Russian saintliness—beginning with Saints Boris and Gleb. He is struck by the fact that the earliest—and some of the most respected—saints do not display any strictly speaking religious qualities: they are neither witnesses to the faith, nor miracle workers, nor martyrs for the sake of Christianity. They are meek victims of the cruel and brutal acts of the secular, political, authorities. They do not resist these cruel deeds and must perish; it is on account of their meek obedience and passivity in the face of evil that they are canonized and worshipped, and perform miracles after death. Some other saints—the lay princes—are extolled for having gone to battle against non-believers for the sake of the Russian (*Rus*) land. Finally, most of the other subjects of hagiographic works have been elevated to sainthood or blessedness mainly because they lived a righteous life and helped their poor and weak fellow men. With rare exceptions, Russian hagiography does not extol martyrs, teachers, or example-setting ascetics.

This ideal of the true religious *life*—with physical submission to evil but without moral recognition—was displayed by Metropolitan Philipp of Moscow when he publicly condemned Ivan IV's persecutions but did nothing to resist them or to call for the tsar's overthrow. For this attitude and behaviour, Ivan IV deprived him of his see and starved him to death—this martyrdom earned the Metropolitan canonization soon thereafter. Fedotov published a biographical sketch of St. Philipp of Moscow in 1938; it is a fine example of his understanding of Russian saintly values, but it is obviously also a commentary on the contemporary scene that forced so many to suffer passively and in silence for their refusal to countenance the tyranny of dictators.

In *The Russian Religious Mind*—especially the first volume, since the second is but a fragment—Fedotov carries this approach and interpretation a step further, intending to give a full account and analysis of what was most characteristic of all aspects of Russian life. In the completed volume, the story is carried only to the 16th century—the anthology mentioned earlier may be seen as a complementary source book that brings illustrations from the imperial period as well. *The Russian Religious Mind* is a valuable, though unintended, complement and foil to Florovsky's *Puti*. In the populist tradition that was his at the time of his involvement in the revolutionary movement before 1917, Fedotov focuses on the "people" and their religious norms and practices before and after conversion to Christianity. Approaching the chronicles and hagiographic sources in the imaginative way he had used for his work on Merovingian France and for establishing the typology of Russian saints, Fedotov enlarges his conceptual framework by turning

to anthropological and ethnographic findings, both Russian and western European. He is thus brought to speak of the history of the religious mind of the Russian people or, in our more contemporary vocabulary, their religious beliefs, attitudes, and practices and the changes they underwent over periods of time—in short, what Clifford Geertz defines as the "thick study" of religious culture. Unbeknown not only to himself, but to contemporary anthropologists as well, Fedotov was a precursor of the anthropology of religion in a historical context. Although I have found no evidence for it either in his published work or in his papers, he may have been familiar with the work being done at the Musée de l'homme in Paris (where Claude Lévy-Strauss was making his début), since quite a few Russian émigrés of the younger generation (e.g. Felzen, Shreider) were active there in the late 1930s.

The Russian Religious Mind is well known and readily available and need not be summarized; it should suffice to point out two of its assertions: first, the survival of pagan practices and superstitions continued to colour Russian Christian Orthodox life long after conversion. The religion of the Russian peasant was heavily laden with pagan elements, especially those relating to the mineral, animal, and vegetable environments. This is neither surprising nor a startling new discovery. But Fedotov points out how, over the centuries, these pagan elements were adjusted to Christian beliefs and practices, so that far from being in opposition to each other, there was convergence and eventual blending. Whether the pagan or Orthodox Christian element predominated depended on the period, the region and, especially, on the area of life and the issues involved.

The second point made by Fedotov was a logical extension of his observations on the lives of Sts. Boris and Gleb, as prototype and on the character of saintliness in early *Rus*: it was that Russian piety aims at imitating Christ's self-abasement in order to serve fellow man and help him towards Salvation. Self-abasement, a willingness to take on the humblest form and shoulder the meanest tasks to serve the other, not to mortify oneself—this is the essential value, which Fedotov calls the kenotic aspect of the Russian's religiosity. This "other directedness" of the religious aspiration, its social dimension so to speak, is—according to Fedotov—Russian Orthodoxy's greatest contribution to the storefund of European ethical and spiritual progress. Naturally such an interpretation was closely related to Fedotov's own Christian socialist values, hopes, and expectations.

So far as I am aware, Fedotov does not seem to have had an impact on the study of Russian religiosity and culture. But his is an approach that should be particularly fruitful for the history of the Old Belief and its adherents, a necessity on the agenda of all those interested in Russian (or more generally European) religious history—it fits in well with the

methodology and findings of such recent works as E. Leroy-Ladurie's *Montaillou* and Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms*.

The Émigré Attitude to History

WE ARE NOW in a better position to offer some general observations on the issues raised at the beginning of this article: What was the Emigration's attitude to Russia's past and how did the scholarly émigré community respond to it? As a group, the Emigration had an ambivalent relationship to its country's past. The burden of experiencing so-called dramatic historical events had totally "soured" it on history. The émigrés implicitly rejected and showed little enthusiasm for Russia's history as it had been studied and presented in pre-revolutionary historiography. To the extent that the émigré scholars carried over the methods, assumptions and major interpretations that had held sway in earlier, happier times, they elicited little interest and received little support from the émigré communities.

The difficulties of carrying on original work and the limited possibilities for publication did not stimulate émigré historians to strike out along new paths. This goes far to explain the great success among the émigré public of the historical novel: a genre that combined nostalgic descriptions of past circumstances, absorbing plots, enviable characters, and scepticism as to man's ability to foresee and understand, let alone control, events. It accounts for the popularity of Mark Aldanov—a past-master of the genre. Characteristic of the changed circumstances, Aldanov's novels, in spite of their stylistic and technical brilliance, have not stood the test of time, though one can never know whether a revival of his popularity may not occur among the third wave Emigration (or in an "open" Soviet Russia).

A major factor of the ineffectualness, as well as sterility, of émigré historians was their inability to find an interested echo in the host countries. In the 1920s and 1930s, whatever curiosity there was for Russia, it was for the "Soviet experiment"; it did not extend to a desire to know better or to understand the past experiences of the country where the experiment was taking place. Those who were enthusiastic about it shared the anti-historical mood of the early Bolshevik years—and they were to be disappointed and shocked when Stalin reintroduced a concern and respect for the Russian past. Those foreigners who were anti-Bolshevik had little use for the country; they were resentful of Russia's having left the World War, reneging on its foreign debt and supporting all kinds of modernistic and nihilist trends in politics, the arts and literature. They could feel at one with those liberal émigré historians who wrote of Russia's backwardness in relation to Western Europe and leave it at that.

To be sure there were in the West a few academic circles or institutions

(the latter mainly in Germany) that were concerned with Russia. But they were unreceptive to new approaches and showed no interest in new interpretations. Theirs were all too frequently narrow utilitarian concerns—of a political, military or economic kind—which stood to benefit from factual information about contemporary Russia. They did not feel the need to understand the country's past.

For their part, the émigrés endeavoured to pinpoint and enlarge their knowledge and understanding of those aspects of Russia's past which would be soothing to them in their difficult circumstances and offer some prospect as building blocks for the future. This double purpose was served on the one hand by an almost worshipful and reverential interest in the cultural accomplishments of modern Russian literature as symbolized by Pushkin, and, on the other hand, by a renewed commitment to their religious past. As we have seen, the latter resulted in the most notable and innovative contributions of émigré scholarship, for it was an area that could not be studied in the Soviet Union. The seminal works of Florovsky and Fedotov, illuminating Russia's religious traditions, proved to be of lasting value not only for Western, but also for Russian (including Soviet Russian), interpretations.

Perestroika in History: The First Stage

Aleksandr M. Nekrich*

As long as anger and argument rage, and wonder lives, then history lives.
S. S. Averintsev

When talking of history, we do not wish to exalt or debase individuals, we seek to give the people their due, for they are the deciding force in history.
M.S. Gorbachev

AT THE BEGINNING of January 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the first stage of *perestroika* was in principle complete. Among its positive results, he said, was a better knowledge now of history, which "is exceptionally important".[1]

Soviet citizens have only a fragmentary knowledge of the true history of Russia, as a rule, but they feel its consequence in their bones. Their attitude is a mixture of confusion, shame, pride and rampant ignorance. Dissatisfaction with the works of professional historians has made people turn to histories written nearly a hundred years ago, those of Soloviev or Klychevsky, or indeed nearly two hundred years ago, such as Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*. Reprints of the 19th century historians have been produced in amazing quantities, which indicates that the Soviet reader has a sustained interest in Russian history and wants to find his own place in it.

But throughout the Soviet period, the upper echolons of the Party bureaucracy have wanted nothing more than to direct discussion of the Soviet past into pre-set channels.

Establishment of the one-party Bolshevik system entailed the emergence of a correspondingly new type of historiography, in the shape of M. N. Pokrovsky's "school", which was at first supported by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. All the other historical schools were more or less prohibited.

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[1] "Speech to media, ideological establishments and creative unions", 8 January 1988, in *Pravda*, 12 January 1988.

Those historians who did not shame the Marxist view were removed from teaching, or accused of anti-state activity. As a result they were forced to emigrate, or were exiled, or arrested, or shot, and their works went out of circulation. The advent of Stalinism destroyed "Pokrovsky's school" as well, and this took place through the efforts of its own pupils, not for the first time in history. Later many Soviet social scientists of the new generation were liquidated as well.

The need under Stalinism for a new, politically useful, interpretation of history led in 1934–6 to a series of Party decisions about the teaching of history, and inspired the "comments" by Stalin, Kirov and Zhdanov on a new textbook history of the USSR. The result was the *Short Course in the History of the Communist Party*, 1938, which formed the new basis of Soviet historical science. It set out the basic professional duties of Soviet historians. Their research had to reinforce or confirm the *Short Course*, whose fundamental thesis was that the Party is always right.

Although there was some opposition from individuals, submission to the Party's instructions became routine for Soviet historical writing ranging from archaeology to modern history. But as the Party leaders changed, each one tried to make his own changes in the interpretation of Soviet history.

General Secretary Gorbachev and History

WHAT IS THE General Secretary's view of Soviet history? The answer is not unambiguous, since Gorbachev's views, like those of any leader, affect concrete policy. In his book, which is aimed mainly at the Western reader, Gorbachev stresses that "the Soviet Union is a young state without analogues in history or in the modern world".[2]

It would be hard to object to that. It is true that world history has never known a state like the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's point of view may be of interest to those people who think that the Soviet state is just a direct continuation of tsarist Russia.

However, his further thoughts on Soviet history arouse doubts and objections. Leaving aside his digressions on matters including Soviet-Nazi relations, 1939–41, and the Second World War, the main stumbling-block is his assertion that progress in the USSR was made possible only by the revolution, and that such progress is a result of socialism and the historical choice allegedly made by the people.[3] Here he is repeating almost word for word certain Soviet historians. P. V. Volobuyev, for example, has in his

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[2] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, p. 18.
[3] Ibid.

recent book the totally unprovable proposition that the Bolshevik revolution saved Russia from disaster. Later Volobuyev mentions not only the "historical choice"[4] allegedly made by the people in October 1917, but also claims that "the people remained loyal to their fundamental historical choice".[5] This idea of both Volobuyev and Gorbachev is thoroughly dubious, if only because the Soviet people were never allowed a chance to express their attitude to the Soviet one-party system through the normal constitutional means of a universal referendum. They were offered no alternative. Lenin's formulation of the system as "the dictatorship of the proletariat" stressed that it could have no other character. In actual fact, that meant, and still means, dictatorship by the Party élite. The present privileged position of the Party is determined by Paragraph 6 of the 1977 Constitution.

Gorbachev thus summarizes his position on the history of the country: ". . . Soviet history is in general a history of indisputable progress, despite all the losses, setbacks and failures . . . we stubbornly marched on and never thought of retreating, or giving up ground we had gained, or of questioning our socialist choice."[6]

The "choice" did indeed entail terrible sacrifices but, as the Soviet historian has it, this was the fault of counter-revolutionary forces who disagreed with the verdict of history.[7] We should, however, observe that the "verdict of history" was reached not only in October 1917 but also in 1929–33 by the self-same Party during the second Bolshevik revolution, the "revolution from above". Although there were then no more Whites or interventionists, the Bolsheviks and the Soviet state declared war on a national scale against their own citizens, the peasants, ear-marked by the Party for ruin and destruction in the guise of "de-kulakization". Millions of peasants died in de-kulakization and collectivization, agriculture was destroyed, as we know from the abundant personal testimony, the scholarly literature published in the West, the half-admissions by Soviet leaders, and from Soviet writers in their wake. Even now, fifty years on, the Soviet state is incapable of coming to terms with the consequences of collectivization. Who at that time passed the "verdict of history"? Stalin answers with his customary succinctness at the XVIth Congress of the Bolshevik Party in 1930: "We are now conducting a policy of liquidation of the kulaks as a class, a policy that makes our special measures against them look like a trifle."[8] A year later, in conversation with the German writer Emile Ludwig,

[4] P. V. Volobuyev, *Vybor putey obshchestvennogo razvitiya: teoriya, istoriya, sovremennost*, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1987, pp. 177, 184.

[5] P. V. Volobuyev, "Velikiy Oktyabr' i istoricheskie sud'by nashey rodiny", in *Pravda*, 27 March 1987.

[6] Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 38.

[7] Volobuyev, *Vybor putey* . . ., p. 164.

[8] I. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 13, p. 14.

Stalin praised his Party for the destruction of a section of the people: "You are aware that we Bolsheviks do not confine ourselves to frightening people, we go beyond, to the liquidation of this bourgeois class."[9]

The noted Soviet agrarian historian V. P. Danilov has written in a recent article: "The excessive violence of collectivization and the associated coarse methods used in creating the *kolkhoz* and reinforcing its organization, the artificial intensification of class war and the widespread use of "de-kulakization" led to *unnecessary* losses and sacrifices, peasant protest *extending to armed uprisings*, the destruction of half the cattle stock, and the famine of 1932–3 in the rural parts of the Ukraine, the Don and Kuban, the Middle and Lower Volga regions, the Urals and Kazakhstan."[10] It is noticeable that Danilov, while mentioning the loss of cattle, fails to say how many peasants perished.

Yuri Chernichenko, however, who has been writing for many years on economic questions, has declared loudly what Western researchers have been saying for years, namely that the famine in the Soviet countryside was organized by the state.[11] The well-known publicist Ivan Vasilev has summed up the results of Soviet agrarian policies: "It is the spiritual impoverishment, indeed pauperization, of the countryside that I consider to be the most intractable consequence of the decimation of the peasantry, and one that it will take many generations to recover from."[12]

Gorbachev links the peasant uprisings in the fifteen years following the October revolution with a necessity for an "ineluctable historical choice"! He says that "collectivization changed, perhaps not easily and not immediately, the entire way of life of the peasantry, making it possible for them to become a modern, civilized class of society".[13]

But that assertion only scrapes the surface of the problem: collectivization entailed the mass destruction of the productive forces of the countryside, and the peasantry as a social class were undermined physically and morally. The centuries-long tradition of love of work on the land was lost. According to V. Danilov, "A view alien to socialism took root for a long time, namely that the *kolkhoz* was a source of material and human resources for society and the state."[14] Contrary to Danilov, that view is not only not alien to socialism, but it was constantly cultivated by the Bolsheviks, and Gorbachev himself is not far from it when he says: "Collectivization released considerable resources and many workers

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[9] Ibid., p. 111–12.
[10] V. Danilov, "Oktyabr' i agrarnaya politika partii"", in *Kommunist*, No. 6, November 1987, p. 36.
[11] Yu. Chernichenko, "Trava iz pod stoga", in Yu. Afanasev, ed., *Inogo ne dano*, Moscow, Progress, 1988.
[12] Ivan Vasilev, "Boomerang", in *Pravda*, 2 October 1988.
[13] Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 40.
[14] Danilov, op. cit., p. 36.

needed in other areas of development in our society, above all in industry."[15] The logic is curious, and it goes some way to revealing his approach to Soviet history. "Just think: how can we agree that 1917 was a mistake and all the seventy years of our life, work, effort and battles were also a complete mistake, that we were going in the 'wrong direction'?"[16] At least Gorbachev implicitly concedes the possibility of the question, even if he does deflect it.

Such a formulation denotes major progress for a Soviet leader. Even professional Soviet historians would hardly dare to phrase the question like that, particularly as the question is far from rhetorical. It arises again and again in the Soviet press, in letters from various Party veterans worrying that they may have spent their lives in vain.[17]

The most extensive recent document about the state of the social sciences, including history, and the tasks imposed on them by the CPSU, is Central Committee secretary A. N. Yakovlev's speech to the colloquium of social scientists at the Academy of Sciences on 17 April 1987.[18] (Yakovlev is a corresponding member of the Academy.)

According to him, CPSU policy towards the Soviet past is clear and unambiguous: there is a direct link between the 1920s, the Lenin period, and the 1980s, the Gorbachev period. The intervening periods are, as it were, just transitional phases between Lenin and Gorbachev. Yakovlev said this explicity elsewhere: "In the auditorium of the Palace of Congresses we felt the 1920s and the 1980s were an indissoluble entity."[19] The Central Committee secretary is campaigning for a full restoration of the "Leninist concept of socialism",[20] evidently forgetting the CPSU Programme confirmed by the XXVIIth Party Congress: "The Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, has *realized concretely* V. I. Lenin's plan for the building of socialism. *Socialism in our country has become a reality.*"[21] [Author's emphasis.]

Yakovlev speaks of the need to "*safeguard* a new reading of the theoretical heritage created by our precursors in the name of the social liberation of man".[22] So far as history is concerned, Yakovlev says: "We need a truthful and full analysis of every page of our history, aimed at revealing in all its aspects the dialectic of the path we have trodden."[23] Here the secretary for

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[15] Gorbachev, op. cit., p. 40.
[16] Ibid., p. 42.
[17] See the selection of letters "Narod i skazhet pravdu", in *Pravda*, 14 September 1987.
[18] Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, No. 6, 1987, p. 53.
[19] *Pravda*, 3 December 1987.
[20] *Pravda*, 28 November 1987.
[21] XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU, 25 February–6 March 1986. Stenographic report, 1, p. 555, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1986.
[22] *Pravda*, 28 November 1987.
[23] Ibid.

ideology goes further than the General Secretary, who had suggested focusing primarily on the events of 1937.[24]

Gorbachev's critical remarks evoked anxiety even among members of his staff and obvious dissatisfaction in the country on the part of opponents of *perestroika*. He was forced to manoeuvre. During a meeting with media managers on the 8 January 1988 he explained that "we cannot agree with people who urge us to forget history or use only a part of it. *Now* we can all see that such a point of view is unacceptable."[25] He added that understanding of history is not fixed, it seeks depth and development—thus giving himself room for manoeuvre in judging the past. Clearly Gorbachev's change of position was closely linked with the political problems of the day and the need to consolidate the position of his supporters while struggling on two fronts: with the die-hards inside the Party, and the so-called avant-gardists who had shown their claws during the Yeltsin affair.

Professional Historians Set Their Limits

THE SORRY STATE of the social sciences, as perceived by the Central Committee, caused the widest range of people to write in to the press. They included writers, Party veterans, veterans of the Second World War, workers, and historians. Not one of them had a good word for Soviet historical science. It was only the gurdians of the "glorious past", in the form of the Party élite of the historical establishment, that defended themselves in the polemical article "We are the descendants of October".[26]

The situation for historians, in particular non-conformist historians of Soviet society, is still unenviable. All the key positions have been occupied by the "guardians", whose elevation dates back to the days of Stalin. They adapted to the Khrushchev period, but life was at its most perilous for them in the Brezhnev years. At that time the Central Committee department for science and higher education was headed by S. P. Trapeznikov, but the "guardians" managed, in the face of unbelievable difficulties, to drag him into the Academy of Sciences as a corresponding member. When *perestroika* began, they did not at first take it seriously. They were all "as pure as the driven snow". Their general attitude to the past was Stalinist and pragmatic, and tended as a rule to prevail over simple common sense. One fairly vivid example will suffice. For more than twenty years the USSR Institute of History had been preparing Volume V of its *Essays on the History of Historical Science in the USSR*. The vicissitudes accompanying the preparation of the

[24] *Pravda*, 3 November 1987.
[25] *Pravda*, 12 January 1988.
[26] *Moscow News*, weekly, no. 19, 1987, p. 11; see also no. 21.

book merit a separate story, but anyway it came out in 1985. Although the book was devoted precisely to the 1930s–1960s, the text not only emasculated the mildest criticism of what had gone on in the historiography of the time, but actually had words of praise for the *Short Course*.[27] The book also praises the campaign against "cosmopolitanism" instigated by the Central Committee, one of the most disgraceful campaigns ever waged, in the social sciences or indeed in the country at large. Now we read: "Because the contradictions between imperialism and socialism were becoming more acute, it became necessary to deploy clearly and logically the Marxist-Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism as a counterbalance to the ideas of bourgeois cosmopolitanism and nationalism. And historians contributed to this great political task."[28] These words were written by Academician L. V. Cherepnin, the expert on Russian feudalism, and CPSU member since 1957, who died in 1977.

This is not all that surprising. Even in today's *perestroika* venerable Soviet historians, hardened by the experience of survival, are stressing the need for "the truth" but are trying to avoid *perestroika*, which for them would mean deleting all their historical works. How much simpler it is to hang on to the customary formula—the Party is always right. Academician Maxim Kim pinpointed the problem at a round-table discussion of the editorial board of *Kommunist*, the Party's chief theoretical journal, when he said: "For that reason our Party's and leadership's position is absolutely right, we need to revive history, and scrutinize both the negative and the positive element from all angles."[29]

One can understand Yakovlev's irritation when he remarked that: "The social sciences are one of the outposts of conservatism, the guardians of the embers of dogmatism."[30] The question now is whether even the most virulent criticism from the CPSU leadership is able to penetrate the ossified armour of the Soviet historical establishment.

Although he was criticizing social scientists, the Central Committee secretary failed to mention that all the sins he accused them of—the vulgar sociologizing, the swaying with circumstance, the tendency to improve on the past and the present, their refusal to research in depth, replacing it with denunciations of "pseudo-scholarly bourgeois historical ideas"—not only were the fault of the historians themselves, but also brought about their downfall. At all times they had, enthusiastically or obediently, followed the directives of the Party machine.

If one looks carefully at the Soviet historical journals and studies the

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[27] M. V. Nechkina (ed.), *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoy nauki v SSSR*, V, Moscow, Nauka, 1985, pp. 372–3.
[28] Ibid., p. 12.
[29] *Kommunist*, no. 12, 1987, p. 78.
[30] *Pravda*, 28 November 1987.

discussions, the conferences and the research agenda, one is left in no doubt that so far there have been no radical changes in Soviet historical science. All one can say is that one or two historians have become a bit bolder, and started to defy orthodoxy.[31]

Historians' Attitudes to the State of their Discipline

THE RECTOR of the Moscow Institute of Historical Archives, Yury Afanasev, said at a conference of historians and writers in April 1988: "There probably is not a country in the world with a history so falsified as ours is."[32] And with what result? In the latest elections to the Academy of Sciences the great majority of newly elected historians were those famous for their obedience and conformism.[33]

There are, however, historians of the younger generation coming forward. We might mention the 22-year-old Dmitry Yurasov, who has carried out unique archival research on Stalin's victims; the newly formed young historians' group at Moscow University; the youth section of the informal organization *Memorial* at Moscow school no. 86; the participants in the political theatre of Moscow school no. 962; and there are undoubtedly others who are interested in the true past of the Soviet Union. Perhaps hope for the future of historical studies in the USSR lies with these young people.

As always, just in case *perestroika* turns out to be a failure, historians are doing what they always do to avert reproaches now and accusations later, they are relying on Marx, Engels and Lenin, whose works are certainly not short of apt quotations to suit any situation. One historian quotes Engels' remark that "in the interests of the Party" criticism "*is required* to display the greatest frankness".[34] The word "*required*" demonstrates not only the writer's loyalty to Party ethics, but also the possible direction of his thoughts. Yury Afanasev says, on his own behalf: "We are the governing Party, nothing in the country opposes or threatens us apart from our own self-satisfaction and fixed opinions. For that reasons we must be, as it were, our own opposition." Although the thought is not original (it has already been expressed in various ways by Gorbachev himself and other Party leaders) it is a device which permits attack on dogma and those who "place principle before fact, and answers before questions".[35] Afanasyev finds vivid metaphors for the system: "We have for a long time lived in a state of

[31] L. Batkin, "Vozobnovlenie istorii", in *Inogo ne dano*, pp. 154–91.
[32] Yu. Afanasev, "Perestroika i istoricheskoe znanie", in *Inogo ne dano*, p. 498.
[33] *Izvestia*, 25 December 1987.
[34] Yu. Afanasev, "Sotsial'naya pamyat' chelovechestva", in *Nauka i zhizn'*, 1987, no. 9, p. 57.
[35] Ibid., p. 58.

deliberately monolithic, almost hypnotic unity . . . This false unity has begun to splinter into all sorts of phenomena, facts, processes, groups, gatherings: rockers, Pamyat, Alma-Ata . . ."[36]

He calls the present the "death throes" of the administrative system. Afanasyev is of course sufficiently experienced not to offend the Holy of Holies—the System as a whole. In the introduction to the *Readings* in the Historical Archive Institute, of which he is the head, Afanasyev says among other things: "History has ceased to be of help to the Party in solving problems of social development and policy-making."[37] . . . But what is the reason? Inability? Unwillingness to look truth in the face? Or perhaps a conscious policy?

The servility of Soviet historiography is so well-known that it cannot be doubted even with all its plaintive reiterations of the need for "historical truth". S. Osmachko, a rank-and-file teacher of CPSU history, understands the tasks of Soviet historians through the Party's viewpoint: "We need the truth *today* . . . interest in history *today* is no less acute than in the historic concerns of *today* (author's emphasis)."[38] A very business-like approach: we need history now, because it meets the political needs of the present. What's new in the world, you might well ask? Has it not been the same every ten or fifteen years with every new policy? As A. Budkov, worker and CPSU member, says in his letter to *Sovetskaya Kultura*: "This, after all, isn't our first *perestroika*, in 1956 we started to fight the cult of personality, in October 1964 we were fighting subjectivism and voluntarism. Now, it appears, we haven't fought enough."[39]

Soviet historians are in a difficult position, since almost everything they have written over the years has been branded as defective. You would imagine that their long-term professional interests would dictate the necessity to cast off their fear of self-criticism, to save themselves from an ambivalence so ingrained it is practically hereditary, to stop measuring out equal doses of "white" and "black". But self-seeking short-term considerations prevail, impelling them to vapid manoeuvring. There are plenty of examples of this, but here are two of the most striking ones. In the agenda for a comprehensive study of the problem of "Revolution and Social Progress", compiled by a group of historians led by Academician I. I. Mints, we read: "In order to reinforce the propaganda value of Soviet historians writing on this problem, it is necessary to unmask the falsifications of bourgeois historiography by means of argument."[40] Some very familiar formulas there have obviously migrated from the Stalin era and been

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[36] Ibid., p. 59.
[37] Ibid.
[38] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 28 July 1987.
[39] Ibid.
[40] *Voprosy Istorii*, 1987, no. 4, p. 86.

adapted to *perestroika* through the inclusion of the word "argument". And here is another appreciation of *perestroika*, from Academician S. L. Tikhvinsky, secretary of the Historical Section of the Academy of Sciences: "Soviet historians must analyse their own work critically, and get a fresh view of their role in the realization of Party policy."[41]

Abusing bourgeois scholars is much easier than arguing with them. As a nurse in a kindergarten tells the children why they mustn't use bad words, so G. L. Smirnov (director of the Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism) admonishes historians "to listen patiently to the arguments of their opponents and reason back, without any name-calling". Although he had little hope of getting through to his overgrown miscreants, he did think it necessary to warn them: "Anyone who does not live up to these requirements must abandon scholarship . . . that kind of person should not be a scholar."[42] Smirnov's warning is aimed particularly at the "guardians" who have for decades been the Party's ideological bastion. They are in command at the Main Archive Administration, in faculties of Party History, and elsewhere. Their strength comes from their cohesiveness and their web of connections across the Party apparatus, state security, and the media. Being socially astute as well helps them to figure out the best way to neutralize, if not defeat, "revisionists", "leftists", and "cosmopolitans" of all types. Some of them are hardened enemies of *perestroika*, while others, the majority nowadays, are trying to adapt to it. The debate over "We are the descendants of October", which ran in the Soviet press for nearly a year and a half, showed that the "guardians" of history have no intention of yielding in their defence of the "purity of Marxism-Leninism", i.e. Stalinism.[43] Their power is shown by the fact that *Pravda* itself, the central organ of the Party, published articles by Vera Tkachenko,[44] Nikolay Gribachev (editor-in-chief of *Sovetsky Soyuz*),[45] and other articles and letters attacking sincere and logical proponents of *glasnost* and democracy.[46] And there was of course the bombshell of the "Andreyeva letter".[47]

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[41] Ibid., no. 12, p. 13.

[42] *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1987, no. 8, p. 141.

[43] The debate was provoked by a series of articles by Yury Afanasev (Rector of the Moscow Historical Archive Institute): "Proshloe i my", in *Kommunist*, no. 14, 1986; "S pozitsii prava i realizma", in *Sovetskaya kultura*, 21 March 1987. See also V. Polikarpov (Doctor of Historical Science), "O 'diskussiyakh' minuvshikh dney", in *Sovetskaya kultura*, 9 June 1987; and "Puteshestviya knig", in *Moskovskie novosti*, 18 October 1988.

[44] Vera Tkachenko, "Rodina dana nam odin raz i do samoy smerti . . ." in *Pravda*, 21 August 1987. Readers' comments, under the same headline, in *Pravda*, 7 September 1987.

[45] Nikolay Gribachev, "Protsess. Zametki publitsista", in *Pravda*, 29 October 1987. According to Gribachev, pre-revolutionary Russia was specializing in the production of soles for bast sandals when, by way of illustration, America was driving in cars down roadways. The editor of *Sovetskii Soyuz* appears to have an equally naive image of both Russia and America.

[46] See, for example, the letter from the veteran worker I. Kimarskaya from Khabarovsk, "Vo imya pravdy", in *Pravda*, 6 July 1987.

[47] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 13 March 1988; *Pravda*, 5 April 1988.

Her continuing campaign shows that the "guardians" do not intend to capitulate.[48]

New Plans for Soviet History—the Role of Literature

AS THE ACUTE PROBLEMS of Soviet history have received greater and more striking coverage in newspapers and magazines than in the professional periodicals, so readers have grown more interested in historical literature. They have turned to literature because professional historians have refused to discuss Soviet history seriously, because their thoughts on the ingredients of the national tragedy (such as the fate of Soviet POWs during World War II, the deportations from the Caucasus and Crimea), were flat and insipid. On the other hand, writers and artists have taken advantage of the impotence of Soviet historians and "boldly" invaded their territory. They may discuss history unprofessionally, but their justification is that they are looking for the same "historical truth" which professionals, even though they understand its essential nature perfectly well, like to keep a decent distance from.

Yury Afanasyev's bitter criticisms of the leaders of the historical department of the Academy of Sciences have, for a long time if not for ever, barred his path to the Academy. He accused them and many other historians of dogmatism and careerism at the expense of their professional duty. "One has to be brave," he said, "one has to be able to resist temptation when confronted with a choice between the truth and one's career. I assure you very few have chosen the former".[49]

Historians have also been attacked by their rivals—writers—and literature has done a great deal to reveal the nature of the Soviet system. Andrei Platonov, Vasilii Grossman, published first in the West and now in the USSR, and the novels and stories of Yury Trifonov, Sergei Zalygin, Anatolii Rybakov, the little-known authors like Moris Semashko, with his *Gu-ga*, or M. Kurov, with his *Kapitan Dikshtein*, say much more to Soviet citizens about their past and present than hundreds of monumental tomes by Soviet historians. The Soviet publicist Yury Pompeyev, author of a novel about the October revolution, is alarmed by the possibility that émigré historians and writers might overtake their Soviet colleagues in illuminating the history of the Soviet Union. "We should not forget that the present Emigration is convulsively trying to fill in the blank spots which we have forgotten."[50]

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[48] *Moskovskie novosti*, 2 October 1988.
[49] Afanasev, "Sotsialnaya pamyat' chelovechestva", p. 59.
[50] Yury Pompeyev, "Tok istorii", in *Sovetskaya kultura*, 10 November 1987.

Pompeyev is wrong: those Soviet historians and writers who have been forced to emigrate have actually been keeping the flame of historical truth burning, so as to fill the gaps left by the confiscation of the country's memory of its past. Pompeyev is pointing to the historical illiteracy typical of Soviet society, illustrated by readers' letters.[51]

As ever, a touchstone is needed, and we find it in descriptions of the lives and works of Stalin's ministers. Many years ago Alexander Bek, author of the famous war story *Volokolamskoye Shosse*, wrote a novel about a Stalinist minister entitled *Novoye Naznachenie* ("The New Assignment") which came out first in the West and only recently in the Soviet Union. Its hero is Onisimov, a staunch Party man ready to carry out any order. The life of this minister of Stalin's revolves exclusively around the best way to carry out any given order without counting the cost. The novel provoked heated argument. Some attacked the Onisimovs, others, like V. A. Kozlov, defended them: "It is very easy to condemn or justify. But Onisimov and his colleagues lived in bitterly difficult and heroic times."[52] Such talk of "difficult and unrepeatable times" shows how much the CPSU needs a theory to explain Stalinism and make it acceptable to a generation which had wasted its life realizing Stalin's directives. But because Soviet history is not just the history of the Soviet élite, such a theory would have to relate less to historical events and more to the experiences of the "little man", the worker, the peasant.

Most of the prominent writers supporting reform, including of course Yury Afanasev, Fyodor Burlatsky, and the dramatists Mikhail Shatrov and Alexander Gelman, have joined in the task of "correcting" Soviet social history. Their standpoint is that, considering the "extreme conditions" for the creation of Socialism in One Country (age-old backwardness, the opposition of the kulaks, capitalist encirclement, the growth of German fascism), the style of the Onisimsovs was justified. But what Kozlov elegantly terms "style" was not just exhortation, organization and mobilization, it was the toil and death of millions of prisoner-slaves, illegality, terror (nowadays referred to euphemistically as the Stalinist "command administration"), bureaucratism, and the suppression of initiative from below. The "new" outlook, which suits both "progressives" and "conservatives", says that while socialism was being built in one country that style was justified, but afterwards, it was not. What is this supposed to mean, since they are constantly changing the date when socialism was built and the building of Communism began (the term "Communism" itself increasingly falling out of use)? Repeated debates by venerable academics on just this issue, the precise periodization of Soviet society, have actually

[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., p. 120.

been strictly opportunistic and not in the least academic. According to the Congresses and Plenums of the CPSU, Communism is still a long way off, and there is a whole intervening period due in the meantime, which means that the periodization of history has to be re-thought in a way that allows the "exceptional circumstances of the times" a place in the legal scheme of things.

Such a scheme does not face up to the central question of historical responsibility. The Onisimovs consciously refrain from straight thinking, suppress their conscience, and banish all doubts. As soldiers of the Party, they do its will, which for them is paramount.

But anyone can see, even without the help of the volumes of research on the law and its definitions, including those of the Nuremberg Tribunal, that responsibility for an order and its execution is borne by two sides: the source of the order and the person who obeys it. In this case that means the Party and Onisimov, which is why discussion of his responsibility must face up to the problem of the Party's responsibility.

The Soviet past is being discussed more and more openly by writers, but only with the greatest reluctance by professional historians. They suggest various ways to come to terms with the unfortunate episodes, the 1930s and particularly 1937 itself. Eduard Beltov, writing in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, seems to be wondering: "What can we remember about 1937 if we know nothing about it?"[53] And, to make the reader who has stumbled on the events of 1937 scratch his head, Beltov reminds him of Iona Yakir who (as Khrushchev reported in the Secret Speech at the XXth CPSU Congress 33 years ago) exclaimed seconds before his death: "Long live Stalin!" Beltov continues: "With the same name on his lips died the man at whose hands the flower of the Party and the state had been destroyed, General Commissar of State Security and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov."[54]

Advice on how to approach 1937 has also been given by V. M. Chebrikov, former head of the KGB and now a Central Committee secretary, when reporting the deaths in the 1930s of twenty thousand "honest Chekists".[55] All those executed were members of the Bolshevik Party, their arrest warrants had been confirmed by Party offices, and the death sentences of high-ranking state and Party officials had been signed by all the members of the Politburo. These facts were made public at the XXIInd CPSU Congress in 1961. But who had sanctioned the repressions against millions of ordinary Soviet citizens?

These deliberately obfuscated matters can hardly be explained merely by

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[53] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 23 December 1987.
[54] Ibid.
[55] *Pravda*, 10 September 1987.

the "exceptional times" factor. An alternative theory of "revolution from above" comes into play. One of its variants is expressed in Fyodor Burlatsky's dialogues, published first in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*,[56] and later televized. According to Burlatsky, after the death of Lenin the Party had two choices: economic reform by force, the Stalin option, and gradual peaceful reform, by implication the option of Bukharin and the "rightists". However, Burlatsky does not mention that the option of Building Socialism in One Country had been favoured by Lenin, who had considered it a real possibility, through the dictatorship of the proletariat, the one-party system, and a policy of restricting the activity of the remaining bourgeoisie. Sociologically, the peasantry was regarded by the Bolsheviks as a petty-bourgeois force, and economically it was viewed as an inexhaustible supply of food, raw materials, and cheap labour. But for Lenin all this was seen in the perspective of revolutionary developments abroad.

Any historian claiming to be objective cannot ignore the fact that until 1928 Bukharin, a former "leftist" Communist, accuser (on behalf of society) of the right SRs at their trial in 1922, and Stalin's ally against Trotsky, had supported Stalin many times. In the mid-1920s he had publicly supported the restriction of intellectual freedom, and the creation of a new generation of intelligentsia instead of the old which could be stamped out in the way "details are stamped out in a factory".[57] This ideal was indeed attained. In his capacity as editor of *Pravda* and Politburo member Bukharin shares Stalin's responsibility for the Soviet domestic and foreign policies of the time. Their differences date from when Stalin changed his policy of gradual reform and adopted Trotsky's methods, widespread coercion and force, particularly in relation to the peasants. The "restructured" Party supported Stalin and his policy, and the right wing, including Bukharin, was defeated. Soviet historians have yet to work out why this happened, what the Bukharin Party of the time stood for. Historians of the CPSU have made a mish-mash of the whole question of the social structure, the political and moral standing of the Party, and have avoided clarifying the causes of Stalin's elevation. Bukharin's policy, if we are right in calling it that, was defeated in the struggle within the Party for the additional reason that the "rightists", unlike the "leftists", had not struggled for power. But that struggle had been one of the main elements of Party history until the establishment of Stalin's unlimited dictatorship in 1934. How did Bukharin conduct himself later? He went on to tread every step of a thorny path from political capitulation, through admission of his own mistakes, to moral surrender. But it was, I think, Stalin's personal motives that led to

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[56] Fyodor Burlatsky, "Politicheskoe Zaveshchanie", in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 22 July 1987.

[57] Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *Utopia in Power*, N.Y., Summit Books, 1986, p. 198.

Bukharin's execution: he had once, in private conversation, called Stalin a "Genghiz Khan with a telephone".

The other interpretation of Soviet history has been put forward by a representative of the "guardians", Dr. Volkogonov, who is a Colonel-General and Director of the Institute of Military History. His long article "The Stalin Phenomenon" asserts that the conflict over options was conducted between Stalin, Trotsky, and Bukharin.[58] Delegates to the XIIth Party Congress had not heeded Lenin's warning that Stalin should be removed from the post of General Secretary. The methods advocated by the vanquished Trotsky, the "tightening of the screws", had been taken over by the victorious Stalin. Bukharin, who had proposed the "gradual development" of socialism, finally admitted his "errors" and "actively participated in the realization of the Party's aims". Volkogonov's description of the penitent Bukharin is much closer to historical truth than Burlatsky's interpretation. But for Volkogonov, Bukharin's "active participation" in Stalin's policy is necessary for his basic conclusion: "Stalin was the most consistent and determined defender of the Party's policy of affirming and reinforcing the world's first socialist state . . . there was no alternative leader." Volkogonov does not say that Stalin was actually the continuer of Leninism, but that is what he implies.

Although Burlatsky and Volkogonov stand at different points on the spectrum of *perestroika*, their tasks are quite similar. Both need to prove that, in spite of mistakes, miscalculations, and sacrifices, the building of socialism continued and triumphed. But official Soviet history demonstrates precisely that. The reasoning may be slightly different but the conclusion is predictable. Volkogonov is of course far to the "right" of Burlatsky, and his loyalty to Stalinism shines through everything he has published. He reprimands those who "doubt the real achievements of socialism" for being "politically mistaken" and "morally dishonest", and thus illustrates the way that even repentant Stalinists are totally unable to cast off their old habits in which historical truth has been permanently replaced by political calculations.

Details have recently been published of the case of the alleged "military plot", in which Mikhail Tukhachevsky and others were executed, and nearly the whole of the senior high command of the Red Army was destroyed. The confessions of the accused were obtained by terrible tortures.[59] The cases of the Komsomol workers, Alexander Kosarev and others, have also been publicized.[60] For the first time public opinion has

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[58] Dmitrii Volkogonov, "Fenomen Stalina", in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 December 1987.

[59] Boris Viktorov, "'Zagovor' v Krasnoy armii. Zapiski voennogo prokurora", in *Pravda*, 29 April 1988.

[60] Anatoly Golovkov, "Ne otrekayas ot sebya", in *Ogonyok*, no. 7, February 1988, pp. 26–9.

learned the details of the fate of the eminent doctor Professor Pletnyev, condemned to twenty-five years of prison, but shot in September 1941.[61] In September–October 1941, when the Red Army was retreating from the *Wehrmacht*, political prisoners were shot wholesale. They included the famous communist Khristian Rakovsky and the well-known SR leader Maria Spiridonova who had long before ceased to be politically active. This typical page of the tragedy of the Soviet past has only just been glimpsed, and we have no idea when the contents of the sealed envelopes in the safes of prison governors will finally be published. These envelopes used to contain instructions on how to deal with prisoners in exceptional circumstances. How many of them have been destroyed? So far, no answers exist.

The problem of legality in the Soviet state has only just begun to be discussed openly. It has been broached in an article by the journalist Yury Feofanov on Peoples' Commissar of Justice Nikolai Krylenko, who after the revolution was Supreme C-in-C of the Russian Army and Fleet. Krylenko, himself executed in June 1938, did nothing in 1934 to hinder the passing of the law on special trials in cases of "terrorism", or the law of 14 September 1937 which gave a cloak of legality to the accelerated procedures adopted for cases of "sabotage".[62] Feofanov caused a stir in the Soviet legal world by demonstrating the lawlessness which had prevailed in the Soviet state for decades.

The Rehabilitation of Nikolai Bukharin, Aleksei Rykov, Martemyan Ryutin and others

IN FEBRUARY AND JUNE 1988 the Supreme Court of the USSR finally reviewed the sentences passed on Bukharin and others fifty years ago. The death sentences, it is stated, had been passed "on the basis of evidence falsified during investigation and cross-examination".[63] It also became known, officially this time, that Stalin and Voroshilov had promised the accused on behalf of the Politburo that they and their families would be spared on condition that they agreed to make dreadful false confessions publicly. They signed, and were shot immediately after the trial. In addition, the whole of Lev Kamenev's family was murdered—his wife (sister of Trotsky), his children, his grandson (after a spell in Kolyma), likewise his younger brother and his wife.[64]

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[61] Viktor Topolyansky, "On slishkom mnogo znal . . ." in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 15 June 1988.

[62] Yury Feofanov, "Stanovlenie zakona", in *Izvestia*, 11 August 1987.

[63] *Pravda*, 10 July 1988.

[64] Dmitry Shelestov, "Pyat konvertov, a v nikh pochti vsyo, chto ostalos ot semi Kamenevykh", in *Nedelya*, 1988, no. 25, p. 14.

Those rehabilitated also include Yury Pyatakov, one of the organizers of the industrialization drive (shot in 1937), and Karl Radek, sentenced to ten years in prison (perished in a camp). In June 1988, Party officials murdered on Stalin's orders were posthumously rehabilitated. All this took place on the eve of the XIXth Party Conference and was intended as confirmation that under Gorbachev justice and truth are victorious. In the latest development, Leon Trotsky has also been cleared of the accusation of treason. There has been a public acknowledgement that Trotsky was murdered by an agent of Stalin. Whether his works will be issued in the USSR remains an open question.[65]

Soviet writing described for the first time the interiors of Lefortovo and Sukhanovo, the two worst Moscow prisons, which had contained the private offices of the People's Commissars for Internal Affairs Yezhov and, later, Beria, who was not above taking a personal part in the torture of prisoners under investigation.[66]

Many a Soviet citizen is likely to have shuddered when reading the letter from the theatre director Vsyevolod Meyerhold about his abominable tortures: ". . . they laid me face down on the floor, used an iron rod to beat the soles of my feet and my back, when I was sitting on a chair they beat my legs with it . . . the pain was so fierce that it was like having boiling water poured on the painful parts (I screamed and sobbed with pain) . . . the investigator kept threatening me: 'If you don't write, we'll beat you again, we'll just leave your head and your right hand, the rest of you we'll turn into a piece of shapeless bloody meat . . .'" The letter was addressed to Academician Andrei Vyshinsky (State Prosecutor of the USSR) and honorary Academician Vyacheslav Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Meyerhold evidently was hoping that mention of their academic rank, with the implied reference to their moral duty, would arouse their sympathy. His answer was the death sentence for himself, followed by the bestial murder of his wife, who had her eyes put out by her murderers. When her father approached a famous actor who was also a deputy to the Supreme Soviet with a request to be allowed to bury her, he answered mockingly: "Public opinion refuses to sanction your daughter's burial . . ."[67]

But the most important materials for the history of the Stalin era are to be found in an article about the "Ryutin case", an obscure episode of Stalin's struggle to establish his own unlimited dictatorship.

Martemyan Nikitovich Ryutin was a peasant by birth, a Siberian from the Irkutsk province. After joining the Bolshevik Party in 1914 he worked

[65] Dmitrii Volkogonov, "Demon revolyutsii", in *Pravda*, 9 September 1988; N. Vasetskii. "Likvidatsia", in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 January 1989.
[66] Evgeny Gnedin, "Sebya ne poteryat", in *Novy Mir*, no. 7, 1988, pp. 173–209.
[67] Arkady Vaksberg, "Protsessy", in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 4 May 1988, p. 12.

his way up during the revolution and civil war, and came to be Party Secretary to the Krasnopresnensky Local Committee in Moscow—an important post in those days.

A candidate member of the Bolshevik Central Committee, Ryutin openly and sharply criticized his party's policy at the 1930 Party Plenum. At Stalin's insistence he was sacked from the Party and then arrested, but in January 1931 he was freed because there was no *corpus delicti* (for which Stalin was unable ever to forgive the then Chairman of the OGPU, Yagoda). More than that, he was actually reinstated in the Party. That kind of thing was still possible in 1931. But Ryutin did not stop there. In 1932 he wrote an "Address to all the Members of the Bolshevik Party", which was discussed by a group of Party members.

In that document Ryutin emphatically condemned the "dangerous speed of industrialization", "the hazards of collectivization", and "the expropriation of the land" which had brought the country to "the severest economic crisis, monstrous pauperization of the masses, and famine". He went on to say: "the whole country has been muzzled . . . revolutionary legality has been flouted . . . the rights of the Party have been usurped".[68] After that Ryutin was denounced. He was arrested again, but a search failed to bring to light either his "Address . . ." or his manuscript "Stalin and the Crisis of Proletarian Dictatorship", which has not been found to this day. Stalin's insistence that Ryutin be shot was opposed by several members of the Politburo, so he was sentenced to ten years in prison. But after Kirov's murder Stalin got his revenge. Ryutin was brought to Moscow, where he was submitted to the farce of a new cross-examination by State Procurator Andrei Vyshinsky. Ryutin was accused of terrorism, although he had been in prison. He was tried by the Special Law of 1 December 1934, without prosecution, or defence, or witnesses or right of appeal. The trial lasted forty minutes. Ryutin refused to give evidence. He was shot a few minutes after the end of the trial. As an extension of the Ryutin case, everyone who had read his "Address . . ." was shot as well.

Kuropaty—the Quintessence of Socialist Construction in the USSR

THOSE DREADFUL EVENTS, the monstrous tortures and the mockery, have to be described now in order to allow Soviet citizens to heave a sigh of relief: instead of the cruelty of Stalinism, they are now experiencing a liberal period of *perestroika*, and there is no comparing the present with the torments to which ordinary people, peasants and workers, were subjected at other periods of Soviet rule.

Information published in September 1988 about the terrible Soviet crimes

[68] Arkady Vaksberg, "Kak zhivoy s zhivymi", in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 20 June 1988, p. 13.

in Kuropaty (near the Byelorussian capital Minsk) shows that the time is now ripe to judge Soviet socialism objectively. What happened at Kuropaty?

Deep in the forests of Kuropaty about 250,000 people (a preliminary estimate) were shot. The executions took place in an enclosure, day in, day out, round the clock, for four years, from 1937 to 1941. Exhumations have been carried out in the presence of archaeologists from the Institute of History of the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences, who established that the majority of victims were not local politicians or Party members but workers, peasants, low-rank civil servants, and members of the rural intelligentsia. By the end of September 1988 510 mass-graves had been found, each one ten metres long and three metres deep. It was then supposed that the total number of mass graves might reach 900. The victims included not only Byelorussians but citizens of the Baltic states where, as everyone knows, class and ethnic purges began in the summer of 1940 immediately after the establishment there of Soviet power. Evidently the overcrowding in the camps and the burden on the railway system had brought the authorities round to the simplest solution: kill the people on the spot. The locals called the road to Zaslavl "the Death Road", and there are still people to be found who witnessed the crime and who have kept silence for half a century. The victims included many women. Their belongings have been found and from these it is obvious that they had not been told where they were being taken to or why. Because of the wholesale nature of the crime it is logical to assume that Kuropaty was no exception, that other Kuropatys and Katyns will be discovered elsewhere.[69] Indeed, the latest estimate of the man-made demographic catastrophe has now been put before the Soviet public: from 1927 to 1953 there were 40 million victims of Stalin's repression with 20 million deaths. These statistics will surely shock the Soviet public as much as they will confute those Western "revisionists" who continue to write of "thousands" of deaths under Stalin.[70]

Will Soviet historians and Western "revisionists" explain those events in their usual way, "there were great achievements, but also there were losses"? Or will they have the courage to describe and judge the events even if it means having to judge Soviet socialism impartially?

New Myths About The Soviet Past

HISTORY IS OF KEY importance to today's leadership. They need to persuade the people that the new policy is a realization of Lenin's

[69] Ales' Adamovich, "Oglyanis' okrest", in *Ogonyok*, no. 39, September 1988, pp. 28–30. Vadim Shershov, "Bol lyudskaya-Kurapaty", in *Sovetskaya molodyozh*, 22 September 1988, p. 3, according to RFE/RL Munich, *USSR Today, Soviet Media Features Digest*, Radio Liberty Monitoring, 30 September 1988, N. 423–5.

[70] *The Christian Science Monitor*, 30 January 1989; *The New York Times*, 4 February 1989.

precepts. That in turn means that everything Lenin did or said was justified.

Lenin now speaks on television to Soviet citizens, through newsreels, and he speaks from the stage. A new play by Mikhail Shatrov, *Onward, Onward, Onward*, published in the January edition of *Znamya*, portrays Lenin not only as a great teacher but also as a merciless accuser. As if at the Last Judgement he examines what happened in the thirty years after his death. Above all he judges the actions of Stalin—who is today again the focus for Party and popular criticism. Lenin seems to confirm Gorbachev's announcement at the seventieth anniversary of the October revolution: "Stalin's guilt before the Party and the people, and the guilt of his closest cirle, for the mass repressions and violations of legality, is enormous and unforgivable."[71] In Shatrov's play Lenin speaks like a newspaper editorial: "I am definitely guilty before the workers of Russia. Because of my accursed illness, I did not see to it that Stalin was finally removed . . . I want everybody to know that I am not shirking my moral responsibility."[72] At each end of the political spectrum both reformist-liberals and "guardian"-conservatives agree on one thing: that Lenin's heritage must be preserved, he himself must not be touched, and his period may be researched only to demonstrate the greatness of the founder of the Soviet state. But the struggle to "purify Leninism" from the pollution of Stalinism is not as safe as all that for the Party. Being liable to expose the Party's ideological bridge-heads, as formed over the decades, it thus opens the possibility of an irreparable breach in the defence of the Party's last bastion, its Lenin period. Some attempts have been made, but the Party is vigilant.[73]

No sooner have the old myths about the Soviet past, myths which have prevailed for nearly seventy years, dissolved away, than new ones have appeared. They have arisen in response to the need of the ruling élite to save the most vital part of the past, the Party itself, and represent it as a force for the good.

As always, this responsible task falls on the shoulders of the Party intelligentsia. Since the "Andreyeva letter", it is the dramatist Alexander Gelman who has been coming to the fore. He was commissioned by the editorial board of the main theoretical journal, *Kommunist*, to write an article about the return of the Party to its moral roots. The article took a direct line of reasoning. According to Gelman, the Party arose as a moral, spiritual force. After Lenin's death the Party became alienated from universal human values, as a result of which "mankind was humiliated". Unity of policy and morality was destroyed under Stalinism (a term hitherto used only by political émigrés). The attempt to return to moral roots after Stalin's death

[71] *Pravda*, 3 November 1987.
[72] *Znamya*, no. 1, January 1988.
[73] Vasily Selyunin, "Istoki", in *Novy Mir*, no. 5, 1988, pp. 162–89.

failed. Gelman does not say why this was so, he seems to imply that the reader must figure it out for himself. In the period of "stagnation" things got worse: deception, hypocrisy, the birth of the mafias.

Gelman reassures those who, as he puts it, "are confused by the revelation of mistakes, illegalities, crimes". He sees a way out in the idea that after Lenin's death the history of the Party "divides into two streams". So it turns out that side by side with Stalinism there was within the Party another current, loyal to Lenin, to "spirituality, and the nobility of mankind". And in the Party there were "heroes", "saints", who were numbered in "thousands". They did not accept "Stalinism". What *did* they do? They "defended those who had been wrongly condemned", there were cases of collective disobedience which, according to Gelman, "forced even Stalin to retreat". Another thing in favour of the "second current" was, according to Gelman, the selfless labour of the people in the war with Germany.[74]

Of everything listed by Gelman, that is the closest to the truth, for at that time the people were saved by their belief, not in the Party, but in the idea that under German occupation there would be no life at all.

As a matter of fact, the defeat of Germany was achieved largely because by the beginning of the war the Party had not succeeded in creating a "new Soviet man" equivalent to a cog in a massive machine, it had not broken initiative, or replaced human moral values, even if by then they were a bit frayed, with Party values. It is true that during the repressions there were cases when people helped those who had ended up in Soviet prison cells, but this happened under Stalin, under Khrushchev, and under Brezhnev, and had no connection with the Party. Gelman's assertion that the "spiritual, moral fund built up by the Party among the people was so strong and so deeply embedded in the popular mind that it never abated or diminished" is a gross untruth based on juggling with facts: he counterbalances the limitless crimes against the people committed over a period of seventy years by the Soviet leaders, with the fundamental goodness of the mass membership, exemplified by the actions of brave individuals like Ryutin. In fact, Ryutin, and others who were not Party members, had tried to help the victims because their human decency was stronger than Lenin's formulation of Party morality, which held that the only thing that was moral was what served the working class and the Party.

His article, which appeared on the very eve of the XIXth Party Conference, was probably meant to dampen down the passions ready to rage at the Conference, and to show to the hierarchy that the Party intelligentsia were not a threat to them. But at the same time it lays the foundation for a new interpretation of the Soviet past: in spite of all the

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[74] A. Gelman, "Vozvrashchenie k nravstvennym istokam", in *Kommunist*, no. 9, June 1988, p. 20.

costs (and this time the Party's mistakes may be mentioned) the gradual advance towards socialism continues.

Gelman and other members of the pro-Gorbachev Party intelligentsia are now creating a new Party mythology aimed at maintaining in power the Party which has several times now brought the country to the verge of catastrophe. However, the truth of the matter is that only the non-Party intelligentsia, the physicist Petr Kapitsa and physiologist Ivan Pavlov for example, intrepidly spoke out in defence of the régime's victims. Twenty days after the murder of Kirov and the Party's initiation of a bloody reign of terror, Pavlov wrote to Molotov: "Those who maliciously sentence masses of people like themselves to death, those who satisfactorily carry out these orders, and those who by compulsion become accustomed to take part in this, will hardly remain beings who feel and think humanly. And on the other side, for those who are transformed into timid animals, it will hardly be possible to be made once again into beings with a sense of personal human worth . . . Have pity on our land and on us."[75]

It is probable that policy towards the Soviet past will for a considerable time be determined by Gorbachev's instruction at the 29 July 1988 Plenum, soon after the XIXth Conference: the delegates sharply condemned "the mistakes and crimes of the past". But "they rejected vehemently any attempt to cancel out the historic achievements of the Soviet people".[76] Gorbachev repeated this formula in his speech at the reception for Erich Honekker in the Kremlin, 28 September 1988.[77]

The Soviet leaders clearly do not really differ in their fundamental attitude towards the Soviet past. This means that both professional historians and writers will still be concerned less with the truth of history than with a politically balanced version. But some may perhaps dissent and be prepared to risk writing a more objective history of the USSR.

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[75] *Sovetskaya kultura*, 14 January 1989.
[76] *Pravda*, 30 July 1988.
[77] *Pravda*, 29 September 1988.

Restructuring Literary Memory in the USSR

Leonid Heller

I have much to do today:
I have to kill my memory stone dead . . .
Anna Akhmatova

NOW THAT AKHMATOVA'S *Requiem* is being published in the USSR, Soviet readers and literary scholars are indeed going to have much to do today, for they have got to give literature its memory back, and bring its petrified soul to life once more.

This resurrection has received official blessing: *perestroika* is in full swing, its main point being what is called "a process of democratization", which, according to an authoritative source, a reference book which popularizes *perestroika*, means *liberation*:

> . . . liberation from all possible taboos and all previous bans. We are witnessing the publication of works which for a long time have been suppressed and are unknown to the general reader. Now these books are becoming a part of our culture and their appearance forms a benchmark in artistic life. The names of Gumilev, Khodasevich, Nabokov and Zamyatin are being heard again. This process has even reached contemporary writers whose works have for many years been awaiting their time. We have already read the novels of Bek, Dudintsev, Rybakov and Tendryakov, and others will be published too.[1]

People now think, with some justice, that *perestroika* has changed everything that used to be said about the closed and irredeemably stagnant nature of Soviet culture. But has it really? Let us examine the present situation more carefully, since it is in moments of crisis that the nerve centres of the system become more visible.

The situation can be summed up thus: political and administrative decisions and measures have step by step extended accessibility in literature and art; they have assured free, or at least freer, public discussion of cultural questions; they have suggested possible reforms in cultural institutions; and finally, they have made it possible for a significantly longer list of authors

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[1] *Sovetsksoe Obshchestvo segodnya. Voprosy i otvety*, Moscow, 1987, p. 263.

to get into print, artists to be exhibited, films to be screened, plays to be staged, and so on.

Even if we look only at literature we can still examine the various aspects of the process now under way.

There are three levels of interaction which together can be regarded as a dynamic system. These are: factors external to literature; the literary environment—meaning both the institutions which enable literature to function as well as a set of symbolic links and relations; and finally, a certain number of literary works and texts.

Of course, a system of this sort operates not only under Gorbachev and not only in the USSR, and the division mentioned above is somewhat trivial, as it is universally applicable. But the character of a system derives not so much from the qualities or quantities of its separate parts, as from their mutual relationship and inter-dependence. And in Soviet conditions, the latter are defined much more sharply than elsewhere. For example, changes in the *genre* structure of literature may in principle be stimulated in any part of the system: a non-literary event may give rise to a whole series of books on a new topic or with a new kind of plot; or a publisher or literary group may start to dictate what the readers demand; or a given work may provoke a wave of imitations and be canonized as a model for the *genre*. In Soviet literature, however, the vector of change flows, with few exceptions, from the level outside literature to within the literary establishment and only after that to the works themselves.

Clearly, viewed like that, *perestroika* has not only *not* affected the existing system, but on the contrary has itself been the most striking manifestation of it.

The influence on literature of non-literary factors, such as politics and ideology, continues to be paramount. And from the official—even the most liberal—point of view, ideology continues to dominate art:

> Every honest artist of today is thinking about how to assist *perestroika*, . . . to contribute to the common good, to participate through his art in the revolutionary re-fashioning of life.[2]

Yet surely this means to say that in art nowadays there is still just as little room as there was before for sceptics, individualists indifferent to *perestroika*, and provocateurs, all of them "heretics" in the sense Zamyatin meant.

The authors of the reference-book quoted above are convinced that this is the way things ought to be, and that only this will guarantee future success. They believe that the Party's new policy is aimed at "improving the conditions for creativity", and that the creative intelligentsia of the country

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[2] Ibid., p. 265.

> fully shares the programme advanced by the Party, and is now preoccupied with developing and strengthening the position of socialism. If these ideas have captured the minds of artists then naturally and inevitably they will flow over into significant works of art which will bear relevance, high artistic quality, and philosophical depth. All the conditions for this have been created.[3]

It is surprising how reminiscent the tone and vocabulary of these utterances are of classic Soviet discourse. Here is an example from an article published in 1950:

> Surely the Party and government decision concerning the extension of sub-tropical citrus farming to the north will serve as material for numerous vivid canvases by our artists of the word. What about the theme of rebuilding the new city of Moscow, for which plans are being drawn up at this very moment? Let us repeat, conditions for the development of Soviet . . . literature are tremendously dazzling.[4]

It may come as no surprise that the ideas that have captured the minds of artists are not now, any more than they were then, racing to overflow into profound or highly artistic works. And among the voices of those who sing the *perestroika* song and who are dissatisfied because art is dragging behind social and political thought we can hear certain familiar, steely tones:

> Artists must be totally accountable for the situation in their creative workshops. They share their responsibility equally with the state insitutions of cultural management. . . . Creativity and responsibility become inseparable. That is where we shall see democratization in action which is our chief aim.[5]

The semantics of this passage are contradictory: do artists carry "total" responsibility—that is one hundred per cent—or do they share it equally and thus only carry fifty per cent of the responsibility? Nevertheless, the basic meaning is clear. Culture is subject to management by the state, whose institutions remain operative, while artists are lumbered with a bigger load of social responsibility for their actions than before, and that in an unspecified form.

The second aspect of the situation—the second level—is this: all appearances indicate that the conditions for the existence of literature are changing radically. To judge these changes properly in their historical perspective requires detailed analysis. The trouble is that such an analysis (first discussed by the formalists, who introduced the concept of a "literary being") has

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[3] Ibid., p. 270.
[4] S. Ivanov, "Fantastika i deistvitelnost", *Oktyabr*, No. 1, 1950, p. 155.
[5] *Sovetskoe obshchestvo segodnya*, p. 267.

never been applied seriously to the literature of the Soviet period. The USSR has developed a tradition of academic chronicles recording the facts of literary or cultural life, and of the lives of individual writers (Gorky, Mayakovsky, etc.), but these facts are seldom interpreted in the context of an overall picture. Instead, they more often than not serve to back up everyday clichés. There are very few works that attempt a synthesis.[6] A bad example would be A. Ovcharenko's book on Gorky in the context of the literary quests of the twentieth century; a good one would be the book by the Polish poet and Russian specialist W. Woroszylski about Mayakovsky, or the books by L. Fleishman, printed in the West, about Pasternak in the 1920s and 1930s. For the sake of brevity we shall describe the "literary being" as the *production–dissemination–reception* chain. The first component of the chain comprises external factors which govern creativity, by helping or hindering, as for instance in an individual's biographical circumstances, or membership of literary groupings, or participation in study trips sponsored by the Union of Writers. In the second, we find the problems, methods and forms of reproduction and dissemination of literary texts, such as print-run policy, or book design being appropriate for an intended audience. In the third there is the reaction of the literary world and public opinion to an individual work, or works, of a writer. Each link in the chain is a complex unit of organization, requiring special study. And all the links are joined by complex connections forming a system which is an entity of a higher order, reinforced by elements passing from one link to another. One such element is censorship, one of the most powerful motive forces of cultural life in the USSR.

Perestroika has made itself more tangibly and more powerfully felt in this area than in any other. The ubiquitous power of *Glavlit* has been abolished and the supervision of literature being printed has been weakened. Has the chain fallen apart? Does literary life show genuine signs of changing to a different mode of existence, now that we have such fundamental changes as the introduction of self-financing and re-shuffles in the creative Unions?

Publishing Bulgakov

A FEW CONCRETE EXAMPLES will illustrate the character of the changes, beginning with the *Plays* of Bulgakov in the 1986 *Sovetsky Pisatel* edition, the fullest edition yet of his works for the theatre. Out of eleven texts printed here, seven are taken from a collection published in 1965, two were published in journals in 1966 and 1982, and only two—the adaptations of *Dead Souls* and *War and Peace*—appear for the first time, on

[6] For a not very successful attempt see M. Slavinsky and D. Stolypine, *La Vie Littéraire en URSS*, Paris, 1971.

the basis of archive materials. The compilers of the collection remark: "Being unable to gain access to the majority of autograph manuscripts of the plays in the Bulgakov archive in the Manuscript Section of the Lenin Library, we were unable to compare these texts with the originals and for that reason used publications already available." (p. 651) These remarks are indeed a sign of *perestroika*, for it would not have been possible to read them in print before. But censorship was in operation even so—at the director's level in the Manuscript Section of the Lenin Library. And it was in operation at the editorial level and in the publishing house: while the foreword and the notes speak of the "amazingly prophetic, philosophical and social drama" *Adam i Eva*, and of the "fantastic, light-hearted farce" *Bagrovy ostrov*, those two plays fail to appear in the book (as does the first draft of *Zoikina kvartira*), even though their texts can easily be got hold of, having been published in the West nearly 20 years ago.[7] But the general rule is: never mention the fact that first or subsequent publications exist outside the USSR. Strangely enough, this rule is obeyed even by the Moscow journal *Sovetskaya literatura* which comes out in French and is intended for Western readers. In its issue devoted to Bulgakov (No. 8, 1988) they published a translation of *Adam i Eva* with a note to the effect that it was the first publication of the play. As far as *Bagrovy ostrov* is concerned, this "light-hearted farce" was included in a book published in 1988 by *Sovetskaya Rossiya* under the title *Chasha zhizni*. This one-volume edition includes items of various genres collected from the three books published in Bulgakov's lifetime, from periodicals of the 1920s as well as from archives. The compilers stress that:

> The texts published here have been taken from contemporary publications, or, in the absence of such, from author's manuscripts and typescript copies held in the Bulgakov Archive in the Manuscript Section of the Lenin Library, to whose staff we are grateful for assistance in the collation of texts.

And later they say:

> The bibliographical part of the commentary contains all the information about contemporary publications of the works included in this edition, or about first publication, in the case of works not published in Bulgakov's lifetime. It also gives information about the first full posthumous re-publication in a journal or a collection. (p. 571)

Nevertheless, the note to *Bagrovy ostrov* says "Published by *Druzhba narodov*, No. 8, 1987, and re-printed in accordance with that text." The reader is baffled. Why has the text of the play not been compared with the author's

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[7] M. Bulgakov, *Pesy, Adam i Eva, Bagrovy ostrov, Zoikina kvartira*, YMCA Press, Paris, 1971.

manuscript? The suspicion arises that perhaps the other texts have not been compared with originals either, an altogether justifiable suspicion for anyone who has read the article by L. Yanovskaya, the leading Soviet Bulgakov scholar, which concerns the textual problems of publishing Bulgakov's literary heritage. As her article makes clear, a note claiming that texts have been collated with archive material is no guarantee of authenticity.[8] Is it perhaps that the archive does not contain either an autograph manuscript or a typescript of *Bagrovy ostrov*? If so, why was the fact not mentioned? And exactly what text served as the basis for the play published in *Druzhba narodov*? Anyway, how does one explain the appearance of a play in a collection of prose and correspondence? If this is really supposed to be an opportunity to publish previously unpublished plays, why publish only one? The impression of conscientious and trustworthy scholarship is undermined by such constant slips, distortions, suppressions, and illogicalities. Works by Bulgakov which have been hitherto unknown in the USSR are indeed being published but hastily and chaotically, after secret negotiations and bargains and compromises. As a result, Bulgakov is being presented to the reader piecemeal, exactly what would have happened if there had been some secret directive from above ordering that access to the writer's work had to be made as difficult as possible.

Science Fiction

THE OTHER SERIES of examples comes from science fiction. As is well known, science fiction played a special role in the Soviet literature that appeared in the 1960s. Under the heading of SF, which allowed works of surprising boldness to be printed, I. Efremov, A. and B. Strugatsky, A. Gromova, R. Nudelman, G. Gor, V. Savchenko, I. Varshavsky and other SF writers turned the genre into a laboratory for free-thinking and experiment with form.[9] Beginning in 1965, the publishing house *Molodaya gvardiya* brought out its series *Library of Modern Science Fiction* in 15 volumes, which was extended to 25 volumes and finally ended in 1973. Besides foreign authors, it printed the best of Soviet SF. The end of that series coincided with the decline of a genre whose significance had been eroded by the "mainstream" literature which had taken over, while trivializing, many of its themes and conventions (Aitmatov, Orlov, Kim, Yevtushenko). But now, in the fever of *perestroika*, the publishing house *Pravda* is starting to issue a *Library of Science Fiction* in 24 volumes. What discoveries await us there, now that there are no taboos!

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[8] L. Yanovskaya, "Publikuetsya Mikhail Bulgakov. Zametki tekstologa", *Voprosy Literatury*, No. 12, 1986.

[9] See L. Geller, *Vselennaya za predelom dogmy. Sovetskaya nauchnaya fantastika*, OPI, London, 1985.

Take for example Volume One: *Russkaya fantasticheskaya proza XIX–nachala XX v.* ("Russian prose of the fantastic, 19th to early 20th century") (1986), whose contents virtually replicate the collection *Vechnoe solntse* of 1979. The symbolists, who wrote some extremely interesting SF which is scarcely known by Soviet readers, are represented by just one story from Briusov, although his prose happens to be more accessible than most, and in fact his story *Respublika yuzhnogo kresta* has already been reprinted by the publishing house *Sovetskaya Rossiya* in the collection *Povesti i rasskazy* by Briusov (1983). The compiler of Volume One of the *Library of Science Fiction* describes A. Bogdanov's novel *Krasnaya zvezda* as "the most important work of SF from the early 20th century", but he offers it in the same mutilated version that was printed in *Vechnoe solntse*. In addition, where cuts (of everything about "free love") have been made is not indicated at all, whereas in *Vechnoe solntse* they are at least documented. It is curious that publication of Volume One of the *Library of Science Fiction* coincided with Moscow University's collection *Russkaya literaturnaya utopiya*, where *Krasnaya zvezda* is reproduced intact. In the *Library of Science Fiction* censorship has been exercised by the compiler himself, who has opted for an ideologically harmless text. Incidentally, in spite of the fact that Bogdanov's first novel has lately been published three times, his second utopian novel, *Inzhener Menni*, reviled by Lenin, has still not made its way into print.

The same compiler says of *Krasnaya zvezda* that it is "almost the last classic utopian novel" in world literature (p. 692), which is completely untrue. Genuine utopian novels were being published one after another in the 1920s both in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. The last of them, *Strana schastlivykh* by Ya. Larri (1931), was branded as Trotskyist, after which the genre and all memory of it were expunged from Soviet literature right up to 1956, and the utopian novels of the 1920s, so often cited in articles and books about Soviet SF, have never been reprinted. The *Library of Science Fiction* was intended to fill this gap, and its Volume Six came out under the title *Sovetskaya fantastika 20–40-kh godov* (1987). Of its six hundred pages, fifty are devoted to V. Itin's *Otkrytie Rielya* in a version cut to half its original length. Itin's story is the least interesting and least typical of its kind, having been written as early as 1918, constructed with symbolist stereotypes, and having no links with Soviet life. All the rest of the volume is taken up either by well-known pieces (such as Platonov's *Potomki solntsa* and stories by V. Ivanov) or by works which have long since been anthologized (Grin's *Blistayushchii mir*), and any new material gets lost among them.

One can safely say that the *Library of Science Fiction* will not publish anything interesting now, since evidently the work of the censor has been taken over by all its editors.

But who does that work in the SF collections published by *Znanie*? Their Volume 31 (1987), for example, noting the 70th anniversary of the birth of A. Gromova, lists her books, but excludes the novels she wrote in collaboration with R. Nudelman who emigrated to Israel (p. 233).

In the *Fantastika-87* annual we find a note on the sessions of the SF committee at *Molodaya gvardiya*, the publishing house which has been and still is publishing the majority of Soviet SF. From the note we learn that the writers and critics previously connected with the experimental "new wave" (the Strugatsky brothers, V. Revich) are conducting a debate using methods employed during the RAPP period. And there follows this denunciation:

> The recent work of the Strugatskys increasingly displays destructive, nihilistic tendencies. This applies to *Khishchnye veshchi veka*, *Trudno byt bogom*, *Zhuk v muraveynike* and *Gadkie lebedi*.

V. Bondarenko's review of *Zhuk v muraveynike* in *Nash sovremennik* (No. 12, 1985) is quoted sympathetically:

> It has become noticeable that nowadays our "avant-garde art" has put itself on the level of "mass culture" which it so deplored and, moreover, mass culture of the lowest sort. Former "progressives" are advocating vulgarity, and earning themselves cheap fame and popularity in the process. (p. 398)

This is the debating technique not of RAPP, in fact, but of Soviet criticism of the most commonplace type, which there are no plans to reform. The "recent" work of the Strugatskys actually belongs to the 1960s, with the exception of *Zhuk*. . ., which was written long enough ago, in 1979.

The Bulgakov example illustrates the process by which major writers return to the literary canon, and the re-discoveries of Platonov and Zamyatin illustrate the same. But the SF examples are also significant in that they reveal to us a whole cross-section of publishing houses, editions and themes.

These examples of the present situation serve to highlight not so much the mythical struggle between hawks and doves or between opponents and defenders of *perestroika*, as the constant relapses into literary routine which take place against the frenetic background created by the twinkling mirage of falling taboos, a routine long since familiar in Soviet literature with all its features, censorship included.

Censorship and Control

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID about censorship and the political and ideological control of culture in the USSR. But we are far from having even a reasonably full description and explanation of how the control

works. It is interesting to compare the article by R. Gul on censorship in the USSR (almost the first of its kind, published in Paris in 1938, in *Sovremennye zapiski*) with one of the latest, by M. Yakobson in *Strelets* almost half a century later. The second supplements the chronology of the first; it contains more material, is more systematic and more exact, and yet it is amazing how similar the two articles are. They both examine the system of control, virtually unaltered by time, at the centre of which are *Glavlit* coming under the control of *Agitprop*, together with the security services. To this scheme Yakobson adds the Writers' Union.[10] But there were still many more offices that controlled and managed cultural matters, and with all of them there went the function of censoring. To mention only one, there was *Glaviskusstvo*, the People's Committee on Painting, Literature and Art, which came under *Narkompros* and was set up in 1928. Its work has not yet found a chronicler and is not mentioned in histories of literature, but it was called upon to implement artistic policy and plan "all artistic work in the RSFSR", and to exercise "ideological control over the repertoire and all other artistic works". This office testifies eloquently to the desire of the state to unify culture and subordinate it to centralized management long before the fateful year of 1932.[11]

The apparatus for the control of culture in the USSR is extraordinarily complicated and its functional aspects are various at all levels of the state pyramid. Here, for example, is the way a Soviet textbook describes the system of institutions controlling the press and the other media:

> A *vertical structure* is formed by subdivisions of publishing at various levels: central and local offices, republic, provincial, regional, area, urban offices, and others lower still (according to workplace). In addition to that, directives from the top levels concerning the press, television and broadcasting must be complied with by the lower ones . . . The political organization of Soviet society corresponds to a *horizontal structure* for the management of the press, television and broadcasting. The Party, in the form of its executive offices, special departments and sections, and its committees, controls not only all the media but also all the other publishing sub-structures.[12]

And here is an example of the taxonomy of a Soviet publishing house according to a regulation adopted by the Ministry of Culture in May 1955 and basically unchanged since then:

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[10] R. Gul, "Tsenzura i pisatel v SSSR", in *Sovremennye zapiski*, XV, 1938; M. Yakobson, "Tsenzura khudozhestvennoy literatury v SSSR", *Strelets*, 1986.

[11] See for example *Sovetsky teatr. Dokumenty i materialy. Russky sovetsky teatr 1926–1932*, Part 1, Leningrad, 1982.

[12] Prof. E. Prokhorov (ed.), *Sotsiologiya zhurnalistiki. Teoriya, metodologiya, praktika*, Moscow, 1981, pp. 112–13.

1. Director, with an editorial committee, an artistic committee, and a legal adviser
2. Editor-in-chief (or Editorial Board)
3. Editorial staff
4. Design section
5. Library
6. Production section

and later it mentions personnel, finance, and other departments.[13] Practically every level of this hierarchy controls either the creative process (often indeed at the inception stage), or the production of texts. But the possibilities for control are not exhausted even then:

> The path followed by a manuscript through the editorial offices of a magazine or book-publishing house shows that every office, every person who reads the manuscript or advises the author, from the editor, to his head of department, the executive secretary, the referee, the editor-in-chief, the head of the Central Committee's Ideology Section, the inspector and head of department at *Glavlit*, all work as censors.[14]

We need not mention the pressure exerted on writers by the organizations structuring their daily life (the Writers' Union and its numerous sub-structures, the social organizations and so on), and which operate both at the basic, material level (prizes, study-trips, flats, holiday facilities) and also intangibly, through the symbolic relations of social dynamics described by Bourdieu. One should bear in mind that everything described above refers only to the production aspect of the *production–dissemination–reception* chain. There is also the "consumer" side, whose institutions are strictly controlled and are themselves significantly involved in the control of culture—the book trade, libraries, clubs, and other systems for distribution which are accredited as social institutions. One should also remember that the state aims at controlling rival systems as well, not just *samizdat* and émigré publishing, but also private circulation. The sheer size of the apparatus required can be deduced from a Central Committee resolution of 7 September 1925 concerning one narrow distribution sector, "On rural libraries and the popular literature to be supplied":

> . . . 5. To finish inspecting the inventories of rural libraries and remove from them books found to be ideologically unacceptable and out of

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[13] S. Likhtenshtein, N. Sikorsky and M. Urnov, *Teoriya i praktika redaktirovaniya*, Part 1, Moscow, 1964, p. 78.

[14] B. Khazanov, "Kontrol nad pechatnym slovom v Sovetskom Soyuze", in S. Rezny (ed.), *The Sakharov Hearings, Fourth Session*, OPI, London, 1985, p. 115.

> date. To do so: a) entrust *Agitprop* with the task of reviewing the instruction from *Glavpolitprosvet* about the inspection of book-holding in rural libraries; b) issue a directive to local Party committees about the need for greater attention to the checking of rural libraries and about their involvement in this; c) inspection of libraries should be done using propagandists sent to the countryside for that purpose by the Party; *Glavpolitprosvet* must check the work of purging rural libraries in ten areas and submit a written report to the Central Committee . . .
>
> 6. Recognize the urgent need, in the local branches of *GIZ* and other publishing houses and co-operatives, to organize warehouses for supplying rural libraries. The order and plan for the organization of such bases to be co-ordinated with *Glavpolitprosvet* and its offices.[15]

Note the abundance of operations, always controlled by instructions and directives, their strictly hierarchical logic, intended to foresee all possible situations (the scientific approach), and the number of check-ups. *Agitprop* checks up on *Glavpolitprosvet*. The latter checks up on fieldwork consisting of librarians being checked up on by local Party committees and specially sent propagandists. Finally, the Central Committee checks up on the whole implementation of the task. The entire campaign involves the participation of numerous people and resources, and in enforcing acquiescence to constant observation by everybody of everybody, it breeds certain professional, intellectual and social habits. And that is just one of the components, a module which is reproduced on various scales, in a machine already perfected by the mid-1920s and still operating to this day. To a certain degree this machine merely demonstrates the translation into cultural policy of Taylorism—the breaking down of a complex action into simple ones; the search for the best logical sequence; the principle of stock-taking and checking, according to which one worker is watched by two supervisors—the model that Lenin tried to introduce into Soviet life. And the machine is undeniably highly efficient.

S. Żółkiewski, one of the founders of the Polish school of cultural systems-analysis, distinguishes three types of institution that put cultural policy into effect (the offices possibly changing depending on evolving social needs, but their functions remaining the same). The first type sets up programmes, determining the aims and direction of cultural development and creating a "self-image" of culture; in a historical context, for example, these institutions could be the ecclesiastical authorities, political parties, organs of state power and trade unions. The second type controls specific aspects of the culture in a society, deciding whether to change or to

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[15] *Izdatelskoe delo v SSSR (1923–1931). Sbornik dokumentov i materialov*, Moscow, 1978, p. 59.

preserve its values, as for example, do book-sellers' guilds, creative unions, organizations for cultural education, and monastic orders. The third allows culture to play a part in social life, so that its values can be adopted and absorbed, as happens, for example, via parish schools, youth clubs, libraries, political clubs and literary cafés.[16]

S. Żółkiewski's model may have been deduced logically from historical experience, but (in a paradox typical of much Polish research) its applicability to Soviet life is of doubtful value, for it assumes a comparative separateness and autonomy in institutions of different types. A great monastic order was able to exist even while it was in conflict with Rome and was even able to influence deeply the cultural life of its time in spite of a Papal "programme" (such was the influence of the Franciscans, and particularly of the 14th-century Minorites). In the Soviet context, nothing of the sort could have happened until now, for the Party and state institutions combine the functions of programming culture and forming its "self-image" with control of all its practical manifestations. It is for precisely this reason that censorship in the USSR is not simply an institution or even a series of institutions created administratively for the surveillance of culture, but something less tangible: the natural instinct for self-surveillance is not something alien imposed on Soviet culture from outside, it is on the contrary one of its vital functions, a function of all its organs. When one of the organs is removed, others do its job instead, or try to. Up to now, the experience under *perestroika* has confirmed this, in spite of the appearance of informal societies, clubs, and other formations of the "third type" in Żółkiewski's scheme) which have dropped out of an integrated whole: their influence is still unable to oppose the existing structures of literary life.

Literature, Criticism and *Perestroika*

LET US, FINALLY, move on to the third aspect of the situation, the most measurable and perceptible one—the discovery of new texts and archive material, with the extending of boundaries in Soviet (and Russian) literature, which is apparently capable of endless replenishment from its own reserves, from the treasures of *samzidat* and émigré publishing which were thrown onto the rubbish heap and forgotten either by force or by chance . . . Is there any other literature in the world with such a happy prospect?

The foregoing was not meant to imply the inalterability of the present state of things. The change is there. New material is pouring into the reservoir of accessible literature not, as before, in a meandering and somewhat thin stream, but in a turbulent torrent.

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[16] S. Żółkiewski, *Wiedza o kulturze literackiej. Glòwne pojecia*, Warsaw, 1980, pp. 119–23.

Soviet critics have observed that the process is largely spontaneous. All the same, we have just seen how the regulatory structures continue to operate. The torrent is definitely still being controlled. D. Likhachev, speaking at the VIIIth Writers' Congress, proposed a programme of filling in the "blank spots",[17] which was evidently approved and is being carried out fairly scrupulously. The fact that historians are now referring to that programme in their own discussions is yet another example of how the old system operates: the discoveries of the future are announced in a suitably formal context by a public figure invested with a high degree of moral and professional authority.

However it came about, the situation is bristling with consequences which the authors of the text-book on *perestroika*, quoted above, only gloss over:

> The well-known fuss created by the appearance of works long suppressed is understandable and explicable. But the public needs time to adopt and absorb them critically, and inevitably it will not be long before such works start to be assessed according to their various qualities.[18]

This swing between, on the one hand, liberal thinking about the time needed for public opinion to mature, and on the other, the sharp reminder about time-limits and the inevitability of differentiation between the good and the not-so-good (i.e. laying down a precise line of development to be followed), is worth noting as typical of the political discourse of *perestroika*.

Obviously, not everything now being published is going to be of enduring quality; some process of selection will be inevitable, and it will be done within "a fairly short time", its criteria having been established long before:

> The dialectical peculiarity of the present situation in art consists in its being at one and the same time both an object and a subject of *perestroika*. That is, while art is bringing about a change in peoples' awareness, it is also supposed to be learning a new way of thinking itself.[19]

This "new way of thinking" is a return to revolutionary humanism: to "Leninist principles" as opposed to the social and spiritual values of the Stalin period of regression or the Brezhnev era of stagnation. Bearing this in mind, we might note the ambiguity of the formula just quoted and the gravity of the questions it conceals.

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[17] D. Likhachev, "Rech na VIII s"ezde SP SSSR", *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 2 July 1986.
[18] *Sovetskoe obshchestvo segodnya*, p. 263.
[19] Ibid., p. 264.

If art has to learn new ways of thinking, then its present patterns of thought are outmoded. The authors of the text-book say this openly when they speak of the current dearth of bright new talent: "This can be attributed to the long and well-known stagnation of artistic and public opinion, when everything was, so to speak, levelled downwards and forced to the lowest common denominator."[20] In other words, by the time *perestroika* had begun, art had lost its avant-garde function in public opinion, sharing with it the sins of deviation from Leninist principles, and being, as a result, levelled downwards and suffering a loss in quality.

But if that is true (and the pathos of the appeals to *perestroika* confirms it), what are we to think of the generation of "40-year-olds" which was formed in the 1970s (Krupin, Yesin, Makanin, Kireyev and others), who are now at the forefront of the literary stage? What is one to do with writers who quite recently were considered, and are still considered by many, to be the best representatives of Soviet literature? What about Bondarev, Aitmatov, Astafev, Rasputin, Belov and others, who wrote their most famous works precisely during the Brezhnev period of stagnation? What is to be the fate of works that have become classics—books not only expressing the spirit of "mature socialism", but embodying literary progress and proving that Soviet art was advancing in great strides?

> Soviet literature has never been able to gather so rich a harvest as it did in the 1970s and early 1980s, showing the world once again that it was the greatest literature on earth.[21]

Whom are we to believe? Are the works of the last 20 years classics (in which case we have to give up the idea of stagnation), or are they all pot-boilers created in standard form to match the time they were written in? Obviously the impending reassessment applies not only to newly discovered works but also to well-known writings and to authors already in the text-books. But for proper "democratization of artistic creation" what are chiefly required are criticism and self-criticism. "No single artist or work may or should remain outside critical consideration."[22] Is this not the revolutionary essence of *perestroika*?

As everyone knows, criticism and self-criticism have, from the earliest times, been proclaimed key factors in Soviet life. It is instructive to re-read, for example, what was being written at the height of the Zhdanov period about writers who, by winning the Stalin Prize, had been elevated to heights seemingly untouchable by criticism. Yet in a collection of articles on the

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[20] Ibid., loc. cit.

[21] A. Metchenko and S. Petrova (eds.), *Istoriya russkoy sovetskoy literatury, 44-88-e gg*, Moscow, 1983, pp. 490–91.

[22] *Sovetskoe obshchestvo segodnya*, p. 268.

1949 prize-winners, praise of each work is followed by the revelation of shortcomings which the writer "can and should put right in subsequent editions"; and in the introductory article, A. Surkov warns: "Even the best of our writers and poets have defects", and reminds us:

> Our writers must be guided by the instruction in Comrade Stalin's letter to A. M. Gorky, that we cannot manage without self-criticism, cannot manage at all, and that, without it, stagnation is inevitable.[23]

At that time everything—the distant past, the recent past, as well as the present—came under constant critical fire. It is worth remembering how, in that "unforgettable year of 1949", a storm of criticism broke over the hard-line, prize-winning Stalinists, A. Sofronov and V. Kozhevnikov, on account of their ideologically imperfect plays *Karera Beketova* and *Ognennaya reka*; and how *V strane poverzhennykh*, the novel by the acknowledged classic author and prize-winner F. Panfyorov, had, within six months of winning the Stalin Prize, been turned into an example of "negligence and slovenliness" and torn to bits for its literary shortcomings.[24] Loyal Stalinists, incidentally, got away with just a fright, since they did not lose their high-up positions. But the operation had succeeded: at the time it was important to show that anyone anywhere could be picked on, and that any moment might herald a review of everything one had attained (in 1949 Marr was still being exalted, but by 1950 Marrism had been overthrown and a *perestroika* of science and the arts was set in motion).

Today's "reassessment of values" is being advertised so widely that even the return to the fold of forgotten and banned writers is gradually turning, for the majority of Western commentators, into a voyage of discovery unprecedented before Gorbachev's rise to power.

However, there had been such returns before, even in the worst Stalinist periods. For example, there was the "thaw" of 1939–40, when a collection of Khlebnikov's unpublished works, and a collection of verse by Sologub, suddenly came out. As is well known, the real return began in the post-Stalin thaw and that has continued ever since, at different speeds to suit the moment: faster after the XXth Congress, more slowly since 1964. Though as the struggle against dissidents has succeeded, particularly since the mid-1970s, literature has once again been allowed, and even advised, to turn back to the past, close its eyes and wallow in memories:

> Critics have correctly pointed out the deepening historicism of the

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[23] A. Surkov. "Za dalneyshiy rost sovetskoy literatury", *Sovetskaya literatura na pod"yome. Laureaty Stalinskikh premiy 1949 goda*, Moscow, 1951, pp. 11 and 16.

[24] See for example A. Fadeyev, "O literature i literaturnoy kritike", *Znamya*, No. 8, 1948, pp. 157 and 161.

> literature of the last decade . . . Its artistic equivalent is often the memory of the people or the memory of the artist himself.[25]

E. Isaev's poems *Sud pamyati* and *Dal' pamyati* win official approval, as do V. Chivilikhin's "novel-essay" *Pamyat* and Ch. Aitmatov's *I dolshe veka dlitsya den* (although it is curious that the new title of the novel, *Buranny polustanok*, erases the work's "historicism"). In addition, the world of literary scholarship has now been offered the opportunity of "discovering" A. Bely, to embark on academic research into *Peterburg*, to examine the modernism of the 1900–1910s, to acquaint itself with the peasant poets (for example, N. Kluyev, who was published in 1977 by *Biblioteka poeta* in the Small Series, and in 1981 by the *Sovetskaya Rossiya* press), and to re-acquaint itself after a long interval with the tradition of Russian utopian writing mentioned above. Meanwhile, the writings of some philosophers are now appearing in print too: K. Tsiolkovsky, A. Bogdanov, P. Florensky, and N. Fyodorov. Extracts from Fyodorov's *Obshcheye delo* appeared first in *Vechnoe solntse*, a collection of science fiction and utopian writing, and only later did a one-volume edition of his works come out, in 1982, in the series *Filosofskoe nasledstvo*.

Among the many writings which prove the constant relevance of these questions, we can cite two items, published a few years before the beginning of *perestroika*. In his work about the literary process in the 1960s and 1970s, the liberally disposed V. Kovsky observes with satisfaction: "The wonderful prose of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, by A. Bely, F. Sologub, I. Annensky and others, is today rapidly returning to our artistic consciousness and to circulation among readers."[26] By contrast, V. Kovalev, author of *Teoreticheskie problemy istorii russkoy sovetskoy literatury* ("Theoretical Problems in the History of Soviet Russian Literature"), says of the atmosphere of literary scholarship in the 1960s: "Unfortunately, we have sometimes found a tendency to concentrate on the works of writers either unfairly ignored in the 1930s, or connected with the aesthetics of decadence."[27] This regret is prompted by the fact that the said tendency prevented an "objective" approach by exaggerating the significance of such "sterile movements" as "acmeism, imagism, Bely's style, and constructivism".[28]

In spite of the divergence of opinion—since what is considered "sterile" by one scholar is considered an active influence on contemporary literature by another—both of them indicate dissatisfaction with the interpretation of literary development made by Soviet historiography. In addition both reflect dissatisfaction with its methodology.

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[25] *Istoriya russkoy sovetskoy literatury, 40-80-e gg*, pp. 515–16.
[26] V. Kovsky, *Literaturny protsess, 60-70-kh gg*, Moscow, 1983, p. 36.
[27] V. Kovalev, *Teoreticheskie problemy istorii russkoy sovetskoy literatury*, Leningrad, 1984, p. 16.
[28] Ibid., p. 17.

The debate about historiography, about *how to write the history of literature*, has never ceased in the USSR, where it has been carried on at a higher pitch than in the West. Here, a new view of literary history may surprise or interest, or disturb or even produce a revolution in the literary world or the universities. Yet, for all that, in the West there is none of the drama, or the heritage of 19th-century Russia, that sharp awareness of the social, or political, significance of every single utterance; nor, either, is there the tense anticipation of completely non-literary—maybe irrevocable—consequences, a threat which, in the Soviet period, has always been lurking in the background to all literary debate. It comes as no surprise that in the Soviet books mentioned above, which concentrate on the theory of historical literary scholarship, and in the vast majority of similar works, the authors' standpoint is based not on coherent argument in a well-defined conceptual framework, but on arguments of an emotional, ethical, and socio-ideological order. And that is the difference between them and the increasingly numerous works in the West which try to tackle a problem formulated sixty years ago by Tynyanov and Yakobson, namely that of describing the historical development of literary forms by systematic means.

At the end of 1987, the pages of *Voprosy literatury* (Nos. 9 and 12) carried a debate about the new approach to the problems of historiography. It was summed up, in a certain way, by an article by A. Bocharov entitled "Pokushenie na mirazhi" (*Voprosy literatury*, No. 1, 1988), which expressed what might be called the "liberal platform" of *perestroika*. The main section of the article is devoted to a consideration of the IMLI (*Institut Mirovoy Literatury*) proposal to create a "History of Russian Literature of the 20th Century" in several volumes.

Bocharov explains how Soviet historians have at last, in his view, managed to break out of the circle they have been trapped in these thirty years, constantly tinkering with their constructs when in fact the whole edifice requires a total overhaul. Soviet literature has to be viewed as one stage or one current in the development of Russian literature, and attention has to be paid to other stages and currents (the émigré and dissident ones, for example). The cult of the "untouchables" has to be abolished, while D. Bedny, Makarenko, and Furmanov (authors of classic works which have failed to create an original artistic world), will have to be "squeezed out" of their special places to make room for an assessment of Pilnyak, Mandelshtam, Zamyatin, and Gumilev. Bocharov is doubtful about the necessity for a unified and correct *History*, and states that "we need many histories".

What more could one ask for? It would seem as though there had been a total revolution, with every taboo toppling. Yet a close reading of Bocharov's article reveals so many contradictions and caveats that they almost completely neutralize the novelty of his proposals. "Many histories"

merely means lots of books for different audiences (the common reader, the specialist, or the teacher), all differing in their range, tone, or structure, while adhering to a single overall vision. Dissidents have to be included, but primarily those who have been officially printed in the USSR; and émigrés may be too, at least those who do not raise tricky questions. The proposed complete overhaul of the literary–historical structure turns out to be a floor-by-floor conversion job, with new classics replacing some old ones, while the "load-bearing structure" and the foundations stay the same.

In a continuation of the debate about the history of Soviet literature, these contradictions have been pointed out in an article by E. Dobrenko, who represents the young, radical generation of literary scholars.[29] He disagrees with the "squeezing out" of disagreeable or "uninteresting" periods, and talks of the moral duty of historians of literature "not to allow the tragedy of quarter-of-a-century's decay and paralysis in a great literature to be passed over in silence". (pp. 72–3)

> Demyan Bedny was not a mirage, Babaevsky was not a mirage, nor was Kozhevnikov or Kochetov. They, as participants in the literary process of the Soviet period, were real and even very typical figures, and as such they are needed in a history of literature . . . Each of them is irreplaceable. It is not a question of crossing out certain people and putting others in instead, but of including everybody from the outset, then arranging them in their proper places, and only then assessing each one's role and importance. (pp. 80–81)

But putting them in their proper places is impossible unless one gives up the cult of the classics. Dobrenko goes a long way beyond Bocharov in his reassessment of celebrities: "Perhaps we have done enough exercising of our principles on P. Pavlenko and Demyan Bedny?" (p. 62) He debunks Fadeyev and the psychological hollowness of *Razgrom*; and A. Tolstoy's historical books, with their falsifying of history so as to harmonize with doctrine, provoke him to raise the question of the "accountability of talent and a writer's civic position". (pp. 65–7)

Disagreeing with Bocharov, the young researcher says that Soviet literary history "needs to be built up again from scratch, and the idea that it 'has already been built in principle' is a dangerous delusion. In principle, it is non-existent." (p. 51) A completely new concept is needed.

> Scientific truth is indivisible. By contrast, myths are legion, and they adapt to changing circumstances and will continue to do so until we

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[29] E. Dobrenko, "'I padaya stremglav, ya probuzhdalsya . . .' (Ob istorii sovetskoy literatury)", in *Voprosy literatury*, No. 8, 1988. Further references to this article are given in the text.

> withdraw from a system which has bred and nurtured this essentially deeply anti-scientific kind of thinking. (p. 50)

Soviet scholarship is still ideology, although it pretends to be a science. It is still nourished by myths, so Dobrenko warns in the strongest section of his article, where he criticizes works which were conspicuously supported by the literary–historical framework of Stalinist times and which are still flourishing and being reprinted even today during *perestroika*. Their authors, P. Vykhodtsev, V. Kovalev, L. Yershov, S. Petrov, A. Metchenko, A. Ovcharenko, are the leading lights of literary historiography, and, as Dobrenko correctly observes, it is they who edit the textbooks and who thus "transmit their ideas right into secondary and tertiary education". (pp. 68, 76)

Dobrenko's article is radical and, by pre-Gorbachev standards, unusually courageous. But, in common with other contributions to the historiographical debate, it shows a lack of scholarly argument. It makes no attempt to define new concepts or a new methodology. A research programme is set out, but the only prescription for its implementation is dialectical thinking, whose effectiveness is supposed to be proved by two pages of quotations from Lenin. This method is hardly likely to yield the desired result. For example, Dobrenko tries to show that within every period of the literary process there are various trends locked in dialectical battle:

> Did the thinking that characterized literary development in the late 1930s and the post-war decade really spring into being suddenly in the "year of the great change", as the old textbook said? No, obviously not, it was all mature thought, and elements of that type of artistic thought can be found in *Lyubov Yarova*, in *Razgrom*, in *Tsement*, and in the poetry of Demyan Bedny. (p. 82)

To begin with let us note how a trivial statement of fact—that socialist realism had forerunners in the literature of the 1920s—is presented as a discovery. No "old textbook" could dispute this truism, which has been dinned into Soviet criticism ever since the first Writers' Congress. The only real argument is whether it is logical to attribute to socialist realism the literature that preceded the first appearance of the term, although the first academic history of Soviet literature, dating from 1954—the old Stalinist textbook which Dobrenko may have in mind—speaks directly of "the young literature of socialist realism of the 1920s".[30] Secondly, the author of the article commits what one might call a methodological pleonasm, by both seeking and also finding the seeds of socialist realism in the very writings which are now recognized as its early manifestation. Thirdly, and

[30] *Ocherk istorii russkoy sovetskoy literatury*, Part 1, Moscow, 1954, p. 285 and passim.

lastly, it is noticeable that the author discusses works whose artistic value is altogether dubious or, more exactly, is considered dubious by universal tacit agreement, a fact that greatly facilitates his task but only leads him on to commit another pleonasm, because from his transparent hints, it follows that socialist realism is bad literature for the simple reason that its classic works are bad works. The truth, however, is that Stalinist culture was created with the involvement of the 1920s avant-garde, led by Mayakovsky, plus those writers who later became victims of the system, such as Bruno Yasensky or Ivan Kataev, and others who, by a common consent which unites official critics, liberals, and radicals, are considered outstanding, such as L. Leonov or K. Paustovsky. But the author, who has so naively been proclaiming his faith in the utopia of a "unified scholarly truth", prefers to ignore the elements of socialist realism in their work. His dialectic and his iconoclasm are in actual fact extremely limited.

No sooner has the historian despatched one collection of myths than he starts, seemingly unaware of himself, to create new ones—about the Free Loving avant-garde, which perished in its struggle against the totalitarian system; about RAPP, supposedly guilty for all the persecution of non-conformists; and about the "great literature of the 1920s", where Leonov's early stories are displayed as an outstanding artistic achievement. So, once again, all sense of perspective is lost, and we start to be wrapped in a thickening fog through which we can only begin to recognize some familiar outlines. It is not so easy to tear oneself out of a myth-creating system.

Bocharov's article about the attack on mirages ends like this:

> Every literary scholar knows it is as easy to do violence to literary history as to any other, by emphasizing certain names and events, omitting others, and bringing prejudice to bear on yet others. All our "Histories" have existed without ever mentioning certain writers and works, often major ones, and yet the whole thing still hung together. For how many years now have we been reading a textbook containing no mention of Pilnyak, Mandelshtam, or Akhmatova, and passing in silence over Bulgakov's satires, *Doctor Zhivago*, Zamyatin's novels [sic!] and so on . . . The public puts up with it, and the paper our "Histories" are printed on puts up with it too.[31]

One is struck by the ambivalence of such words. A literary scholar is confessing to having deceived and concealed, and thus consciously to have distorted the history of Soviet literature. His alibi is that everyone else was doing it, "every literary scholar". And today's candid self-criticism is supposed to expiate the guilt.

Leaving aside questions of guilt, what if the "mythological way of

[31] A. Bocharov, "Pokushenie na mirazhi", in *Voprosy literatury*, No. 1, 1988, p. 77.

thinking" and the creation of illusions that are constantly practised in Soviet literary scholarship—always for the sake of truth, scholarliness, or objectivity—what if they have entered its very flesh and blood?

In the first two years of the revolution, the futurists and proletcultists competed for the most outrageous slogans about the "burning of Raphaels" and "shooting Rastrelli". Soviet and Western researchers always contrast such nihilism with the caring attitude towards the culture and history of the past which distinguished Lenin's position and thence the Party's cultural policy. In actual fact, though, the utterly pragmatic zeal with which, immediately after the Revolution, official history was re-written, and the nihilism of school syllabuses in the 1920s, were in every way worthy of the enthusiasm of the futurists. This was the attitude to the past that took root. In the literary histories written in the 1920s, the late 1940s and then the 1960s, it may seem to the untrained eye that they have gradually been revised in every particular from their overall design down to the very bricks in the façade.

Even the works of socialist realism, which had, so to speak, a residence permit in Soviet literature, were, as is well known, corrected from one edition to the next, if not completely rewritten. Gladkov's *Tsement*, in its first 30 years of life, until the death of its author, was published in over 30 variants, with alterations not only to its style, but to its themes, its composition, and its semantic structure. A text of that nature constantly adapts to circumstances, follows the Party line, reacts to criticism, takes into consideration the complaints and wishes of its readers, and thus escapes the deadly reification to which, according to R. Escarpit, a book was subject after the invention of printing. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a book like this is more responsive to outside stimuli than any avant-garde "happening", which imposes its own laws on its audience![32]

And any history of literature, or art, or culture, or society, which is regularly being re-written, with the most radical of intentions, and to the accompaniment of sharp criticism and self-criticism, is also an *open text* of precisely the same type. This is one of the basic mechanisms of the Soviet system.

Memory

IN *BURANNY POLUSTANOK* Ch. Aitmatov tells the legend of the *mankurty*, prisoners turned into obedient slaves by a particularly refined

[32] See L. Heller and Th. Lahusen, "Palimpsexes. Les métamorphoses de la thématique sexuelle dans le roman de F. Gladkov 'Le Ciment' ", *Wiener Slawistischer Almanach*, B. 15, 1985; A. Baudin, L. Heller and Th. Lahusen, "Le Réalisme socialiste soviétique de l'ère Jdanov", *Études de lettres*, No. 3, Lausanne, 1988.

torture which totally deprives them of their memories. Knowing nothing of their past or of their place within any cultural or historical tradition, the *mankurty* lose their identity. They are incapable of revolt or protest. At the time, the parable about the creation of the *mankurty* seemed to many to be a profound allegory of the essence of the Soviet system. Even now some Western researchers refer to Aitmatov's legend as decisive proof of the demise of Soviet literary socialist realism. What socialist realism can there be after so bold and uncompromising a look at the past?[33]

Aitmatov's wit may or may not be original. The creation of *mankurty* is clearly related to the lobotomy in Zamyatin's *My* ("We"), and in the 1960s manipulation of the memory was a popular theme in American and then in Soviet science fiction (in the stories by I. Varshavsky, in A. Gromova's *V kruge sveta*, and in A. and S. Abramov's *Rai bez pamyati*). The point is that if, in his legend, Aitmatov really meant to encapsulate a formula for Soviet consciousness based on its attitude to history, then one has to say that his formula is a failure, because its premises are false.

No external enemy enslaved Soviet Man and wiped his memory completely clean. On the contrary, he was frequently made to recall his great traditions. He simply had to transmute his own memory, to sacrifice to the evil of the day one detail or another, in private, in public, and also on paper—the paper which puts up with it all. The poet—Akhmatova—was obliged to kill her memory in order to stay alive, while the man in the street became an expert in the art of what we may call "mnemo-sculpture". And now Soviet literary scholars are faced with the enormous task of resurrecting memory, a task that is all the greater, since memory was not, in fact, quite dead.

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[33] See R. Robin, "Le Réalisme socialiste. Une esthétique impossible", Paris, 1986, p. 323.

Soviet Generals in German Captivity: A Biographical Inquiry

Michael Parrish

IT IS DIFFICULT to think of a more deserving subject for historical study than the fate of the Soviet POWs during the Great Patriotic War, yet the subject still seems neglected. Even though there is a fair amount of literature on those prisoners who collaborated with the Germans, there is little written about those who did not. After two studies, by Alexander Dallin in 1957 and Gerald Reitlinger in 1960, indicated the need for further study,[1] more than a quarter of a century elapsed before the publication of Christian Streit's masterly *Keine Kameraden*, a work which should prove to be the foundation for all future research on the subject.[2] More recent studies by Hirschfield and Bartov have expanded on Streit's themes, particularly on the direct responsibility of the Wehrmacht in the campaign of terror waged against the Soviet POWs.[3]

Soviet writing in this area has been spotty, at best. For instance there is a noticeable gap on POWs in the Soviet military encyclopaedia. As in the case of high-ranking officers, a handful (including, for example, General Karbyshev) have been subjects of books and articles, and there are also a number of books about Soviet resisters in German captivity. But facts must also be gleaned from German documents, memoirs literature, samizdat and émigré publications, obituaries, and the like.

The study here is a modest attempt to trace the history of those captured Soviet generals who did not join the Vlasov movement;[4] I have excluded those who did join since they have been covered in some detail in Western publications.[5]

[1] Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1957). Gerald Reitlinger, *House Built on Sand* (NY: Viking Press, 1960).

[2] Christian Streit, *Keine Kameraden, die Wehrmacht and die Sowjetishchen Kriegsgefangen 1941–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag, 1978). This book shockingly still lacks an English translation.

[3] Gerhard Hirschfield, ed., *The Politics of Genocide, Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986). Omar Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–1945, German Troops and The Barbarisation of War* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

[4] All research in this area should start with P. Kruzhin's seminal study, *Voina i Sudby Generalov* (Radio Liberty Research Material, PC 103–77, May 20, 1977). I am deeply grateful to Mr Al Graham, US Library of Congress, for providing me with a copy of this study.

[5] There is an extensive literature in the West about the Vlasov movement. The most detailed Soviet sources are *Neotvratimoe Vozmezdie* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1973) and A. Vasilev, *V Chas Dnia, Vashe Prevoskhoditelstvo . . .* (Moscow: Politizdat., 1973). See also Catherine Andreyev, *Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987); E. E. Dwinger, *General Wlassov* (Frankfurt: O. Dikreiter, 1951); W. Strik-Strikfeldt, *Gegen Stalin und Hitler* (Mainz: Hase und Koehler, 1970); S. Steenberg, *Vlasov* (NY: Knopf, 1970); J. Thorwald, *Wenn sie Verderben Wollen* (Stuttgart: Steingrüben-Verlag, 1952); G.

To give some background information about the Soviet POWs: of the nearly 5,740,000 prisoners taken by the Wehrmacht, only slightly over one million remained in camps at the end of the war: the camp registers record the deaths of nearly two million. Of the remainder, 818,000 had been released to "civilian or military status" (i.e. they were collaborators), 473,000 had been exterminated while in the custody of the OKW (Oberkommando des Wehrmacht) in Germany and Poland, 273,000 had died in transit, nearly half a million had been exterminated in transit and 67,000 had escaped. Of nearly 4 million Russian POWs, two out of three died in captivity, the first year of the war being the worst for them. Of the 3.3 million Soviet prisoners taken in the first six months of the war nearly 2 million had died or been executed by January 1942, a pace which exceeded that of the extermination of the Jews at the peak of the Holocaust.[6]

The architect of this campaign of terror was not a member of the SS or even of the Nazi party but an elderly general who had been serving in the military ranks since 1905. This man, General of Infantry Hermann Reinecke, was head of the Prisoner of War Department in the OKW. Even before the start of Operation Barbarossa, Reinecke had proposed that the Jews among the POWs be segregated and handed over to the SS for "special treatment". Later, Reinecke served as a judge in the "People's Court", where he sentenced hundreds of fellow Germans to the gallows after kangaroo trials. For his part in these events, the General served a few years in prison during the post-war years and was released from Landsberg prison in 1957. Christian Streit argues very persuasively that the Wehrmacht's active co-operation in this extermination campaign encouraged Hitler to put the Final Solution in high gear, knowing that he had little to fear from the military.[7]

Stalin's attitude towards those of his soldiers who became POWs was equally callous, even though his own son, captured in 1941, was one of them. Stalin had refused to sign the Geneva Convention, a decision which gave extra ammunition to Hitler. And in fact Stalin's position on POWs was already manifested in 1940 in the Katyn woods. He was also the real author of the doctrine "whoever surrenders is a traitor",[8] which has been attributed to one of his closest satraps, the head of the Political Administration of the Red Army, L. Z. Mekhlis. Also, as Moscow did not recognize prisoner-of-war status for its own personnel and consequently provided no security briefing, prisoners generally spoke freely and thus

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Reitlinger, op. cit.; M. V. Satov, *Bibliografiia Dvizheniia Narodov Rossii, 1941–1945* (Munich: Possev, 1961).

[6] Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 446. Hirschfield, op. cit., p. 112.

[7] Hirschfield, op. cit., p. 10.

[8] K. M. Simonov, "Zametki i Biografii G. K. Zhukova", *Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal*, 7–1987, p. 53.

helped the German intelligence. In November 1941 there was a faint Soviet protest about the mistreatment of the POWs, while at the same time the efforts of the International Red Cross to exchange prisoner lists were rejected.[9] Equally feeble were Soviet protestations during the Nuremberg trials, in which Soviet prisoners were represented by one solitary witness, Lt. of Medical Services Evgenii Kivelisha, who had been captured in 1941. The scenes described by Kivelisha and confirmed by others show that Soviet POWs received the kind of treatment that was later to be meted out to the Jews; indeed, when the gas chambers were first being tested in Auschwitz, the victims were Soviet POWs.[10]

The Soviets made no attempt to extradite anyone for crimes committed against the POWs, not even the arch-criminal Reinecke or military commanders such as Hermann Hoth, Erich Manstein, Richard Ruoff or the SS commanders Kurt Meyer and Sepp Dietrich, against whom there were strong cases. In fact, although the Waffen SS units rarely bothered taking prisoners in the east (and likewise only occasionally did so in the west), captured Waffen SS officers such as Helmuth Becker (CC Totenkopf Division) and Bruno Streckenbach (Einsatzgruppe commander, later CC 2 SS Latvian Division) were treated as mere POWs, and those who survived the rigours of labour camps returned to Germany in 1955. To some, this Soviet behaviour might seem bizarre since the same government would hang elderly German rear-area commanders after perfunctory trials and would go to great lengths to extradite pro-German White Cossack generals whose units were never deployed on Soviet soil.

The explanation, however, lies in the fact that the Soviets obviously realized that full-scale trials would have exposed the fallacy of Stalin's military genius and his failure to protect Soviet territory and population. In addition, the widespread collaboration between Soviet citizens and the Germans might have been brought to light. Actually, most of the returning prisoners were sent to labour camps to languish there until after Stalin's death; among them were such bona-fide heroes as Major E. Gavrilov, leader of the resistance at the Brest Fortress, who ended up spending more time as a prisoner in Russia than he had in Germany. In 1941 Hitler told Field-Marshal Reichenau, "Losses can never be too high; they sow the seeds of future greatness."[11] Stalin is alleged to have put it even better: "One man's death is a tragedy, that of thousands statistics." The number of views shared by the two dictators is extraordinary indeed.

The Soviets claim that all the captured generals, except those who joined Vlasov, fell into enemy hands after being seriously wounded or while

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[9] Mikhail (Michel) Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *Utopia in Power* (NY: Summit, 1982), p. 389.

[10] Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 9; *Novyi zhurnal*, No. 32, 1953, p. 194.

[11] Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler* (NY: Macmillan, 1947), p. 71.

actually unconscious. This of course is not true: the pictures of Russian generals, such as commander of the 6 Army General I. N. Muzychenko, show them to be in good health after capture.

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BELOW I HAVE put together details of what happened to some of the generals who were captured by the Germans. A fuller list is given in the table at the end of this article. There are many unanswered questions about the fate of these men. Some of them could stand book-length treatment.

The fate of Maj. General P. V. Bogdanov remains a mystery. He commanded the 48 Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District which was destroyed in the very first days of the war while marching from Riga to the border.[12] In captivity Bogdanov joined the Gil-Rodinov Brigade, one of those shadowy anti-partisan units formed by the Germans from various East European nationalities. This brigade was formed in 1942 from Soviet POWs and was commanded by Lt. Colonel V. V. Gil-Rodinov, the former chief of staff of the 29 Rifle Division. Bogdanov was chief of counter-intelligence in this brigade, a rather lowly position for a former general and division commander. Double-cross was the rule in such units, and in August 1943 members of the brigade murdered their German officers and defected to the partisans. Gil-Rodinov was later killed fighting on the Soviet side. The fate of Bogdanov, who also defected, remains unknown.[13]

Maj. General K. C. Dobroserdov commanded the 7 Rifle Corps which, in August 1941, had the unenviable task of stopping the 1 Panzer Group's attack towards Zhitomir. The counter-attack failed, in effect contributing to the encirclement of the South-West Front in Kiev. Dobroserdov, however, managed to avoid his unit's fate and was appointed chief-of-staff of the 37 Army.[14] This was a period when the battered remnants of the South-West Front were being regrouped on the left bank of the Dnieper, having been given a reprieve by Hitler who had turned his attention to Moscow after inflicting the greatest single defeat of the war on the Soviets. Little is known of the activities in this period of the 37 Army, which was commanded by none other than Vlasov, who had done an excellent job—considering the circumstances—in commanding the Soviet rearguard actions

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[12] *Istoriia Vel. Otechst. Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1963), Vol. 2, p. 12.

[13] P. Kalinin, "Uchastie Sovetskikh Voinov v Partizanskom Dvizhenii Belorussii", *Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal*, 10–1962, pp. 34–8. Kruzhin (op. cit.) bases his account on this article which does not, however, give Bogdanov's rank and position; information on this must have come from another source. See also John Erickson, *The Road to Berlin* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1983), p. 96.

[14] *Kievskii Kransnoznamennyi* (Kiev: Kvo., 1969), p. 224.

at Kiev.[15] Sometime during this period, under circumstances not yet known, Dobroserdov was captured; the 37 Army itself was dissolved at the end of September and was re-formed in November under A. I. Lopatin to take part in the defence of Rostov. Little is known about Dobroserdov during his captivity although, as one who had served under Vlasov, he must have been a likely candidate for defection. Dobroserdov, however, remained loyal to the Soviet Union and returned home after the war.

Lt. General F. A. Ershakov was a true survivor. He took over the command of the Urals Military District in the summer of 1938 at the height of the purges and managed to hang on. In the first days of the war, the Urals Military District was renamed the 22 Army and thus became one of the three armies which the Soviet command threw recklessly into the inferno on the West Front. In early July, the 22 Army failed to stop the advance of the 3 Panzer Group toward Vitebsk and finally was destroyed in August. But Ershakov managed to escape. In September 1941 he assumed the command of the 20 Army, which was routed in its turn, in the battle of Smolensk, where he was captured under undisclosed circumstances.[16] He survived captivity. The 20 Army was re-formed in November under Vlasov to take part in the defence of Moscow.

In the Soviet pantheon of war heroes, few rank higher than Lt. General of Engineering Troops D. M. Karbyshev, a rather unusual fact considering that he spent almost the entire war in captivity. On 29 June 1941, while Karbyshev was visiting the 10 Army of the West Front, the column in which he was riding was ambushed and he was captured. During the next three and a half years Karbyshev was an inmate of a number of German concentration and death camps including Zamost, Hammelsburg, Majdanek, Auschwitz and finally Mauthausen. During his captivity he steadfastly refused to cooperate with the Germans even though he was too old, having been born in 1880, to be a leader of Soviet resistance, a task

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[15] The Soviet attempt to blacken Vlasov's name usually takes the form of ignoring his role during the war. There is no entry for him in the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia and there are time blanks in the histories of units that he commanded. The *History of the Kiev Military District* lists all units commanded by him, such as the 4 Mechanized Corps, the Kiev Defence Zone and the 37 Army under their chiefs of staff, while *Bitva za Moskvy* lists Vlasov's 20 Army under its deputy commander. There are occasional mentions of Vlasov in memoirs literature, for example by A. I. Rodimtsev, who served under Vlasov during the defence of Kiev as commander of the 5 Airborne Brigade. In his memoirs, *Na Beregakh Mansanaresa i Volgi* (Peterzavodsk: Karel. Kn. Izd., 1966) and *Tvoi, Otechestvo, Synov'ia* (Kiev: Politizdat., 1962), Rodimtsev, apparently possessing psychic powers, detected a potential traitor in Vlasov. The process of vilification continues under *glasnost*. *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (12–8–1987) repeats the old charges but also points out, correctly, that no other officer from the 2 Assault Army defected to the enemy, a fact not mentioned by Vlasov supporters.

[16] *Istoriia Uralskogo Voennogo Okruga* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1970); *Istoriia Vel. Otechst. Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941–1945*, Vol. 2, pp. 40, 65; V. A. Anfilov, *Nezabyvaemyi Sorok Pervyi* (Moscow: Sov. Rossiia, 1982), p. 102; *Bitva za Moskvy* (Moscow: Mosk. Raboch., 1966). p. 626.

which was left to younger men such as Nikitin and Tkhor. Karbyshev, a former Tsarist officer, served more as an inspiration to other prisoners such as the hero of the Brest Fortress (and future Gulag resident) Major Gavrilov, who met him in the summer of 1942 in Hammelsburg. Luck finally ran out for Karbyshev in Mauthausen when, on a typical day for this deadliest of concentration camps, on 12 February 1945, 400 prisoners were taken to the showers and clubbed to death, among them the elderly general, and their remains were cremated.[17]

Before the war Lt. General M. F. Lukin had commanded the Trans-Baikal Military District. In May 1941 an increasingly nervous Stalin started to take some half-measures to counter the unfriendly gestures that were being made by Hitler. These included the formation of the 16 Army, basing it on the Trans-Baikal Military District, which was then transferred to the Ukraine where it was duly decimated in the early days of the war. Lukin later commanded the 20 Army and subsequently the 19 Army, which was to suffer a similar fate in the battle of Smolensk in October 1941. Lukin, who lost a leg after capture and suffered from a paralysed arm was approached by Vlasov in December 1932, but refused to join the ROA ("Russian Liberation Army"). Similar efforts to lure Lukin by Vlasov's Chief of Staff, F. I. Trukhin, a former colleague, were also in vain. Lukin returned to the Soviet Union at the end of the war but was not restored to active rank, possibly because of his wounds.[18]

The case of Maj. General P. S. Mishutin is one engulfed in mystery and intrigue. Born in 1900, Mishutin had fought at Khalkhin Gol, and he commanded an unidentified rifle division in Byelorussia at the time of the German invasion, where he disappeared without trace (a fate to befall thousands of Soviet troops). In 1954, in response to what was probably a disinformation ploy by Western intelligence, the Soviets were informed that Mishutin was a high-ranking intelligence officer working in Frankfurt. According to this version, Mishutin, who had joined Vlasov during captivity, was recruited in the last days of the war by General Patch, commander of the US 7 Army, to become a Western agent. The real story, as related by the Russian writer L. Tamaev, had an NKVD case officer tracing Mishutin's steps and proving that he actually had been shot by the Germans after refusing to cooperate with them, an imposter then being

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[17] I. Voronets, "Pritiazhenie Pamiti", *Krasnaia zvezda*, 25–2–1955; *Soldat, Geroi, Uchenyi* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1961); E. G. Reshin, *General Karbyshev* (Moscow: Dosaaf, 1971); V. A. Anfilov, op. cit., p. 159. Other books with information about Karbyshev include: D. D. Davydov, *Vernost* (Moscow: Politizdat., 1984); V. S. Poznanskii, *D. M. Karbyshev* (Novosibirsk: Kn. Izd., 1980); T. N. Ivanova, *D. M. Karbyshev* (Omsk: Kn. Izd., 1980); *Istoriia Vel. Otechst. Voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941–1945*, Vol. 5, pp. 24, 217.

[18] *Ogonek*, No. 47, 1964, pp. 26–30; *Neotvratimoe Vozmezdie*, p. 293; Vasilev, op. cit., p. 438ff.; I. F. Stadniuk, *Voina* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1974), Vol. 3, p. 45.

used to recruit Soviet POWs to join Vlasov.[19] This version is not entirely convincing. The accounts of the Vlasov movement do not identify a Mishutin, and the Soviets, through their own agents among the POWs as well as from the post-war interrogation of Vlasov and his collaborators, undoubtedly would have ascertained the truth about Mishutin. In addition, if the real Mishutin had died a hero's death, it seems strange that no mention of him has been made in the Soviet histories of Khalkhin Gol. The case of Maj. General P. S. Mishutin therefore remains a mystery.

Lt. General I. N. Muzychenko commanded the 6 Army of the South-West Front at the beginning of the war. This powerful force included two of the gigantic Mechanized Corps which proved to be such great disappointments. The 6 Army managed to put up a spirited resistance in defending Lvov, thereby enabling the NKVD rearguard to commit mass atrocities against prisoners. This gave the Germans an additional excuse to incite anti-Jewish pogroms. The next battles of the 6 Army were fought at Brody and Berdichev, where poorly coordinated Soviet counter-attacks, lacking air support, ended in disaster. On 25 July, the 6 Army was transferred to the South Front and was destroyed in the Uman pocket, where Muzychenko was taken prisoner.[20] He survived captivity but was not restored to active command. It seems that generals (such as Muzychenko, Ponedelin and Kirillov) who had been captured at the South Front received harsher treatment from the Soviets than others.

Maj. General P. G. Novikov started the war as the head of a regiment fighting on the Prut and later on the Dnieper. During the defence of Odessa, Colonel Novikov commanded successively the 2 Cavalry Division and the 109 Rifle Division in the battle for Crimea, in the rearguard action in Sevastopol. On the night of 13 July 1942, the ship that was evacuating Novikov and other defenders was sunk and he was captured and sent to the Hammelsburg camp. One of the true incorrigibles, he was active in resistance there and later in the Flussenberg camp, where he was transferred by the Gestapo in the spring of 1943. He was murdered in February 1944.[21]

Maj. General S. Ia. Ogurtsov commanded the 10 Tank Division which was part of the 15 Mechanized Corps of the South-West Front. Its defeat in August 1941, as part of the "Volskii Group" south of Kiev, sealed the fate of that city. Ogurtsov was captured but managed to escape during transfer from Zamost to Hammelsburg. He joined a partisan group in Poland commanded by Manzhevidze, and was killed in action on 28 October 1942, in Tomaszow, Poland.[22]

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[19] *Cheskisty Rasskazyvaiut* (Moscow: Politizdat., 1973), Book 3, pp. 247–412.

[20] *Sovetskaia Voennaia Entsyklopedia* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1978), Vol. 8, pp. 192, 508.

[21] *Krasnaia zvezda*, 13–2–1966, pp. 2–3; I. A. Laskin, *Na Puti k Perelomu* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1974), p. 186.

[22] Reshin, op. cit., p. 271; *Kievskii Krasnoznamennyi*, p. 230; *Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal*, 10–

The fate of Maj. Generals P. G. Ponedelin and N. K. Kirillov is a good example of the arbitrariness and savagery that characterized Stalin's rule. On 25 July 1941, near Uman, the battered remnants of the Soviet 6 Army (commanded by the aforementioned I. N. Muzychenko) and the 12 Army were re-formed into "Battlegroup Ponedelin" and were placed under the command of the former commander of the 12 Army, General P. G. Ponedelin. The Battlegroup was ordered by the South Front, under which it was now operating, to break through the German encirclement. The attempt failed and the units involved were destroyed. Ponedelin and commander of the 13 Rifle Corps Maj. General N. K. Kirillov were captured. Shortly after this, the two generals were condemned as deserters and to this day their fate after returning from captivity remains unknown. Writing in 1960 during destalinization, the commander of the South Front, Army General I. V. Tiulenev, does not mention this fact but pointedly repeats the text of a telegram signed by him and another veteran Stalinist, Corps Commissar A. I. Zaporozhets, the political commissar of the same Front, in which Ponedelin is accused of "panic", a most serious crime under Stalin.[23] The facts, however, indicate that Ponedelin, an experienced officer who had served as Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District before the war, was being used as a convenient scapegoat for the failure of Tiulenev's own South Front. Only as late as 1983 did a Soviet book try to rectify the injustices that were done to Ponedelin and Kirillov, who had steadfastly refused to collaborate with the Germans during their captivity.[24] The last chapter in this sordid and tragic drama was perhaps written in the September and October 1988 issues of *Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal*, a publication which so far has been somewhat slow in catching up with the spirit of *glasnost*. The September issue published the Stavka Directive No. 270 of 17 August 1941. Marked "not for publication" and addressed to Party leaders down to local levels and signed, among others, by G. K. Zhukov, it accuses the commander of the 28 Army, Lt. General V. Ia. Kachalov (who in fact had died a hero's death on the battlefield), as well as Ponedelin and Kirillov of deserting to the enemy. The October issue has an article by Doctor of Historical Sciences I. I. Kuznetsov, which among other things, mentions Yezhov's name for the first time since the journal started publishing in 1959. According to Kuznetsov, after their capture Ponedelin and Kirillov were forced to pose for photographs with their

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1963, p. 61; E. G. Dolmatovskii, *Zelenaia Brama* (Moscow: Politizdat., 1983), p. 45; Z. K. Sliusarenko, *Poslednii Vystrel* (Moscow: Voenizdat.), p. 28; *Synovnii Dolg* (Kiev: Politizdat-Ukrainy, 1981), pp. 66–73. Kruzhin, op. cit., incorrectly identifies Ogurtsov as commander of the 49 Rifle Corps.

[23] I. V. Tiulenev, *Cherez Tri Voiny* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1960), pp. 155–6.

[24] Dolmatovskii, op. cit., pp. 15, 65, 74; I. Kh. Bagramian, *Tak Nachinalas' Voiny* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1971), p. 58.

captors and their pictures were dropped beyond the Russian lines, which convinced Stalin and Budennyi that they had deserted to the enemy. As a POW in Wolfheide camp, Ponedelin rejected the overtures from ROA ("Russian Liberation Army") and so did Kirillov, who was to end up in Dachau. In 1945 Ponedelin was liberated by American troops and immediately contacted the Soviet military mission in Paris. On 30 December 1945, Ponedelin and Kirillov were arrested. After five years of lingering on in Lefortovo prison at the height of the "Leningrad Affair" the two generals were dragged before a military tribunal, condemned to death and shot on 25 August 1950. The author omits the judge's name, blaming the whole thing on the "Beria machine" even though in 1950 the state security was run by Abakumov under the personal direction of Stalin. Two other generals, M. G. Snegov (CC 8 Rifle Corps) and P. V. Sysoev (CC 36 Rifle Corps) were also captured in Uman as part of the "Battlegroup Ponedelin", but apparently did not suffer any consequences when they returned from captivity.

Maj. General of Tank Troops M. I. Potapov was one of the five army commanders who were captured by the Germans. Potapov had fought with distinction at Khalkhin Gol where he commanded the Southern Group. In the beginning of the war he commanded the 5 Army of the South-West Front which perhaps fought better than any other large Soviet unit until Stalin's decision to hold on to Kiev sealed its fate. On 20 September 1941, during the mopping-up operations near Poltava, Potapov was captured and his political commissar killed. The Soviets claim that Hitler personally met Potapov and tried to persuade him to join the Germans, an offer which was rejected by the Soviet general. Despite this offer, Potapov does not seem to have been too active in the POW resistance movement. After the war he was allegedly flown to Moscow to receive the Order of Lenin and was later promoted two ranks to Colonel General. He was then appointed to the rather insignificant positions of the First Deputy Commander of the Odessa and Carpathian Military Districts.[25] His obituary was signed by the entire high command which included several marshals. The obituary mentioned nothing about his capture and imprisonment.[26]

The last Soviet general (and one of the two from the air force) to fall into the Germans' hands was Maj. General of Aviation I. S. Polbin, commander of the 6 Guard Bomber Corps flying in support of the 6 Army which, in February 1945, had surrounded Breslau. He was shot down, captured and later murdered, after his real identity had been discovered. His fate was anything but unusual for any Soviet soldier who had the misfortune to be captured in the last months of the war. The claim by

[25] Dolmatovskii, op. cit., pp. 168–75.
[26] *Krasnaia zvezda*, 28–2–1965, p. 4.

Soviet ace S. D. Luganskii that Polbin's head was flown for personal inspection by Hitler need not be taken seriously.[27]

Division Commissar E. P. Rykov was one of the two high-ranking political commissars who were captured by the Germans, the other being Brigade Commissar G. N. Zhelenikov, who managed to conceal his identity and finally joined Vlasov. Rykov, born in 1906, had joined the Red Army in 1928 and at the start of the war was the political commissar of the Central Asia Military District. In July 1941 he was appointed as one of the two political commissars attached to the South-West Front, the other being M. A. Burmistenko, an official of the Ukraine Communist Party, who was mainly a political rather than a military personality. During the break-out from the Kiev pocket Burmistenko as well as Commander of the Front M. P. Kirponos and Chief of Staff V. I. Tupikov were killed while Rykov, who was wounded, was captured. Hitler's Order required execution of all captured political commissars, a decision in which the Wehrmacht fully cooperated, even if it meant killing such valuable sources of information as Rykov. According to the Soviets he was tortured to death.[28]

Maj. General A. G. Samokhin was one of the few generals not captured in 1941. Samokhin, who had served as the Soviet military attaché to Yugoslavia before the war, was appointed as commander of the 48 Army in the spring of 1942. On the way to assume his command, his plane landed in enemy-held Mtsensk rather than Yelets. According to the former chief of staff of the 48 Army, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union S. I. Biriuzov, the Germans captured along with Samokhin the Soviets' plans for the 1942 summer offensive and were thus able to counteract them.[29] It is interesting that shortly after this, the Russians also captured the Germans' summer offensive plans in a similar fashion, but either drew the wrong conclusions from them or simply ignored them. The result was the fiasco at Kharkov and a defeat of 1941 magnitude. Samokhin returned from captivity and died in 1954.

Maj. General P. V. Sysoev, commander of the 36 Rifle Corps, was captured dressed as a common soldier and managed to escape and join a nationalist Ukrainian armed band before deserting to the pro-Soviet Ukrainian partisans led by the famous A. F. Federov. He refused to return to Moscow, preferring to stay with the partisans where he was not particularly active. After the Soviet forces returned to the Ukraine, Sysoev returned to Moscow and, according to Federov, was rehabilitated.[30]

Maj. General of Aviation G. I. Tkhor, commander of the 62 Air Division,

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[27] S. D. Luganskii, *Na Glubokikh Virazhakh* (Alma Ata: Kasgoslitizdat., 1963), p. 145; I. S. Konev, "Sorok Piatyi God", *Novy mir*, 6–1965, p. 7; *Krasnaia zvezda*, 2–11–1968, p. 4.
[28] *Krasnaia zvezda*, 18–1–1966, p. 4; *Kievskii Krasnoznamennyi*, p. 266.
[29] S. I. Biriuzov, *Surovye Gody* (Moscow: Nauka., 1966), pp. 83–5.
[30] *Ogonek*, No. 23, 1964, pp. 14–15.

was an excellent soldier. He had joined the Communist Party in 1926 and the Red Army in 1931. In 1936 he went to Spain and flew in over 100 combat missions. In 1938 he served in China. In September 1941, while flying as a commander in the Long Distance Air Division, he was shot down and was wounded in the ensuing combat on the ground. He spent time in a number of POW camps and was active in the resistance in Hammelsburg with other Russian generals, particularly I. S. Nikitin, a fact which could not have escaped the attention of the Gestapo. In December 1942 there was a crackdown and Tkhor was sent to Flussenberg, where on 23 February 1943 he received the "special treatment".[31]

Maj. General S. V. Vishnevskii commanded the 22 Army for less than two weeks before he was captured. The Army was thrown into battle in early October 1941 near Smolensk, mainly as cannon fodder and was decimated within a few days. This was at a time when Stalin was confronting the possibility of a military collapse and was planning his escape to Kiubyshev, a fact which did not keep him from ordering the executions of a number of high-ranking officers, who were shot on 16 October 1941. The machinery of terror never went out of use under Stalin. Like so many other generals, Vishnevskii eventually ended up in Hammelsburg, where in December 1941 he became one of 28 high-ranking Soviet officers who were arrested by the Gestapo. Unlike some of his colleagues, he survived captivity and returned to the USSR after the war. During the post-war years he served as the head of the "Za vozvrashchenie na Rodinu" committee, formed to encourage émigrés to return to the Soviet Union.[32] The political commissar of the 22 Army was not so lucky. Brigade Commissar M. N. Zhilenkov joined the Vlasov movement, no doubt influenced by his experiences with the 22 Army, and was hanged after the war.[33]

Maj. General A. S. Zotov has the distinction of having written the most detailed memoirs of any Soviet general who returned from captivity. As the commander of an unidentified unit he was captured in Lithuania on the very first day of the war. He finally ended up in Sachsenhausen where he was active in the resistance movement, which as well as Soviet POWs included representatives from other nationalities. His colleagues there included Maj. Generals S. A. Tkachenko and I. M. Skugarev and Maj. General of Aviation G. I. Tkhor.[34]

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[31] *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 10–1960, pp. 178–83; Reshin, op. cit., p. 305. *V Nebe Kitaia* (Moscow: Nauka., 1966), pp. 37–40.

[32] *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, 4–1960, p. 182; *Za vozvrashchenie zvezda*, 4–1955.

[33] *Bitva za Moskvy*, p. 267. Strangely enough, this book lists the Vlasovite Zhilenkov as the commissar of the 22 Army but lists Vlasov's 20 Army under its deputy commanders. Jurgen Thorwald's account of Zhilenkov, op. cit., pp. 182–3, as well as that of Reitlinger, op. cit., pp. 234–6, contain a number of errors.

[34] A. S. Zotov, *Nezmirnyi Front* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1973); *Militärgeschichte*, 2–1985, p. 142.

Maj. General of Rear Services G. M. Zusmanovich was one of the two high-ranking medical officers captured by the Germans and the only Jew among the generals. The circumstances of his capture remain unclear. He managed to hide his ethnic background in Hammelsburg, but apparently was betrayed, with the expected consequences. Born in 1889, and a Party member since 1915, Zusmanovich took part in the civil war as commander of Red Guard units in Pavlovgrad and later as commissar of the Volunteer Army. In 1918 he was a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Reserve Army and held various other commands on the South Front. In 1920 he served as military commissar in the Orel Military District and in the Dagestan Republic. During peacetime he was attached to the 45 Cavalry Division and later served as assistant commander of the Transcaucasus Military District and as assistant head of the Quartermaster Academy. In September 1941 he was appointed as head of the Rear for the 6 Army and shortly thereafter was captured.[35]

The remaining captive generals, who are less known, can be divided into three categories. Those who died in captivity include Maj. General M. M. Shestopalov, commander of the 12 Mechanized Corps of the North-West Front. This unit was formed in February 1941 in the Baltic Military District, and was destroyed in defensive battles in August 1941. Shestopalov was wounded during the fighting and died in captivity on 6 August 1941.[36] Maj. General S. E. Danilov, about whom little is known, died in February 1944 in the Flussenberg concentration camp.[37]

The second group, comprising those who were murdered during captivity because of resistance activity, include Maj. General Kh. N. Alaverdov (also listed as Alaverdian), commander of the 113 Rifle Division which fought in defence of Kiev.[38] He was, along with Maj. General I. S. Nikitin, a leader of the resistance in Hammelsburg, and was arrested on 1 January 1942. Maj. General I. S. Nikitin was commander of the 6 Cavalry Corps, which took part in the defence of Minsk at the end of July 1941. After his capture, Nikitin was transferred to Hammelsburg where he was active in resistance. He was murdered in April 1942.[39] There are also references to Maj. General of Medical Services T. Ia. Novikov in Majdanek concentration

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[35] *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 4, 1960, p. 179; *Vnutrennie Voiska Sovetskoi Respubliki, 1917–1922* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1972), p. 683: Zusmanovich, although not a Chekist, is listed here.

[36] P. Kuznetsov, *General Cherniakhovskii* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1969), p. 25; V. A. Anfilov, *Bessmertnyi Podvig* (Moscow: Nauka., 1961), p. 123; M. Parrish, "The Soviet Mechanized Corps in 1941", *Military Affairs*, 4–1983, p. 65; *Istoriia Pribaltiiskogo Voennogo Okruga* (Riga: Prib. Vo., 1968), p. 44; A. A. Sharipov, *General Cherniakhovskii* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1971), p. 47.

[37] *Soldat, Geroi, Uchenyi*, p. 180.

[38] K. Tskitishvili, *Na Frontakh Velikoi Otechestvennoi* (Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1975), p. 85; *Soldat, Geroi, Uchenyi*, p. 164.

[39] *Krasnaia zvezda*, 26–8–1956, 29–8–1956 and 31–8–1956; *Soldat, Geroi, Uchenyi*, p. 164.

camp in February 1944, where he apparently lost his life.[40] Also suffering the same fate was Maj. General I. A. Presniakov, listed incorrectly as commander of the 113 Rifle Division by Kruzhin, who obviously confused him with Alaverdov.[41] Even less is known about Maj. General of Artillery V. N. Sotenskii. The writer Vasilev in an article written in 1969 refers to him as "Sotennyi", but in a book written by the same author in 1970 he is correctly identified as Sotenskii, the name listed in the generals'-rank list published in 1940.[42] Sotenskii was associated with another victim, Maj. General S. A. Shepchuk, the commander of the 10 Guard Cavalry Division.[43] The last member of this group is Maj. General I. M. Shepetov, who in August 1941 commanded the 96 Alpine Division.[44]

Among those who returned to the USSR after the war were the following: Maj. General M. D. Borisov, commander of the 8 Cavalry Corps which took part in the Soviet counter-attack towards Stalingrad. Cutting through Romanian units, this unit, along with others, advanced towards Chir and closed the gap that was to doom the German 6 Army. The 8 Cavalry Corps, however, was decidedly less successful in its next outing. In mid-February 1943, fresh from their Stalingrad triumph, Soviet units advanced deeply through German lines towards Kiev and Donbass; among them was the weak "Battlegroup Popov", to which the 8 Cavalry Corps was attached. Despite the extravagant claims made on behalf of Soviet intelligence during the war, the Russian forces, here including the 8 Cavalry Corps, walked into a clever trap set by Field-Marshal Manstein, and were badly mauled. The Soviet high command's solution was characteristically Stalinist; the 8 Cavalry Corps was honoured by being renamed the 7 Guard Cavalry Corps and was left to its own devices on the frozen steppe hundreds of miles from Soviet lines. During the break-out and retreat, Borisov was captured and one of his divisional commanders killed, whereupon the unit ceased to exist.[45]

Lt. General of Artillery L. A. Mazanov fell into German hands in July 1943. As the artillery commander of the 10 Guard Army, he was also temporarily assigned to the same position with the 16 Guard Rifle Corps attached to Bagramian's neighbouring 11 Guard Army. During an exchange of fire with German Tigers near Medyntsevo, the corps commander A. V. Lapshov was killed and Mazanov captured. After his return, he served in the army until 1953, attached to the General Staff Academy. He died in

[40] *Soldat, Geroi, Uchenyi*, p. 185; V. Degtiarev, *Pobezhdaia Smert* (Rostov: Kn. Izd., 1962), p. 130.
[41] *Moskva*, 9–1967, p. 139.
[42] *Moskva*, 9–1967, pp. 138, 155; Vasilev, op. cit., p. 440.
[43] *Moskva*, 9–1967, p. 138.
[44] *Krasnaia zvezda*, 29–12–1965; Dolmatovskii, op. cit., p. 76.
[45] K. K. Rokossovskii, *Velikaia Pobeda na Volge* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1965), pp. 267–503); *Sovetskaia Kavaleriia* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1981), pp. 220, 232.

1960.[46] Little is known about Maj. General of Tank Troops N. F. Mikhailov who apparently was captured while commanding a tank brigade. In 1955 he replaced the aforementioned Maj. General S. V. Vishnevskii as chairman of the "Za vozvrashchenie na Rodinu" committee.[47]

Other generals who were captured and returned but about whom we know little include Maj. General P. I. Abramidze, who commanded the 72 Alpine Division in the 6 Army of the South-West Front in July and August 1941.[48] The circumstances of his capture and return remain unknown. Similarly, little is known about Maj. General of Tank Troops A. G. Potaturchev, who last commanded the 4 Tank Division, and Maj. General of Artillery I. P. Prokhorov, whose last command was as the head of artillery of the 20 Army.[49] Maj. General I. M. Skugarev is listed in the general's-rank list of 1940, but his command at the time of capture remains unknown. He was apparently active in resistance in Sachsenhausen, but his effectiveness was diminished because of a bout of TB.[50] Maj. General M. G. Snegov was captured as commander of the 8 Rifle Corps which was destroyed in August 1941 near Uman as part of the Battlegroup Ponedelin.[51]

Maj. General S. A. Tkachenko, commander of the 44 Alpine Division, was captured in 1941. He survived despite having been active in the resistance.[52] Maj. General Ia. I. Tonkonogov was also captured in 1941. He survived and as late as 1980 resided in Kiev.[53]

There is also a Soviet reference to one Maj. General P. P. Pavlov being in captivity, but further information was not available.[54] German records also indicate the capture of a further six Soviet generals including Maj. General V. V. Kirpichnikov, identified as commander of the 43 Rifle Division deployed near Vyborg; Maj. General D. G. Egorov, identified, incorrectly, as commander of the 4 Rifle Corps—he was actually commander of the 14 Rifle Corps; Maj. General of Artillery G. I. Fedorov, commander of the artillery of the 6 Army; Maj. General N. I. Proshkin, commander of the 58 Rifle Division; Brigade Commander S. P. Zybin, commander of the 37 Rifle Corps (according to Soviet sources killed in action in August 1941); Maj. General A. P. Kostenko, captured at the same time as M. I. Potapov; Maj. General P. G. Makarov, whose position is not identified; and one

[46] *Voenno istoricheskii zhurnal*, 7–1963, p. 92; I. Kh. Bagramian, *Tak Shli My k Pobede* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1977), p. 216.
[47] *Za vozvrashchenie na Rodinu*, 4–1955.
[48] *Kievskii Krasnoznamennyi*, p. 225; Dolmatovskii, op. cit., p. 174.
[49] Vasilev, op. cit., p. 438.
[50] Zotov, op. cit., p. 137. The article by Doehler and Dorow in *Militärgeschichte*, 2–1985, merely identifies him incorrectly as "Shugarev" while Kruzhin fails to mention him at all.
[51] *Kievskii Krasnoznamennyi*, p. 225; P. S. Grushevoi, *Togda v Sorok Pervom* (Moscow: Voenizdat., 1972), p. 35; Dolmatovskii, op. cit., pp. 80, 174; Vasilev, op. cit., p. 348.
[52] Dolmatovskii, op. cit., p. 83.
[53] Ibid., pp. 7, 174, 176.
[54] Reshin, op. cit., p. 306.

Maj. General Sokolov who was associated with the Rear Services of the West Front. I have been unable to find any confirmation in Soviet sources of these, except for the commands held by D. G. Egorov, G. I. Fedorov, and S. P. Zybin.[55]

Maj. General I. P. Krupennikov was an experienced staff officer who had served as chief-of-staff of three different armies during the battle of Stalingrad. As a colonel (he was promoted to general on 4 August 1942) he was chief-of-staff of the 63 Army between 17 July 1942 and 1 November 1942, when he was appointed to the same position with the 1 Guard Army (its second formation) until 5 December 1942. At this date he was assigned to the 3 Guard Army where he served until he was captured on 20 December in undisclosed circumstances. According to Sven Steenberg, Vlasov's biographer, Krupennikov was interrogated by Maj. Heinz Herre of the "Foreign Armies East" and expressed conditional interest in joining the fight against Stalin; but Vlasov refused to meet Krupennikov and apparently nothing came of these attempts.[56] The Soviet sources list Krupennikov as an officer of good standing but say nothing about his capture.

It is interesting to note that of the over 50 Soviet generals and high-ranking commissars who fell into enemy hands, only six openly collaborated with the Germans. All the officers had witnessed the ravages of the purges and most were captured in 1941, when the army, touted as invincible and led by the Greatest Military Leader of All Time, collapsed before an enemy which was quantitatively and qualitatively inferior. They had every reason to believe themselves to be abandoned (the military memoirs published in the Khrushchev years by such men as the future Marshal S. I. Biriuzev confirm that even some of the survivors shared this feeling); and having known of the fate of Soviet POWs extradited from Finland, after the Winter War, they could have been under no illusion about the kind of welcome they would receive at the end of the war in the unlikely event (or so it may have seemed to them in 1941) of a Soviet victory. Yet despite the atrocious conditions of the camps and the temptations of their Vlasovite colleagues, they refused to defect, and in fact many of them engaged in acts of resistance and sabotage for which they could have expected no mercy.

In his perceptive memoirs, the British prisoner Christopher Burney, who had spent fifteen months in the hell-hole of Buchenwald, rated the Russian POWs as the best among those in the camp. He was moved by their selflessness, stoicism, discipline, cheerfulness and their great love for their country. For almost all of them, Buchenwald was their first glimpse of what had boasted to be a civilized society and they were not favourably

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[55] OKH FHO 2383/87, 27 Oct. 41; OKH FHO 2383/41, 27 Oct. 41; V. S. Anfilov, *Bessmertnyi Podvig*, pp. 407, 434; *Kievskii Krasnoznamennyi*, pp. 113, 119, 193; Janus Piekalkiewicz, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf: Econ., 1985), p. 510.

[56] Steenberg, op. cit., p. 53; Rokossovskii, op. cit., p. 231, 499, 501.

impressed. The result was an unconscious waxing of their pride in their country and a growing sense of paranoia towards strangers. Another British prisoner, Christopher Portway, captured in Caen in 1944, was equally impressed by the courage and patriotism of the Russian POWs.[57]

In recent years we have seen the increasing popularity of the view that the Red Army is a hapless giant torn by racial and class conflicts. This is the view which has been put forward by some Soviet defectors and their Western apologists. Regardless of what one might think of the performance of the Red Army in Afghanistan, the low rate of desertion should provide proof that the Soviet armed forces are not about to come apart at the seams. Hitler's "rotting corpse" theory, by which he persuaded himself to embark on Operation Barbarossa, must also provide ample warning. Despite the problems faced by the Soviet state we should never forget the strength of Russian nationalism and patriotism—misguided as it may seem at times. The greatest enigma of the Second World War continues to be the fact that at least 20 million Russians made the supreme sacrifice in order to perpetuate the most bloody dictatorship of our time.

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Soviet Generals in German Captivity:

Name	Last Rank and Command	Fate
Abramidze, P. I.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 72 Alpine Division (8–1941)	Returned
Alaverdov (Alaverdian), Kh. N.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 113 Rifle Division	Killed in captivity (Hammelsburg 1942)
Artemenko, P. D.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 27 Rifle Corps (7–1941)	Returned
Blagoveshchenskii, I. A.	Maj. General Commander of Military School in Libau (1941)	Vlasovite

[57] Christopher Burney, *The Dungeon Democracy* (London: Heinemann, 1946), pp. 61–79; Christopher Portway, *Journey to Dana* (London: Kimber), pp. 100–103. Christopher Portway, the British writer, was captured in the summer of 1944 near Caen and spent the rest of the war in POW camps in Germany and Czechoslovakia, from which he finally escaped.

Name	Last Rank and Command	Fate
Bogdanov, P. V.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 48 Rifle Division Baltic Military District	Collaborator, returned to Soviet side. Fate unknown
Borisov, M. D.	Maj. General CC 7 Guard Cavalry Corps (2–43)	Returned?
Danilov, S. E.	Maj. General (5–1940)	Died in captivity
Dobroserdov, K. L.	Maj. General (5–1940) Chief of Staff 37 Army (9–41)	Returned
Egorov, D. G.	Maj. General CC 14 Rifle Corps (6–41)	?
Ershakov, F. A.	Lt. General (5–40) CC 20 Army (10–1941)	Returned
Fedorov, G. I.	Maj. General Artillery (5–40) CC Artillery 6 Army (1941)	?
Karbyshev, D. M.	Lt. General of Engineering Troops (5–1940)	Killed in captivity 12–2–1945
Kirillov, N. K.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 13 Rifle Corps (8–1941)	Returned. Executed 1950
Kirpichnikov, V. V.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 43 Rifle Division?	?
Kornilov, I. A.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 49 Rifle Corps	Returned
Kostenko, A. P.	Maj. General (South-West Front, 8–1941?)	?

Name	Last Rank and Command	Fate
Krupennikov, I. P.	Maj. General Chief of Staff 3 Guard Army (20–12–1942)	?
Kuleshov, A. D.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 64 Rifle Corps (7–1941)	Died in captivity
Lukin, M. F.	Lt. General (5–1940) CC 19 Army (10–1941)	Returned
Malyshkin, V. F.	Maj. General Chief of Staff 19 Army (1941)	Vlasovite
Mazanov, L. A.	Lt. General Artillery CC Artillery 10 Guard Army (8–1943)	Returned
Makarov, P. G.	Maj. General (5–1940)	?
Mikhailov, N. F.	Maj. General of Tank Troops	Returned
Mishutin, P. S.	Maj. General CC Rifle Division (1941)	Killed in captivity
Muzychenko, I. N.	Lt. General (5–1940) CC 6 Army South-West Front (1941)	Returned
Nikitin, I. S.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 5 Cavalry Corps	Killed in captivity (Hammelsburg 1942)
Novikov, P. G.	Maj. General CC Rear Guard Sevastopol (1942)	Killed in captivity (Flussenberg 11–1943)
Novikov, P. Ia.	Maj. General Medical Services	?
Novikov, T. Ia.	Maj. General CC 108 RD (8–1942)	Killed in captivity

Name	Last Rank and Command	Fate
Ogurtsov, S. Ia.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 10 Tank Division South-West Front (8–1941)	Killed in action as partisan (10–1942)
Pavlov, P. P.	Maj. General	?
Polbin, I. S.	Maj. General of Aviation CC 6 Guard Bomber Corps (2–45)	Killed in captivity
Ponedelin, P. G.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC "Battlegroup Ponedelin" (7–41)	Returned. Executed 1950
Potapov, M. I.	Maj. General of Tank Troops CC 5 Army (7–1941)	Returned
Potaturchev, A. G.	Maj. General of Tank Troops (5–40) CC 4 Tank Division	Returned
Presniakov, I. A.	Maj. General CC 5 Moscow Militia Division	Killed in captivity
Prokhorov, I. P.	Maj. General Artillery (5–40) CC Artillery 20 Army (1941)	Killed in captivity (Flussenberg 1943)
Proshkin, N. I.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 58 Rifle Division (8–1941)	Died in captivity (Zamost)
Romanov, N. T.	Maj. General CC a Rifle Division	Returned
Rykov, E. P.	Division Commissar Commissar South-West Front (8–1941)	Killed in captivity (8–1941)

Name	Last Rank and Command	Fate
Salikhov, M. B.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 60 Alpine Division South Front (8–1941)	Condemned to death for desertion. Returned, fate unknown
Samokhin, A. G.	Maj. General (5–40) CC 48 Army (spring 1942)	Returned
Shepchuk, S. A.	Maj. General CC 10 Guard Cavalry Division	Killed in captivity
Shepetov, I. M.	Maj. General CC 96 Alpine Division (5–1942)	Killed in captivity
Shestopalov, N. M.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 12 Mechanized Corps	Died of wounds in captivity 6–8–1941
Skugarev, I. M.	Maj. General (5–1940)	Returned?
Snegov, M. G.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 8 Rifle Corps	Returned
Sokolov	Maj. General Rear Services West Front?	?
Sotenskii, V. N.	Maj. General of Artillery (5–40) CC Artillery 5 Army (7–1941)	Killed in captivity (Wultzberg 21–5–1945)
Sysoev, P. V.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 36 Rifle Corps	Returned after serving with partisans
Tkachenko, S. A.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 44 Alpine Division	Returned
Tkhor, G. I.	Maj. General Aviation (5–1940) CC Division in Strategic Air Force	Killed in captivity

Name	Last Rank and Command	Fate
Tonkonogov, Ia. I.	Maj. General (5–1940) ?	Returned
Trukhin, F. I.	Maj. General Head Operations Section, North-West Front (1941)	Vlasovite
Vishnevskii, S. V.	Maj. General CC 22 Army (10–1941)	Returned
Vlasov, A. A.	Lt. General CC 2 Assault Army (5–42)	Vlasovite
Zakutnyi, D. E.	Maj. General (5–1940) CC 21 Rifle Corps	Vlasovite
Zhilenkov, G. N.	Brigade Commissar Political Commissar of the 22 Army (1941)	Vlasovite
Zotov, A. S.	Maj. General Baltic Military District (1941)	Returned
Zusmanovich, G. M.	Maj. General Rear Services (5–1940)	Killed in captivity (1944)
Zybin, S. P.	Brigade Commander CC 37 Rifle Corps (6–1941)	According to Russian records Zybin was actually killed in action in August 1941

Soviet Foreign Policy Since 1917: Achievements and Failures

Walter C. Clemens, Jr.*

THE DEEPEST FACTORS militating for change in Soviet life are probably domestic—particularly economic. Soviet Communism generated the world's second largest economy, only to yield this distinction to Japan—a country with far fewer natural resources. In some gross measures of output, the USSR is still Number One. But the Soviet Union has squandered many of its assets and now faces painful consequences. The new Party leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, has been trying to revitalize the Soviet system to reverse its physical and spiritual stagnation.

A similar trend has characterized Soviet foreign policy. Kremlin diplomacy has helped the Soviet system to endure and to extend its influence globally, but the costs have been extremely high, often harming the country's internal development.

Soviet appraisals of the USSR's achievements and failures tend to be one-sided. Celebrating the October revolution, the Party Central Committee asserted in 1977 that the world's first socialist state is "the main event of the twentieth century," because it showed humanity how to liberate itself from war, how to become more productive and creative.[1] One decade later Gorbachev issued his own assessment, contending that "Great October" ushered in a "new dawn" for humanity. He even endorsed collectivization, affirmed the necessity of the 1939 pact with Germany, and praised Stalin's contributions to the war effort. His candour was probably somewhat muted by resistance to his reform campaigns.[2]

To understand the need for change in Soviet policy we must know how

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[1] *Pravda*, 1 February, 1977.

[2] Gorbachev concluded: "In October 1917 we left an old world. . . . We are going to a new world—the world of Communism." M. S. Gorbachev, "Oktyabr i perestroika: revoliutsiya prodolzhaetsia," *Kommunist*, No. 11, November 1987, pp. 3–40. Foreign affairs essayist Stanislav Kondrashov has warned, however, that while not long ago "doing things for show" (*pokazukha*) dominated Soviet life, there is now a danger that people will take a superficial, mechanical follow-the-crowd approach to the challenges of *perestroika*. For his remarks and the sometimes critical reflections of other writers on the past seventy years, see *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 28 October 1987, pp. 2–3.

effectively the USSR has conducted its policies. How does the balance sheet look to an outside observer?[3]

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[3] This analysis builds upon surveys that I conducted at the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in 1976–7 and a follow-up survey in 1987 conducted among former Kennan Fellows, all of them specialists on Soviet history and foreign policy. The survey instrument was quite open-ended. It asked respondents to list five to fifteen major successes and failures of Soviet foreign policy since 1917, given what they believed to have been the objectives of Soviet leaders, and to list several of the underlying reasons that account for these successes and failures. Considering the complexity of the task, it is gratifying that more than one in five addressees responded to the 1987 survey. The twenty-five respondents are persons of stature in Soviet studies—historians and political analysts, most of them academics, but many with significant experience as government analysts or as diplomats. They are Anton Bebler, Cole Blasier, Henry Bradsher, Timothy J. Colton, Robert V. Daniels, Hon. R. T. Davies, Dennis J. Dunn, Hon. Robin Edmonds, Hon. Hans von Herwarth, Hak-Joon Kim, Jacob W. Kipp, Wladislaw Krasnow, Lyman Legters, S. Neil MacFarlane, Alfred G. Meyer, Roger Munting, Brig. Gen. William E. Odom, Walter M. Pintner, Thomas F. Remington, Yaacov Roi, Harriet F. Scott, Seth Singleton, Darrell Slider, Robert Wesson, Robert C. Williams.

Most respondents are US citizens, but some are citizens of Canada, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, the Republic of Korea and Yugoslavia. Soviet scholars who have worked at Kennan were also addressed, but they have not replied. A smaller, but equally distinguished, group of scholars responded to the 1976–7 survey. George F. Kennan, Fred W. Neal and Peter H. Vigor graciously offered their own evaluations in long, focused discussions at that time.

To help put the Soviet survey in a broader perspective, a parallel set of questions about US foreign policy was put to Americanists at the Wilson Center—Both in 1976–7 and in 1987—and long, analytical discussions were held with Henry S. Commager and J. William Fulbright. A researcher at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies told me in 1987 that, in the age of *glasnost,* it might be feasible for Soviet scholars to take part in the survey of US but not of Soviet foreign policy results, but nothing came of my efforts to obtain Soviet participation in either survey.

A wide ideological spectrum is represented among the respondents, but they share a considerable consensus regarding Moscow's successes and failures. Appraisals do not vary greatly with policy orientations (hard-line or moderate), though US government specialists tend to focus on Soviet territorial acquisitions while some scholars focus on abstractions such as "new type actor" in international relations. Variations in responses hinge more upon respondents' own geographic interests or concerns with particular time periods. Some emphasize the ironies of history—what we get may be quite different from what we sought—and the difficulties in distinguishing short- and long-term results. The 1987 respondents express a somewhat dimmer perspective on Soviet accomplishments and prospects than did the earlier survey, in part because of Moscow's enlarged role in Third World conflicts during the elapsed ten years. On balance, however, the various perspectives complement rather than contradict one another. Their synergy brings together viewpoints that supplement one another and help us to develop a broader understanding of a complex reality.

Rather than detail the individual responses (tabulations are available from the author), this analysis endeavours to sketch the broad picture that emerges from the survey. In so doing it simplifies and omits some nuances in individual responses. It is one person's balance-sheet, aided greatly by the generosity and wisdom of many colleagues. Indeed, some respondents might object to some statements here, especially my interpretation of "underlying reasons." And a few might even put some "failures" of the present listing in the "success" column! While this entire exercise endeavours to analyse policy outcomes in the light of Kremlin objectives, Soviet analysts might well interpret history quite differently. Indeed, each set of Kremlin leaders has appeared to view the track-record divergently. Stalin may have been relatively content with the results of his policies; Khrushchev was not. Brezhnev and Gorbachev expressed dissatisfaction with what went before them.

Successes

1917–1921: *Survival of the Bolshevik régime despite civil war and foreign intervention.*

The Soviets quickly learned to manoeuvre and "exploit contradictions" among their enemies—while marshalling the human and material resources of the world's largest country. They also gained in self-confidence. Beginning with the 1918 Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Bolsheviks learned how to use diplomacy as a way of buying time and regrouping.[4] Lenin dismissed arguments about the need to await salvation from a German proletarian uprising or to embark on a revolutionary offensive as idle daydreams. Six months after the treaty, the Kaiser fell and the Bolsheviks repudiated the treaty; indeed, as Lenin boasted, they had already violated it time and again.

The success of Lenin's approach helped generated a habit of hard-headed *Realpolitik*, one that produced repeated accords with Germany—under Wilhelm, Weimar, Hitler, Adenauer, Brandt, Schmidt and Kohl—despite ideological, political and economic differences between the two countries.

1922–1934: *Normalization of diplomatic relations with the West.*

Having survived its traumatic birth, the Soviet Republic went on to break from its isolation. It signed peace treaties with the Baltic republics, Finland and Poland in 1920–21; concluded friendship treaties with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in 1921; entered into clandestine military collaboration with Germany; dispatched a large delegation to the 1922 Genoa Economic Conference where, unable to reach a broad accord with the Entente powers, Soviet diplomats concluded a side deal with Germany. Europe's two "pariah states" retired to Rapallo to sign an agreement providing for the resumption of full diplomatic relations, cancellation of mutual claims, and establishment of most-favoured-nations treatment.[5] In George F. Kennan's words, Rapallo "drove an entering wedge, on terms favourable to Moscow, into the problem of diplomatic relations and resumption of trade relations between Russia and the West."[6]

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[4] Few events in this analysis require bibliographic citations because they are treated in standard texts by Joseph L. Nogee, Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Adam Ulam and other scholars. What is unique in this analysis is not documentation of specific turns in Soviet policy but rather the systematic attempt to rank successes, failures and underlying factors, based in part on a survey of experts—many of them authors of basic works in the field. Still, footnote references are provided where an authority is quoted or where a little know work may shed light on the issue.

[5] For a Soviet study based on German as well as Soviet archives, see A. Akhtamzian, *Rapall'skaya politika* (Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Moscow, 1974).

[6] George F. Kennan, *Russian and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Mentor, New York, 1961), p. 212.

In 1924 Britain and Italy vied for the distinction of being the next European countries to recognize the Soviet régime. Soon France and China followed in their train. Weimar Germany signed a kind of reinsurance treaty with Moscow before joining the League in 1926. Only when the United States had been humbled by the Great Depression, however, did Washington finally recognize the USSR in 1933. The following year the USSR joined the League of Nations.

Creation of a new kind of actor in world affairs.

The style and content of Soviet foreign relations was revolutionary: Lenin championed open diplomacy and supported national self-determination even before Woodrow Wilson. The Bolsheviks created the Comintern in 1919 and later other "non-governmental" agencies that could promote Soviet objectives abroad. In 1922–23 the Soviets created a new kind of multinational entity, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which later expanded to include other border republics. Recognition of the USSR by other states helped to legitimize Soviet imperium.

1939–1941: *The Molotov-Ribbentrop accords.*

Having lost hope in the willingness of Britian and France to oppose German expansion, Stalin struck a sphere-of-influence deal with Hitler, permitting the USSR to advance its domain far and wide across eastern Europe. The "non-agression" treaty was retrospectively justified as "buying" time in which Stalin could have prepared for an eventual clash with the Third Reich, though he used this alleged breathing-space poorly and unrealistically.

1930s–1945: *Policy towards Japan.*

The Kremlin helped contain Japanese expansionism by an adroit combination of appeasement and military rebuffs in the 1930s, and negated the Anti-Comintern Pact by a non-agression treaty with Japan in 1941. Moscow thus avoided a major two-front war and put off the moment of reckoning with Tokyo until August 1945, after victory in Europe. By joining in the last days of war against Japan, the USSR "earned" the territorial enlargements already approved in meetings with Roosevelt and Churchill. The Red Army's advance also helped Moscow to install a Communist régime in North Korea and to deal with Manchuria in a manner that aided the Soviet economy and left arms for the Chinese Communists.

1941–1945: *Military and diplomatic conduct of the Great Patriotic War.*

Recovering from the initial German *Blitz*, the USSR mobilized its vast resources to envelop, destroy and rout the Wehrmacht. Soviet diplomacy

secured a Grand Alliance with Britain and the United States which facilitated economic and military assistance and kept up pressure for a Second Front; it helped generate an idealized image of "Uncle Joe"; and it negotiated wartime records to prepare the ground for postwar settlements advantageous to the USSR. After horrendous losses of life and property, the Kremlin achieved the greatest ever extension of Russian influence and control east and west. The war ended with Germany and Japan prostrate, unable to pose a threat to Russia far into the foreseeable future, and with the USSR a leading member of the Big Three. If the Grand Coalition did not endure, the USSR had a veto in the Security Council and a broad glacis to buffer threats from any quarter.

1943–1948: *Satellization of Eastern Europe.*

By diplomacy, coercion and support for local Communists the USSR managed to establish a belt of compliant Communist régimes from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic. This was done without Western counter-action, except in Greece, which was acknowledged in 1944 as a Western sphere. This de facto expansion of Moscow's empire fulfilled age-old Russian ambitions, added legitimacy to Communist global pretensions, facilitated economic extractions for a time, established a wide defence buffer and helped Moscow threaten Western Europe, thereby partly compensating for the early US lead in nuclear arms.

Maintenance of the "Socialist Commonwealth".

Despite the challenges of aggrieved nationalism, abetted if not aided by the West, the Kremlin has maintained its dominion over Eastern Europe, except in Yugoslavia and Albania. In an age dubbed as that of self-determination, most East European peoples have bowed to Moscow's will in matters of internal and foreign policy. Outer Mongolia has remained a loyal satrapy while Cuba and Vietnam have also become relatively dependable Soviet partners.

1954– : *Expansion into the Third World.*

Building upon the two-stage strategy outlined by Lenin in 1920, the post-Stalin leaderships have courted the national bourgeoisie of Asia, Africa and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Moscow has championed anti-colonial "liberation movements" and presented itself as the most dependable friend of peoples exploited by "Western imperialism". It has generally approved of the non-aligned movement and tried to tilt it towards Moscow. Though Indonesia, Egypt and other Third World countries have turned against Moscow, at least for a time, India remains a dependable partner, one that

now supplies some advanced technology as well as strategic and political benefits to Moscow. Many Arab countries depend on the USSR for support against Israel. Since 1980, however, the Kremlin's positions in the Third World have become increasingly fragile and unstable.

Use of far-flung allies and proxies.

Though the Korean War was probably instigated by Kim Il-Sung, North Korea and later China conducted most of the fighting with Soviet behind-the-scenes approval and support.[7] The armies of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria assisted Soviet forces in enforcing the Brezhnev Doctrine in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. But Moscow's use of proxies was fine-tuned in the 1970s as Cuba became a partner and agent in joint expeditions throughout Africa. The cost to Moscow of subsidizing Cuba is staggering, but the Soviet leadership long believed that the benefits justified the investment.

Vietnam has also become a Soviet partner, agent and outpost in what is otherwise the Third World. Soviet aid to Hanoi from the 1950s into the mid-1970s was minimal in comparison to the damage done to the West by the Indochina campaigns of France and the United States. Vietnam now provides strategic facilities that expand Moscow's global reach and threaten China's soft underbelly. As Vietnam's economy unravels, the cost of Soviet subvention rises, but the gains to Moscow from this relationship are weighty.

Support for Hanoi's dominion over all Indochina in the mid- and late 1970s coincided with Soviet actions to support "socialist-oriented" régimes coming to power in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and elsewhere. Collaborating with Cuba, the USSR has helped leftists—not merely bourgeois nationalists—seize and maintain power in many countries. The régimes themselves are tottering, weakened by intra-Party rivalries (e.g., South Yemen, Afghanistan) and challenged by other domestic rivals sometimes supported by the West. Still, the world has taken due note of the Soviet ability to help such régimes come to power (e.g., by long airlifts of supplies and Cuban soldiers) and to hold onto power (e.g., by training their security forces—often by East Germans as part of a Warsaw Pact division of labour).

Gorbachev thus inherited a broad domain of Soviet influence in the Third World achieved partly through relatively businesslike, state-to-state relations with countries such as India; through active collaboration with militaristic, revolutionary régimes such as Cuba and Vietnam; and through its support for weak but socialist-oriented régimes such as Angola.

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[7] N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, 2 vols. (Little, Brown, 1970–1974, Boston), I, pp. 368–9.

1917–1988. *Making the USSR a military superpower and a major industrial power.*

Believing that economic and military power is the *sine qua non* for the security of the régime and the state, and that it may be useful for promoting Soviet objectives abroad, successive Soviet leaders have sacrificed the living standards of most Soviet citizens to the gods of heavy industry and military force. The political results of this sacrifice were not very impressive in the interwar years; since the end of World War II, however, the international arena has been heavily influenced by Western fears of Soviet military action, thus enhancing the leverage of Kremlin diplomacy. The forward deployment and periodic exercises of the Red Army across East Central Europe have indeed been "permanently operating factors" for Western planners to consider.

Decisions taken in the early and mid-1940s laid the basis for Soviet mastery of fission weaponry and ballistic missiles. Despite Russia's historic lag behind Western technology and despite the enormous losses suffered during World War II, the country rebuilt rapidly after the war and within a decade was able to threaten not just Europe but the West with nuclear attack. By 1954–55 the USSR had acquired a primitive form of nuclear deterrence. Soviet missile deployments in the mid- and late 1950s permitted the Kremlin to threaten Western Europe and perhaps even the United States.[8]

In the early 1970s the USSR had acquired strategic nuclear parity with the United States. Each country took the lead in different respects, but the permutations of these asymmetries produced an essential equivalence enshrined in US acceptance of the Soviet right to "co-equal security" in arms control agreements. By the mid-1970s the USSR was demonstrating that its air- and sea-lift capabilities were also formidable, even if not equal to the American. The Kremlin also put to sea a blue-ocean navy able to show the flag and function militarily far from Russia's coasts, using facilities in Vietnam and other distant ports.

The USSR in the 1960s and 1970s was clearly the world's second industrial power (unless one regarded the European Economic Community as an economic whole), one that had cultivated Soviet resources to make the USSR the most self-sufficient country in the world. The Kremlin had managed these achievements despite the encumbrances of Stalinist centralization and despite arms outlays probably twice as burdensome as those of the United States. By the mid-1980s Japan's economy had outpaced the USSR, and Soviet economic and technological levels were falling behind

[8] Ibid, II, p. 39.

world levels, yet the USSR remained one of two military superpowers and was striving to restructure its flagging economy.

The fruits of coercion.

Many Soviet successes abroad derived from the build-up over decades of Soviet military power and its skilful management to intimidate, deter or overwhelm foreign adversaries. Though believing that history was on their side, Soviet leaders have also wanted the option to use force (in Mayakovsky's words) "to hustle old history's horse—left, left, left". That is, the Soviet régime has often used military force—from the 1920 offensive against Warsaw up to the recent Afghan campaign—to promote Soviet objectives abroad.

Soviet military power and/or the diplomacy of power underlay most of the successes enumerated above: survival against domestic and foreign foes; containing, and then assaulting, Japan; repulsing Hitler and then advancing into East Central Europe; installing Communist governments in Outer Mongolia and, decades later, in North Korea; maintaining Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe; influencing, if not successfully bullying, Western decision-makers. The Soviet export of threats, arms and advisers—even of Cuba's foreign legions—has established outposts of Soviet influence in the Third World, from the Middle East to India to Angola.

Failures

1917–1921: *Failure of revolution beyond Soviet borders.*

The young Soviet régime failed to ignite enduring revolutions abroad, despite its vigorous efforts in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia. This failure, of course, was due more to local conditions than to shortcomings of Soviet policy, but it marked a serious challenge to Communist doctrine, which had posited that revolution would come first in the most industralized lands. The Red Army's inability in 1920 to carry revolution to Warsaw posted a warning that nationalism would long outweigh class consciousness as a force in world affairs. The babel of the Baku Conference later that year illustrated how difficult it would be for Moscow to co-ordinate liberation forces in the developing countries. The Kremlin's modest support for the March 1921 uprising in Germany indicated how far the Bolsheviks were already moving towards the principle of "socialism in one country", affirmed three years later by Stalin.

1928–1933: *Misperceptions and misjudgments of Hitler.*

Soviet directives to the German Communists not to collaborate with the Social Democrats split the left and facilitated Hitler's rise to power in 1933. Soviet commentators had suggested that Hitler's rise would be a replay of Russia's "Kornilov affair" (August 1917)—a right-wing precursor to a leftist October revolution. Though Stalin later perceived the folly of this diagnosis, and reversed the course, it would not be the only occasion when he misjudged Hitler—a pattern that cost the USSR dearly.

1934–1938: *Failure of collective security.*

Striving now to curtail Japanese and German expansionism, Moscow endeavoured to forge a system of collective security. The USSR also sent volunteers to fight against Spanish Fascism but none of these efforts bore fruit: the West was unwilling to act decisively and promptly to stem challenges to the status quo.

1939–1941: *Failures of expansionism and appeasement.*

Following shortly upon Stalin's purges, Soviet expansion under the Molotov-Ribbentrop accords alienated Communist sympathizers world-wide and confirmed the darkest analyses of Soviet totalitarianism and imperialism. Moscow became embroiled in the Winter War with Finland—itself a setback for Soviet policies. Territorial acquisitions elsewhere, in Poland and the Baltic, created animosities that would simmer for generations afterwards. The 1939–1941 collaboration with Hitler set up Stalin for a disastrous miscalculation. Despite loyal fulfilment of Soviet commitments under the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreements, Hitler's *Drang nach Osten* would not be delayed indefinitely. Almost any other course would have left the USSR more alert and ready to cope with "Operation Barbarossa."

1944–1947: *Igniting the Cold War.*

The Kremlin managed to cultivate a working entente with Britain and the United States during World War II, but it was largely undone by Moscow's determination to implant Communist régimes along Soviet borders from East Germany to Pyongyang. Soviet policies in Poland, for example, steeled US resistance to approving a set figure for German reparations to the USSR. Soviet policy towards Germany—communizing the East, demanding or simply extracting heavy reparations, opposing efforts to create a viable economy for the whole of Germany—led to the creation of two and then three zones of co-ordinated Western policy in what became West Germany. The Kremlin responded slowly and with excessive reservations to the US

proposal for a four-power pact to prevent a resurgence of German or Japanese aggression. All this led Washington by early 1947 to emphasize "containment" in US policy towards the Soviet Union—an inflection sharpened by the Kremlin's refusal to take part in the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan).

Wartime alliances often disintegrate after defeat of a common foe, but Soviet policies contributed a great deal to the polar swing from entente to cold war between East and West.

1945 and after: *Lack of popular mandate for satellite régimes in Eastern Europe.*

Soviet-sponsored régimes in Eastern Europe failed to win a national consensus and had to depend upon coercion. Heavy-handed Soviet policies did much to alienate satellite governments from their own peoples. The USSR has dominated the region for two generations, but Soviet tyranny has triggered defections by Yugoslavia (1948) and Albania (1961); uprisings in East Germany (1953) and Hungary (1956), and institutional or ideological challenges to Soviet-style Communism in Poland (1956, and on a number of occasions later) and in Czechoslovakia (1968); and a cunning Romanian policy that for decades has deviated from Soviet preferences both in domestic and foreign policy. To control these centrifugal movements has entailed great efforts and high costs.

Stalinist exploitation of Eastern Europe gave way in the mid-1950s to Soviet subsidies to the region, particularly in raw materials. The Kremlin by the 1970s felt that it must diminish these burdens of empire. By the 1980s neither Moscow nor anyone else pretended that the Soviet model offered any useful guidelines for dealing with the malaise affecting the countries of Eastern Europe. "Solidarity" undermined the Polish Workers' Party and Moscow was left with having to intervene and depend upon open rule by Polish military and security organs—a new pattern in the evolution of Communism: a peculiar example of the dictatorship of the proletariat against the workers. The region's chronic instability constitutes now one of the greatest failings of Soviet policy.

Eastern Europe has also created problems within the USSR, for it has often funnelled liberalizing breezes from the West that the Kremlin would have preferred to keep out.

Alienation of China.

Moscow's first major policy failure in China occurred in 1927, when the Kuomintang assaulted the Chinese Communists, urged to collaborate with the KMT by Soviet advisers. Despite this development, Stalin continued to tilt toward the KMT in later years and sometimes sought to intervene in internal CCP affairs. When the Communists finally seized power in 1949

and Mao Zedong came to Moscow to sign an alliance, the agreement was full of unequal terms conducive to Soviet exploitation of China. Khrushchev mended some fences with Mao and promised or delivered substantial economic/technological assistance 1954–8, but this honeymoon was cut short when Moscow made what the Chinese termed "unreasonable demands" and let down Beijing in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis.[9] By 1959–60 Soviet aid had stopped; the 1960s saw open polemics and a struggle for leadership within the Communist movement; after border clashes in 1969, the early 1970s even witnessed Soviet talk of a preventive war. Not only did the Kremlin fail to make China a partner but it helped generate a powerful enemy that sometimes works in tandem with the United States.[10]

1962: *The Cuban missile crisis.*

The decision to install nuclear weapons in Cuba was highly risky, a major departure from the caution that has usually characterized Soviet foreign policy probes. It could have produced a war—one that the USSR could not win. Fortunately, it resulted instead in a Soviet retreat which contributed to Khrushchev's downfall. There were, to be sure, two unplanned by-products useful to Moscow: the détente and arms controls of 1963 and the determination "never again" to be dominated by American power. The whole incident must nonetheless be counted as one of Khrushchev's most "hare-brained" schemes and one of the many occasions when Soviet military policies have backfired.[11]

Third World boomerangs and rebuffs.

Neither Lenin's two-stage theory of aiding the national bourgeoisie nor the more radical approach of supporting leftist radicals has provided a dependable way to enhance Soviet interests in the Third World. India has become a valuable political, strategic and economic partner for the USSR, but no bourgeois nationalist revolutions have gone on to yield a situation ripe for Communism. Following Turkey's example in the 1920s and 1930s, Egypt and other "national bourgeois" régimes have utilized Soviet aid for a time

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[9] On Khrushchev's double game, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations* (Hoover Institution, Standford, Ca., 1968), pp. 35–7. For a Chinese perspective, see *Memoirs of Marshal Ni Rong Zhen* [in Chinese] (3 vols.; Beijing: People's Liberation Army Publishing House, 1983), III, 800–809. See also Andrei A. Gromyko, *Pamiatnoye*, 3 vols. (Politizdat, Moscow, 1988), II, pp. 129–35.

[10] See, e.g., Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution* (Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1987), chaps. 6 and 9.

[11] For new documentation, see *International Security*, XII, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 3–92; also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Brookings, Washington, D.C., 1987); also newspaper accounts of a conference held in Moscow in January 1989 by Soviets and Americans with first-hand experience in the October 1962 crisis.

and then turned against the USSR. The list runs from Ghana to Indonesia to Somalia. Soviet military support for the Arab countries has been particularly dangerous, as the Kremlin found that it could not control its clients nor ensure that they would use Soviet weapons to best advantage.

Soviet support for radical régimes has netted the Kremlin a responsibility of sorts for the economic and political survival of some of the weakest and poorest countries in the world—from Vietnam and Ethiopia to Afghanistan. While support for these clients underscored for a time Moscow's military might, the 1988–9 retreat from Afghanistan did not inspire confidence in the Soviet willingness or ability to support leftist régimes indefinitely. A comparable but less direct defeat for Moscow has been the growing awareness that Soviet development models have little to offer the Third or even the Second World.

Last but not least, Soviet forays into the Third World have risked putting the superpowers on a collision course; they have helped undermine détente and trade with the West.

Disintegration of the world Communist movement and loss of revolutionary élan.

The Communist movement has been weakened by many factors: sectarianism and schisms amongs its devotees; nationalism and other competing world views and religions; the disappearance of proletarian class consciousness in the West. Moreover, the evolution of Soviet Communism itself has also played a major role. Five features of Soviet practice have inflicted major damage on the world Communist movement: the Kremlin's tendency to put Soviet interests over its pretended international principles; Moscow's proclivity to dictate rather than persuade; the distortions and excesses of Soviet totalitarianism, especially under Stalin; the loss of élan within the USSR; the shortcomings of the Soviet model as a guide for other people to follow.

To integrate the former borderlands of the Russian empire, the Soviet Communists depended much more on force than on example or persuasion. In 1920 they hoped that the advance of the Red Army through Poland would trigger a revolution there. Almost from its inception, the Comintern became an instrument of Soviet foreign policy rather than of world revolution. Disciplined adherence to Moscow's "line" became the essential quality for membership in the Third International (just as slavish acceptance of Stalin's whims was the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for survival in Soviet politics). Many foreign Communists were alienated by Stalin's purges and later by his collaboration with Hitler. The Chinese Communists had been alienated even earlier—since 1927. Despite such developments, many European Communists remained almost more devout than the Pope. Therefore it was a tremendous shock to the Communist movement when

the Yugoslavs split with Moscow in 1948. Other shocks followed—the use of Soviet tanks against East German workers; Khrushchev's exposé of Stalinism; the Hungarian uprising. For Beijing it was also a shock that Moscow would negotiate seriously with the West on arms control. The Chinese began to denounce the Soviets as "revisionists"—as virtual traitors to Marxism and revolution. The open rift between Moscow and Beijing destroyed the myth of ideological solidarity and pressed other Communists to go their own way. Albania in 1961 withdrew from the Warsaw Pact without any serious reprisal. Romania intensified its autonomous foreign policy, defying Moscow on many points. Czechoslovakia under Dubcek started to evolve a reform Communism that promised to put on "a human face", but it was stifled by Moscow and supplanted by Husak's reaction. Many Communists of Western Europe attempted in the 1970s to early 1980s to adopt ostensibly independent-of-Moscow positions, but the trajectory of Eurocommunism was pulled ever lower by the dampened appeal of the USSR.

Failure to reach long-term accommodations with the West and Japan.

The magnitude of this failure is underscored by two considerations: first, most Western governments since World War II have been willing to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviet régime; many have been strongly interested in reaching arms control and trade arrangements useful to both sides. Second, since the late 1940s to early 1950s there has been almost no chance that the USSR could win if it attacked a Western country; and very little chance that a Soviet-oriented Party could come to power in any Western country. If these assumptions are correct, Soviet objectives would have been best served by minimizing conflict and cultivating some joint interests with the West. But neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev, both of whom tried to come to terms with the West, achieved more than a few intervals of détente in the overall thrust of intense rivalry with the West.

Efforts at East-West accommodation have repeatedly foundered, from the collective security schemes of the 1930s through the plan for Big Five collaboration to maintain peace and security after 1945, to the short-lived détentes of 1955, 1959–60, 1963–4, 1967–8, 1972–4 and 1979. Despite promising starts on arms control, especially in the 1970s, the intensity of the arms competition has far outweighed the few measures adopted to constrain it. The INF Treaty signed in 1987 and the force reductions announced by Moscow and some of its Pact allies in 1988–89 could signal significant movement in the other direction, especially if they lead to deployments "strictly defensive" in nature, as promised by Soviet spokesmen.

The USSR has failed also to come to terms with Japan—not only

because of the four Southern Kurile islands (called in Japan "the Northern Territories"), occupied since the war by the Soviet Union, but also for deeper, historical, psychological and cultural reasons. Alienation of Japan, China, Eastern Europe and the West has recreated a two-front Soviet nightmare that, given the nature of the Soviet geo-political situation, probably could not have been avoided.

Failures of coercion.

The threat of force and its actual use have been the single largest sources of failure in Soviet foreign policy, from the 1920 Polish defeat to the protracted bloodletting in Afghanistan. As noted earlier, the use of force within the USSR has echoed abroad, arousing hostility and suspicion towards the Kremlin and, in the late 1930s, raising doubts about the ability of the Soviet Union to fight Germany.

Sometimes the USSR has fought against long odds and lost, as in its intervention against Franco. Sometimes its putative allies gave way so there was no common stand, as at the 1938 Munich Conference. On occasion the Red Army fought poorly, as in the 1940 Winter War with Finland. More often it performed well and secured Moscow's immediate objectives, e.g., expanding Soviet borders or influence (as in 1939 and in 1943–5), but at the cost of alienating potential or present partners.

Moscow failed in 1945–6 to expand at the expense of Turkey and Iran. It did not win a role in the occupation of Italy or Japan. It rattled swords against Tito in 1948 but he would not relent. Stalin exercised a carefully programmed squeeze on Berlin in 1948, one well calculated to succeed; but he demanded too much and was surprised by Western determination to supply Berlin by air bridge. He also made a reasonable assessment of US weakness when he authorized Kim Il-Sung to attack South Korea, but was again surprised by the resourcefulness of the United States, its allies and South Korea. These and other Soviet moves drove the West to re-arm and to form a global alliance network to contain Communism. They even led the West to favour West German re-armament.

The summary is unimpressive: Stalin helped create Hitler's rise to power and then failed to stop his aggression until it was almost too late. Stalin then seized Eastern Europe after there was no active threat to the USSR, and thereby provoked Western re-armament. His other probes—from Berlin to Korea—netted nothing for the USSR but generated an anti-Soviet alliance and Western re-armament.

The Kremlin has used force effectively to put down East European insurrections and to deter others, but the requirement to resort to arms against Moscow's ostensible allies demonstrates another failure of Soviet foreign policy.

To aid China's nuclear programme in the mid-1950s was a mistake unless Moscow could be sure of Sino-Soviet harmony for ages to come. Though later alarmed by China's incipient atomic capacity, Moscow did not act to remove it. For more than a decade, the USSR has deployed enormous forces along the Sino-Soviet border and otherwise provoked Beijing.

The Cuban missile gambit, as noted above, was another failing of Soviet foreign and military policy, though it ultimately strengthened Moscow's determination to match the other superpower militarily.

Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East have gained some hard currency payments and superficial influence, though Moscow's clients there have usually tended to be quite independent-minded. On more than one occasion their actions have embroiled the USSR in confrontations with the West. And the successes of Israeli forces over their enemies have not enhanced the image of Soviet weapons or advice.

Moscow's ability to provide military supplies over long distances was demonstrated first in Vietnam and then in Africa. Soviet and Cuban aid has decisively aided the present governments of Angola and Ethiopia. These achievements, however, have led to Soviet alignments with some of the weakest governments in some of the poorest countries of the world.

The Afghan war, became by the mid-1980s a no-win quagmire for Moscow. It has hurt the USSR in the Islamic world, the non-aligned movement, and in the West, where it occasioned sanctions and the non-ratification of SALT II. The war has also weakened Soviet society and lowered the morale of the Soviet armed forces, unable to destroy a resistance movement.

The Kremlin's efforts to use the stick and carrot to halt Western arms build-ups have also had little effect. They did not prevent West Germany's integration in NATO or, more recently, the deployment of Pershing 2s and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. Nor did they persuade the Reagan Administration to renounce its Strategic Defense Initiative.

Paradoxes of Power

SOVIET LEADERS have probably sought "security" for their own rule and that of the Communist Party and the integrity of the Soviet state against external challenges. By these criteria, Soviet policy has been relatively effective. The Communist Party has preserved its basic monopoly of power; and the USSR has become a global empire. By other criteria, Soviet policy has been a disaster. A series of catastrophes continued almost without interruption from 1917 to the late 1940s: civil war, deportations of peasants and national minorities; several major famines, one of them deliberately induced by Stalin; several sweeping purges striking down the country's intellectual, political and military élites, as well as countless

ordinary people.[12] Tens and tens of millions of Soviet citizens have perished unnaturally or emigrated since 1917; they have not reproduced themselves, and their talents (many of them above average) have been removed from the genetic and cultural pool. Their relatives and associates have been traumatized.

Next to these miseries, some of the other hardships imposed on the Soviet people seem minor: sacrifice of consumer goods to the gods of war and heavy industry; sacrifice of industrial and agricultural efficiency to ideological fetishism; sacrifice of the arts to the Party line; sacrifice of environmental quality to material growth; sacrifice of political freedom to Party control.

A balance sheet must confront the question: does the government of any other major country feel itself so vulnerable to domestic dissent or foreign pressure as the Soviet? How has it happened that the world's largest country, with the world's third largest population, with a greater capacity for self-sufficiency than any other, has these problems:

- It is surrounded on all sides by hostile neighbours—including its putative allies;
- Its economy has been the second largest in the world, but it appears incapable of producing modernization or better living standards without injections of foreign goods and technology;
- It is ruled by an élite which till recently feared any sign of spontaneity by its subjects and continues to depend heavily on its armoured security forces.

Most policy events war a Janus face: they often connote both success and failure. Short-term successes often become long-run failures: the opposite also occurs, though less frequently. Developments that were probably welcomed by Soviet leaders at the time, such as, for instance, Soviet partition, and later dominion, of Poland, may appear in retrospect as disasters—for the USSR as well as Poland. Thus, Khrushchev wondered how to undo the effects of Stalinism on Soviet-Polish relations. And Gorbachev was reported in 1987 to have encouraged a more candid discussion of Soviet-Polish history.

Not only must we untangle short- and long-term achievements, but we must also distinguish many domains of policy. Thus, Moscow has often achieved its immediate objectives in the narrow military or political-military

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[12] This story has been told in many works by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Robert Conquest. See the latter's *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1986) and corrections/additions in review by Peter Wiles, *The New York Review of Books*, 26 March 1987, pp. 43–5; also Iosif G. Dyadkin, *Unnatural Deaths in the USSR, 1928–1954* (Transaction, New Brunswick, N.J., 1983), and Roy Medvedev's estimates on Stalin's victims, summarized in *The New York Times*, 4 February 1989, pp. 1, 4.

spheres (e.g., in Eastern Europe), but these gains have often been dimmed or even negated by economic and ideological failings. Elementary security has counted for more in Moscow than prosperity or popular enthusiasm, but shortcomings in these domains—at home and in the Soviet "camp"—makes "security" more precarious and costly.

Taking these complications into account, it seems fair to conclude that the Soviet track-record supports the contention that exploitative policies may generate short-term successes, but tend to produce counter-productive consequences which may be harmful to the long-term interests of the initiating country.

Problems of Analysis: Who and What causes What?

WHAT CAUSES WHAT? Some apparent "Soviet" successes were probably due more to other actors than to the USSR. Some examples:

- Churchill announced that Britain would side with Stalin against Hitler because it opposed Germany—not because it liked supping with the devil;
- Mao Zedong signed an alliance with Stalin in 1950—not because he esteemed the USSR, but because he had nowhere else to turn; he supported Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement in 1957 "because every snake must have a head";
- The Arab world thanked Moscow for its vocal intervention during the 1956 Suez crisis, though the outcome was affected more by Eisenhower's policies and by Anglo-French-Israeli ineptitude;
- Hanoi wore down first France and then the United States with aid from Moscow, in spite of the 1972 Nixon accords with Brezhnev; still, the Kremlin gained from Hanoi's victories; it even acquired access to former US bases in Vietnam.

It is striking how important the roles of Germany and Eastern Europe have been in accounting for both achievements and shortfalls of Soviet policy—far more weighty than Britain, France or even the United States, and many times greater than any Third World area. Germany has probably been the single most important foreign actor for Soviet policy-makers from Brest-Litovsk through the Euromissile negotiations of the 1980s. In between these dates our listings point to Rapallo, the rise of Hitler, the 1939–45 alignments and realignments, the issue of reparations, divided Germany, the Berlin blockade, rearmament, the Wall, Ostopolitik and trade. Poland has played a less threatening, but persistently important role: the 1920 Polish-Soviet war, the failure of collective security, the 1939 partition, Katyn, the Warsaw uprising, the legitimacy of the Lublin government, the unrest in 1956 and the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

China has also played an important role since the 1920s—as a potential partner and adversary, as a follower and then a challenger to ideological primacy. But China has remained a still-sleeping giant without the geographic immediacy of East Central Europe for Soviet security interests.

India and Egypt have been important Third World actors for the USSR since the mid-1950s, but it is the Third World as a whole that has been weighty for Soviet interests. This is because Moscow has waged much of its struggle against the West through the Third World. And if one client, such as Egypt, fell away, others could be found and cultivated. Iran and Turkey have also been important because of their proximity to the USSR, making them likely targets for Soviet influence or potential threat.

Since 1945 the main threat to the USSR has come from the United States—its military foces, its position as leader of the non-Communist world, its awesome economic stature, against which Soviet leaders have measured their own progress. Because it would be so dangerous for the USSR and the United States to fight one another, their competition has taken place across a global chessboard on which Moscow has won and lost some key pieces. Though Moscow is often credited with long-term vision and strategic thinking, it is doubtful whether the chess player is prevailing against what turns out to be the ever-changing hands of the American poker player. Perhaps both are losing.

Underlying Reasons for Success and Failure

THE KEYS TO SOVIET successes and failures lie, as is usual in history, in the interactions of deterministic and voluntaristic forces, the interplay between material power and human personality, the ways in which leaders—with their vision, skill, and persistence (or lack thereof)—cope with luck, misfortune and serendipity. This analysis organizes underlying determinants into structural, systemic and cognitive factors, recognizing that there is much overlap and interaction among these categories. And while one might expect "structural" factors, such as geography, to be more enduring than "cognitive" factors, coastlines and forests have given way to the buffetings of man and nature, while Communist Party efforts to shape "a new Soviet man" with "new thinking" have encountered stubborn resistance.

Structural Restraints and Endowments

Geo-politics:

Geo-political and environmental factors create both problems and opportunities for every state. The USSR is more than twice the size of the United States, with a raw materials endowment that makes the Soviet Union more self-sufficient than any other country. Russia's immense size has permitted

defence in depth—useful against Napoleon and Hitler, but of less value in the missile age. The flip side is that the Kremlin must stand guard over extensive borders and face directly many countries long antagonistic to Russia. The continental climate, mountains, permafrost and deserts make it extremely difficult to build dependable communications networks. The savage weather, combined with relatively poor soil in much of the country, puts agriculture at risk each season, making the entire economy hostage to favourable weather. Ice freezes many of Russia's ports for much of the year and has made the country's rulers anxious to establish warm-water ports. When the Soviet fleet goes out into the world's oceans, it must pass choke points controlled by potential foes—Turkey, Japan and North and West European countries—all collaborating with the United States.

Moscow is locked into a rigid negotiating posture by its determination to uphold existing boundaries with all its neighbours. Having gathered up whatever territories became available in the course of World War II, the Kremlin finds itself defending its boundaries and those of Eastern Europe on an all-or-nothing basis. If the USSR would return the disputed Southern Kurile Islands to Japan, this could facilitate improvement in relations with Tokyo and improve Soviet access to Japanese technology and capital. Similarly, lands taken from Romania fuel anti-Soviet feelings in Bucharest. Some border disputes with China derive from clearly unequal treaties imposed by tsarist Russia. But whatever the merits of a specific situation, the Kremlin has feared that if it gives an inch, a mile or an island to one *demandeur*, it will be faced with similar requests from virtually every country on its periphery. Conciliatory signals to Norway and China in 1988–9 regarding disputed borders could, however, herald a departure from Soviet rigidity.

Demography:

Population factors also cut in two directions. The USSR has the world's third largest population, about half of which is Russian. In principle the heterogeneity of the country's many nationalities should contribute to a dynamic synergy drawing on the manifold strengths of its various peoples. But while the USSR has not faced anything like the civil strife of contemporary Lebanon or Sri Lanka, and while the Soviet system has probably enhanced the material living standards of some minority nationalities, the country's ethnic diversity has generated more problems than assets for the Soviet leadership. Coercion rather than persuasion impelled the various borderlands to join the Russian Republic in the formation of the USSR. Stalin used collectivization and famine to decimate the Kazakhs and Ukrainians. He judged whole peoples as unreliable during World War II and had them uprooted. After the war he and his successors dispatched

Russians by the millions into minority republics "to assist in reconstruction" and to russify the provinces.

National memories of abuses under Moscow's rule run deep. The national problem may be the Achilles heel of the Soviet system, one that becomes ever more vulnerable as national and religious feelings pulsate through nearby regions and as the USSR's economic model falls ever further behind its rivals. For a time the Soviet Union hoped that it could exhibit Samarkand and Tashkent to win approval from the Islamic world; now Moscow must see all of Soviet Central Asia as a threat—demographically, ideologically and in other ways—to Soviet stability.

The global setting:

Moscow has also had to contend with attitudes and decisions in other countries stemming from historical developments on which Soviet policy had little or no influence. Thus, the Soviet leaders had to cope with the local nationalisms and accumulated legacies of distrust and hate that most borderlands felt towards tsarist Russia. On the other hand, they gained from anti-Western attitudes prevalent in many Third World countries. Generally speaking soviet initiatives have met with reserve in the West, while many Third World régimes—at least initially—were disposed to welcome Soviet proposals promising to help them overcome dependence and backwardness.

Soviet fortunes in the Third World have been shaped in large part by the heritage of its colonial ties with the West—resentments against erstwhile colonial rule, but also strong cultural and even linguistic ties with the former metropoles. Moscow has also had to carry the albatross of official atheism, a disadvantage in most Third World cultures. The Kremlin has also had to live with Beijing's charge (1960–1970s) that the USSR practises "great-nation chauvinism" and "social imperialism" even more rapacious than Western imperialism. Stoking these fires, "ugly Russians" abroad have offended many Third-Worlders as have the racist attitudes of many Soviets towards Asians and Africans visiting the USSR, or studying there.

Instability in the emerging nations of the Third World has often created opportunities that Moscow could manipulate, as in Angola and Ethiopia. But the weak institutionalization of state authority in such countries has prevented the establishment of deep ties and has often led to rapid reversals of alignment.

Nationalism in the Third World has often worked to Soviet advantage, but when perceptions shift and the USSR is seen as a weak provider, the self-interest of Third World élites and nations drives them back to the West.

The Soviet System

Dictatorship of the Vanguard Policy:

The Soviet system itself has been a double-edged sword. Centralized political and economic controls have helped the Kremlin to mobilize the country's resources with less public accountability than would be needed in Western democracies; to act with more dispatch and greater secrecy; to adhere to a course with more persistence than is typical where public moods bear heavily on policy choices. Centralization of decision-making also makes possible disastrous policies more readily avoided or corrected if subjected to public debate, e.g., prolonged appeasement of Hitler in 1940–41 or the Cuban missile adventure. Centralization may facilitate dynamism: it permits the régime to concentrate its attention on high priority targets such as sputnik; but it may also lead to misallocation of resources in the face of the country's overall needs.

The fact that the Kremlin has relied so heavily upon central dictation and coercion to manage the USSR has undermined the appeal of the Soviet model abroad and eroded popular support at home. Just how risky this could be in wartime was seen when Hitler's armies were welcomed in the Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet empire.

Power struggles at home and abroad:

Kremlin power struggles have sometimes obstructed foreign policy-making. Thus, Stalin's animus towards the German Social Democrats in the late 1920s probably reflected his fear that if they prospered, it might help the Right opposition within the USSR. But he also feared Trotskyist tendencies within the foreign Communist Parties and in the Comintern *apparat*. Better perhaps to strengthen Hitler temporarily than the German and other political factions who might undermine Stalin's hold on the Kremlin. To cite another case from the mid-1950s: the thrust of Soviet arms control policy was vitiated as it became a political football in the struggles among Molotov, Malenkov and Khrushchev.

As I have already pointed out, the pressures of the Sino-Soviet competition have influenced the Kremlin's words and deeds. Chinese carping probably added to Khrushchev's reasons for trumpeting Moscow's commitment to aiding "just wars of national liberation," raising Washington's anxieties about the thrust of Soviet policy. The Sino-Soviet rivalry pushed both Moscow and Beijing to invest resources in arcane struggles to influence leftist and nationalist forces around the world. Thus, since Prince Sihanouk was in Beijing, the Kremlin stood by Lon Nol till he was defeated (which is why the Khmer Rouge shelled the Soviet Embassy when they entered Phnom Penh). The Soviet model has turned sour for many reasons, but

one of them is that Kremlin preachings often radiate hypocritical self-interest and intellectual arrogance.

Material power: economics and technology:

The Soviet leadership has used centralized controls to promote economic policies that have made the USSR a major economic power, with its national product second only to the United States in the 1960s–1970s. But while the command economy is less subject to cyclical depression than free enterprise systems, it also seems to generate much less innovation.

Centralized powers were used to enforce nationalization and requisition during the period of War Communism; relaxed, they were used to facilitate reconstruction in the NEP; tightened, to drive the country into rapid industrialization and collectivization in the 1930s; to mobilize all resources for the Great Patriotic War and then for post-war reconstruction. The system proved capable of concentrating its energies in order to produce high priority targets—tanks, planes, the atomic and H-bombs; space satellites and rockets. In the 1950s and 1960s the system also generated the means to build dams and other showy projects in developing countries. By the 1970s, however, the economic promise of Soviet Communism was badly compromised. It seemed incapable of building living standards or even public health standards comparable to the West; it seemed unable to compete in the high technology revolutions pulsing through the capitalist world. Imported technology has always played a major role in Russia's economic development, beginning even before Peter the Great. By the 1970s the USSR was clearly a military superpower but was continuing to depend upon technology transfers—voluntary and otherwise—for modernization. By the early 1980s Japan's national product outstripped the Soviet one, and even India found the Soviet model and Soviet products lacking. Critics wondered whether a command economy presided over by a Communist *nomenklatura* could ever generate consumer abundance and technological advance.

Military power.

Shield and sword of Soviet Communism, the armed forces, have yielded the régime's greatest successes—driving off all attackers, taking and holding Eastern Europe, planting and showing the hammer and sickle flag throughout the Third World. The strengths and the weaknesses of Soviet military power, however, also explain foreign policy failings more than any other factors. As noted above, the Soviet armed forces often failed in their objectives. What did Moscow gain from intimidating Europe with medium-range missiles? Soviet military build-ups have often sparked off countermoves and counterbuild-ups that have reduced Soviet influence and security.

Ploughing resources into military power has eroded the Kremlin's economic power. The USSR has become a military superpower—able to project armed might into an increasing number of regions—but a backward nation in most other ways.

Cognitive Factors

Political culture:

The political culture inherited by the Bolsheviks in 1917 presented them with modes of operation and habits of thought that could be altered only slowly, if at all. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of traditions—Russian and other nationalities'—have provided the clay from which the Bolsheviks sought to shape a new man and new policies.

Despite many defections, the fortitude and stoicism of the Russian and other Soviet peoples were decisive in repulsing Hitler. In non-crisis times, however, these same traits yield a passive quietism that produces a civic inertia. A deadly circularity ensues as centralization stifles innovation, and passivity permits more centralization. Accustomed to such order, much of the managerial class rejects reforms that might impart new life to the system, leading many of the freshest spirits to turn inwards, revolt or try to escape.

Leadership and skill:

Soviet leaders have generally been adept in foreign affairs. Critics may complain that their world view was too narrow or too much given to adversarial conceptions of life. But one must grant the skill with which most Soviet leaders and their professional diplomats have utilized the means available to them—making full use of the resources and opportunities, whilst overcoming the obstacles and restraints in any given situation—in order to pursue far-reaching objectives.

Soviet policy has, of course, also gained from *fortuna*. On some occasions these gains have been a matter of "pure luck." Sometimes they occurred because the Kremlin had established a reputation that drew revolutionary régimes its way, e.g., Castro's Cuba; more often Soviet good fortune derived from incessant scanning of the globe for targets of opportunity.

Following their particular world view, however, Soviet representatives have often been stymied by their own "approach/avoidance" behaviour. When Moscow approaches other governments to propose joint action, its diplomats often talk or act in ways that militate against acceptance of their overtures.

Despite many handicaps, Soviet diplomacy has usually demonstrated a high degree of professionalism, overcoming early problems of training and

the difficulties of representing a dictatorial régime. The diplomatic service had to draw many of its cadres from other domains after each world war.[13] Many recruits in 1944–6, for example, had been trained as engineers. From Georgii Chicherin (who succeeded Trotsky as Foreign Commissar in 1918) to Andrei Gromyko, however, there has been considerable continuity in the leadership of the Foreign Ministry and its departments dealing with problems such as disarmament and regions such as North America. While Eduard Shervardnadze had little background in foreign affairs, other Gorbachev appointments—including for a time Anatolii Dobrynin in the Central Committee—and the rising influence of academic specialists made it likely that Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev would continue its long-standing professionalism.

The professional ways of Soviet diplomacy have been accentuated by the dilettantism of other governments. The standard components of Soviet diplomatic successes, according to George F. Kennan, have been "one part Soviet resourcefulness and singlemindedness of purpose; two parts amateurism, complacency, and disunity of the West."[14] Kennan has often criticized Western diplomacy for its superficiality, smugness, provincialist bias, and enslavement to the vagaries of domestic politics in the democratic setting.

Western policy between the wars and since 1945 has often displayed a strong penchant for wishful-thinking and unwillingness to face unpleasant realities and recognize the dangers of Soviet totalitarianism at home and abroad.

Kremlin Operational Code: "Kto kovo?"

Ideology has given the Kremlin a long-range perspective conducive to perseverance, patience and confidence in times of trouble.[15] It has also cloaked decisions with veneer of wisdom and proffered to others a pseudo-scientific programme for emulation. Though dogmatic in important respects, Marxism-Leninism has also permitted great flexibility of tactics. At times it has fixed blinkers on Soviet eyes, obstructing or distorting Moscow's perceptions of events at home and abroad. It has also interfered with free discussion of what to do about problems of the real world.

Why do the Soviet leaders choose a policy? And why does it succeed or fail? These are two different questions. Leaders choose a certain orientation because of their internalized "operational code." That policy may succeed or fail, because it suits or does not suit the environment in which Soviet policies

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[13] Nikolai P. Zhukovskii, *Diplomaty novogo mira* (Politizdat, Moscow, 1986).

[14] Kennan, op. cit.

[15] See Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making", *International Studies Quarterly*, XIII, No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 190–222. On Soviet ideology compared to American "political beliefs", see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (Viking, New York, 1964).

must function. The leaders' perception of the results of their policies and the evolving environment, in turn, will slowly shape their operational code.

A world view heavily influenced by Lenin's book *Imperialism* and other writings helped Soviet leaders to appreciate the importance of national liberation movements and the quest for national self-determination in the modern world, and the likelihood of intense competition between and among the USSR's capitalist rivals. But Soviet perceptions and calculations about the external environment were frequently wide of the mark: thus, Soviet leaders over-estimated the "ripeness" of target proletariats in Central Europe, 1917–1921; Stalin under-estimated Hitler for more than a decade; Stalin and his successors under-estimated the Chinese Communists from the 1920s through the 1950s; Stalin probably undervalued the willingness of the West to collaborate with the USSR during and after World War II; then he under-estimated the willingness of the West to resist Communist pressures from Iran to Berlin to Korea; Khrushchev, in turn, exaggerated Soviet dynamism and revolutionary trends in the Third World while under-estimating Western ability and determination to hold fast in Europe and the Caribbean. At least until the mid-1980s Soviet leaders erred in assuming that history was deterministically on their side at home and abroad. While this assumption helped them persevere in dark times, it also spawned a hubris and complacency that ill-served Soviet objectives.

A basic source of the successes as well as the features of the Soviet régime since 1917 has been the *kto kovo*—"who will do in whom?"—premise of the Soviet world view and political culture. This led the Bolsheviks to expect no quarter and give no quarter, unless compelled by temporary weakness. To be sure, they were willing at times to compromise with the adversary—even to enter provisional coalitions with him—on the assumption that when conditions matured, the struggle would resume.

This world view put a premium on self-sufficiency. Expecting that they must ultimately rely on their own resources, the Soviet leaders held fast even when the European proletariat failed to come to their aid in 1918–1921; they industrialized Russia even when the great depression dictated an autarkic approach; they dealt with Hitler by *Realpolitik* flexibility and, before massive Western aid arrived, by self-reliance; they later rebuilt their war-torn economy without Western credits.

While self-reliance can be a virtue for individuals and states, it does not yield optimal results if it fails to tap the potential inherent in strategies of mutual gain and burden-sharing as rooted in comparative advantage and the division of labour.[16] Thus, the USSR and its satellites managed to raise

[16] The author's hypothesis regarding the utility of value-creating strategies over value-claiming exploitation seems to have been confirmed by the results of the Soviet foreign policy survey and a companion survey on US foreign policy achievements. For elaboration of "value-

their economic output after World War II, but they fell far short of the gains which would have been possible had they participated in the European Recovery Plan. Similarly, the Kremlin has achieved its security objectives primarily by building up its own military forces rather than by reaching agreements to mutual advantage with the United States. The result is that each superpower now has a rather dependable second-strike capacity, sustained at levels far higher and more expensive than needed for the purpose of maintaining a secure deterrent.

The *kto kovo* outlook has helped the Soviet Communists to nourish and count on their own strengths, but this *Weltanschauung* has also had another, basically counter-productive aspect. It has undermined the Kremlin's willingness and even its ability to pursue long-term strategies of mutual gain with other governments. Projecting their own determination to overcome all rivals, the Soviet have tended to expect the worst from other political actors. This is the fundamental reason why the Kremlin has alienated potential partners abroad—in Eastern Europe, the West, China and the Third World. Even where the Bolsheviks expected to find allies, as among the European workers, they have often antagonized them by claims to omniscience and a concomitant right to dictate even where local circumstances diverge from Soviet presuppositions. Though the Kremlin may assert that its motives are pure, it faces a huge credibility gap from Yerevan to Tallinn, and from Beijing to Cario.

Messianism coupled with profound anxieties of insecurity and inferiority have permeated Russian policy-making for centuries. These patterns have been reinforced by Bolshevik assumptions of *kto kovo* and omniscient self-righteousness. The product has been a tendency to pursue policies of exploitation rather than co-operation. This approach cannot yield optimal solutions to Soviet and global problems in a world of increasing interdependencies. Though born of idealistic impulses, Soviet Communism has gravitated towards cynical realism, rationalizing the belief that all means are justified in achieving its lofty aims. This realism has boomeranged—if not devouring its children then emaciating them. The Soviet leadership, at least until the mid-1980s, was hardly ready for constructive co-operation with its own subjects, not to mention other peoples with whom they share planet earth.

Not just "new thinking" but "new acting" will be imperative if the Soviet Union is to do more than survive and cast a menacing shadow over the globe.

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creating", see David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, *The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Co-operation and Competitive Gain* (The Free Press, New York, 1986).

The Nationalities Issue in the USSR

Alain Besançon

THE IDEA THAT the nationalities question has been solved by the Soviet régime is one which has gained most of its currency in the West. The very initials of the country (standing for Union of. . . Republics), its "federal" Constitution with the Soviet of Nationalities in pride of place, the preservation of internal boundaries on the map, and the flaunting of the various "ethnic cultures" have all lent weight to this fiction. It also happens to have suited the book of Western diplomacy. It was easier to consent to the re-conquest of the Ukraine, and of Georgia, Armenia and the Baltic states when there were assurances that these nations had entered into a federal unity in which their individual identity, and even, in certain cases such as the Ukraine, some measure of their international judicial character, was being preserved. Consequently, the unfortunate governments-in-exile, or the handful of militant émigrés, rarely enjoyed the ear of those in power. They suffered from the interminable feeling that their countries had somehow disappeared altogether, so little did public opinion take any notice of them.

Today, however, it is clear that the nationalities issue, almost more than any other in the Soviet Union, remains unresolved. Could it be that the power of national feeling, of which there are daily demonstrations, and the fluctuations in the demographic and economic balance between the various nations of the USSR, constitute the long-awaited force capable of constraining the Leninist régime either to make changes or to disappear altogether, or capable at the very least of toppling the whole political apparatus of the USSR? Leading on from the works of such scholars as Pipes, Conquest, Seton-Watson, Dunlop, Shtromas, Bennigsen, Heller and Carrère d'Encausse, and leaning heavily on them, I should like in turn to attempt my own historical and political evaluation. I shall try to answer two questions: How did the question of the nationalities become an issue and how does it now affect the survival of the régime?

The Pre-Modern Régime

I FIND MYSELF UNABLE to side with Richard Pipes when he attributes to Russia an innate, fundamental and exceptionally strong tendency towards imperialism, indissolubly linked to the country's spiritual, social and political institutions. Such an accusation has been levelled at Spain, England and France, which have also formed awkward and bulky empires. A long, measured look at the formation of the Russian empire will reveal several stages and a range of types of expansion which all have their parallel outside Russia.

The first Russian campaign of conquest culminated in the absorption of an ancient and powerful state, that of the Khanate of Kazan, in the 16th century. Circumstances favoured this victory and were subsequently repeated: the Ottoman empire, which possessed all the means required to prevent this operation, did not wish for the revival of the Golden Horde, which seemed an imminent likelihood; it therefore allowed the Russian state to have its way, the latter being weak and barbarous, and seeming to pose, in the long term, not the slightest threat. A first campaign is always important, as the would-be imperialist state is trying out its methods. So it was in the case of England in Ireland. The method used by the Russians was to destroy one part of the local élite and to transport the other to Moscow, where, russified and converted to Christianity, it became integrated with the Russian nobility and filled those positions of which the Russian state had the greatest need.

The conquest of Siberia in the 17th century resembles French expansion in Canada and Louisiana: the same immense scale, the same low population, the same initiatives on the part of small groups of merchants, adventurers and mercenaries; the same monitoring of progress by the central power, right down to the same item of merchandise, which motivates men to wander and explore: fur.

In its seizure of the crown territories of Polish Lithuania, of Sweden and of the Porte, and thus sporting the title of military monarchy as it entered upon the European stage, Russia conducted itself no differently from Prussia or Austria, except that those two countries, in expanding towards the east, came upon civilizations less advanced and less affluent, whereas Russia's movement westwards brought it into contact with wealthier and more advanced societies. The first step was to gain control of the Ukraine. There Russia found natural resources and a population which would accord it the means of becoming a great power. As before, it set about demolishing with great rapidity one section of the local élite, and of the remainder it formed a pool of talent much richer than the one it already possessed. In order to hold on to the Ukraine, it was necessary to gain control of Poland; the carving up of this country with Prussia and Austria left the lion's share to Russia. Part of the Polish nobility entered into the service of the Russian state. The same arrangement was reached in the Baltic region, where Russia came upon a German élite already moulded into the service of the Prussian and Swedish administrations, and again in the Christian, Georgian and Armenian Caucasus, which produced statesmen on a par with Bagration or Loris Melikov. However, there were limits to Russia's imperialist thrust into Europe. The difficulty of maintaining a grip on Poland demanded the politics of prudence and conservatism, and these became the keynote of Russian policy throughout the 19th century.

Finally, in the same century, Russia embarked on a campaign of a colonial

nature in the direction of the Muslim Caucasus and the Turan Plain. This took the form of a series of brillant military operations in very difficult terrain, very similar to those carried out by France in the Mahgreb. Taken as a whole, the colonial expansion of Russia cannot be compared with that of England or France, either in its spread or in the number of peoples subjugated. However, in contrast with France, the demography of Russia did permit a very real colonization of the Caucasus and of Turkistan, along with, in Kazakhstan, for example, a substantial surrender on the part of the Turkish population of their own territory.

From the standpoint of practical politics, the nationalities issue in 1913 must be analysed within a certain framework.

Following the lead of other great European powers, the Russian empire was zealously imperialist. It took an active part in the "carving up" of China, in spite of encountering a buffer in the form of British and Japanese aspirations in the same area. Within the Muslim territories, it implemented policies very similar to those used by France in Algeria. Remnants of the Russian peasantry colonized those territories which the Turkish tribes had consigned as extensive breeding grounds for their animals. In Europe it adopted a defensive stance. It had to deal with highly co-ordinated and organized national movements which could draw upon a historical consciousness often going back further than that of Russia. In this region comparisons with Prussia, and above all Austria, are more appropriate than with the British or French empires. This accounts for Russia's being obliged to adopt two imperialist ideologies. The first was a common one: the role of "harbinger of civilization". The second was unique: Russia's special destiny, its transcendent Messianic role. The first worked well in Turkistan and the tribal Caucasus. The second served to keep the Poles, the peoples of the Baltic, the Jews and the Caucasian Christians in subjugation.

The technical aspects of this process of domination were determined by the situation. They were: russification; the slow stifling of native languages (which was tried even in Finland); the assimilation of the élites, who could make careers in the administration or the army; and finally, the exploitation of existing divisions. The Ukrainian peasant was entrenched against the Polish landowner, and both of these in turn against the Jewish hostelier. Armenians and Azerbaijanis could, within discrete limits, slit each others' throats during times of turbulence across the empire, and so on.

By 1913, therefore, the problem of the nationalities was more or less under control. At the same time it was not yet, nor could it be, resolved. This would have necessitated recourse to measures quite incompatible with the norms of the civilized world to which Russia nevertheless wished to gain access. There is a marked contrast between the modernizing dynamism of the empire, which could give the impression that the problem of economic backwardness, social problems and indeed political problems

were on the point of being solved, and the image of that same empire as a prison for the peoples within it, becoming ever more overloaded. But the serious side of the matter was that the search for solutions to problems in social or political areas was continuously hampered by the issue of nationality. In effect, any large-scale trend towards a European-style liberalism exposed the empire to the risk of dissolution.

The opposition at the time was aware of this possible eventuality. Liberals and socialists of the centre oscillated between nationalism and the making of generous concessions, which in the case of the latter—who modelled themselves on Austrian socialists—could amount to outright interdependence. Thus one can see a pan-Russian federation emerging on the Right, and on the Left a socialist federation, both solutions enjoying at least the tactical consent of most of the nationalist movements. The attitude of Lenin himself was not typical. However, given that future developments stemmed from it, it is worth outlining it in all its admirable simplicity.

In this theoretical writings, Lenin applies both the dogma and the text of the official Marxism of German social-democracy. National differences are to be subordinated to class differences. Only the triumph of the working class, in other words, socialism, is able to provide a definitive solution to the problem of nationality. There are two corollaries to this proposition. When the nationalities problem first came to light after the revolution, it had still to be analysed along class lines. If, according to the terms of this analysis, it appeared that the class nature of this movement was bourgeois, the only remedy was to take socialism one step further, which in practice meant increasing the power of the Communist Party in the region in question. But in the lead-up to the revolution (this is the second corollary) Lenin gave unconditional support to all rightful nationalist claims and, above all, to the most radical separatist elements, because he needed this explosive force in order to overthrow "feudalism" and "capitalism". At this stage, these claims could not be viewed as bourgeois in essence, since they were paving the way towards revolution. After the revolution, however, they had to be treated differently. When the Georgians tried to proclaim their independence and set themselves up with a Menshevik government, Lenin dealt a crushing blow to their bourgeois nationalism in the name of proletarian internationalism, this time allowing Russian imperialist nationalism—progressively orientated in this case—to lend a heavy hand to the re-establishment of socialism.

From Lenin to Gorbachev

IN FEBRUARY 1917 the nationalist movements contented themselves with merely making pleas for an end to the various discriminations and to russification, for the usual liberties enjoyed by cultural organizations

and, in certain cases, for full autonomy; one year later, all the nations had gained their independence and the empire no longer existed.

The policy of the Soviet government, which in practical terms has never varied from the time of Lenin right through to Gorbachev, may be described in the following way.

According to Lenin's plan for world revolution, Soviet power would regain hegemony over the major part of the former Russian empire. The defeat on the Vistula halted its progress towards Poland and the Baltic states. It adopted two courses of action. It mobilized what remained of the former Russian state—mainly the army, the technicians and part of the civil service—on the basis of Russian nationalism. The "White" Russians were equally imperialist in outlook and even refused to recognize Polish independence. When, however, they were beaten, only the Reds, in the eyes of the nationalists, were to benefit from the prestige accruing to "guardians of the Empire". From this moment on Russian nationalism became dissociated for ever from patriotism. The Russian nation accepted the loss of its freedom, its religion, its morals, its culture, its history, even its name; everything, except empire. The words of Coustine apply perfectly here: "The slave on his knees dreams of the empire of the whole world."

The second course of action was to appeal to ideological legitimacy. It only needed, in the more recalcitrant regions, the martialling of international fraternal support in order for the Red Army, adorned with a few battalions of sovietized Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, to re-occupy Armenia, Georgia and the Ukraine. A ten-year campaign in Central Asia finally extirpated "feudalism". The same technique was used to regain control of a territory which Russia had taken under its protection in 1911: Outer Mongolia. This was the first of the popular democracies (1923).

In order to govern the new political ensemble of the USSR, the ruling party resorted to classic imperial methods. It Balkanized Turkistan, dividing into several pseudo-nations a people which was in the process of being unified through a common language, culture and religion. At the frontiers, it patched together remnants of peoples ignored by history: the Moldavian people, at the expense of Romania; the Karelians, at the expense of Finland. It fomented rivalry between disparate elements of the population—what we see happening today in Nagorny Karabakh has a long history. Finally it russified. The Cyrillic alphabet was imposed on the Turks and, but for the complete resistance of those actively involved, it would have replaced the ancient Georgian and Armenian alphabets altogether. The national languages were garnished with russianisms. The élites were obliged to become bi-lingual and its was very soon impossible to make any sort of career without knowing Russian. The First Secretary of any of the national Communist Parties was regularly accompanied by a Russian assistant.

Onto these techniques of domination was imposed the fiction of ideology.

The USSR is a federation of sovereign republics from which the right to secede is solemnly guaranteed in all constitutions. Socialism signifies that in each one of these nations, all forms of political and social life shall be "national in form and socialist in content". Socialism presupposes amity between peoples. If a nationalist movement threatens to tarnish this amity, this shows it is bourgeois and reactionary, harmful to socialism and consequently harmful to the interests of the nation in question. It will be suppressed as being such. The "lifelong friendship" born of socialism promises the gradual wearing away of national differences. Several times, in particular under Brezhnev, the question arose as to whether to do away with the federal map of the Union and to substitute instead another principle of subdivision based on "economic zones". In the last analysis, however, the Soviet authorities did not dare cross this bridge. However fictitious the national boundaries, there seemed no easy way of getting rid of them.

The most often-utilized procedure for preparing the destruction of individual nations was to stamp out their indigenous culture and systematically to replace it with an artifical pseudo-culture. Hence began a cancerous proliferation of folk culture. In the theatres of the republics, officials dolled up as Ukrainians or Uzbeks in multi-coloured costumes would sing and dance to the strains of bizarre balalaikas before an audience of the military in peaked caps. "Folk-ization" was also used to manufacture culture for the pseudo-peoples. For Jews, this meant the prohibition of Hebrew and the substitution of Yiddish as the obligatory tongue.

Eventually these measures proved insufficient. So it became necessary to resort to outright physical destruction. Several small Siberian communities simply vanished: people, culture, language, possessions and all. The Tatars of the Crimea, the Chechens of the Caucasian "Piedmont", the Germans of the Volga all suffered crippling deportations, leaving behind scarcely half of their populations. In Kazakhstan this destruction of half the population was furthermore accompanied by the process of collectivization. Hardly had the Baltic peoples voted, in a unamimous referendum, to be re-attached to the USSR than the same official bodies which had extracted this vote sent off to concentration camps (from which few returned) somewhere between a quarter and a third of the population. Imagine the Germans in 1940 deporting 10 to 15 million French people, mainly young males; what would be the state of the country today?

The most devastating blows of all were aimed at the Ukrainians, potentially the most dangerous group. They suffered the effects of the famine of 1921. Then the artifically produced famine of 1932–3 killed between six and seven million Ukrainians, mainly children—totalling one fifth of the population. The war took its toll of the Ukraine more heavily than any other region of the USSR: the losses suffered by the Soviet army were far greater on the Ukrainian side than on the Russian. Finally there

were new famines and new deportations which accompanied the re-conquest by the Soviets, this being completed only in 1950.

Let us not forget, finally, the hudge blood-letting that was inflicted on the Russian people: after 70 years of Sovietism their total number is still hardly any greater than it was in 1913. After suffering gigantic losses, it finds itself today in an alarming state of ill-health.

This last point raises the question, can one in fact speak, as is currently done, of a Soviet empire? Indisputably one can do so, in the sense of dominium or imperium. But the idea of empire, formed in the Roman empire and the large colonial empires of Europe, incorporates certain constant features which are not to be found in this one. The USSR does not recognize imperial peoples. Since there exists a historical link between Russian nationalism and Bolshevism it is in certain cases an advantage to be Russian. But the Russian people do not take advantage of the kind of legal privileges such as were enjoyed by the British in India or the French in Africa. A Russian is especially favoured in the Ukraine not because he is Russian but because the Communist authorities regard him as more loyal than a Ukrainian. Domination is enforced not by the local presence of Russian military garrisons but by the omnipresence of the Communist Party of a particular nation, which in turn is controlled by the CPSU in which Russians preponderate by virtue of being judged better Communists. The empires of former times, of which Russia was one, used to win over the traditional élites of the peoples they conquered. The Communist government, by contrast, is assiduous in its destruction of them. Lastly, it disregards certain usual motives for expansion—to attribute to it, for example, a desire to gain access to the mineral wealth of southern Africa or to the oil of the Middle East is fundamentally to misinterpret it. It has spread itself according to Lenin's plan, and the control of such riches is a strategic tool used towards the ultimate end of revolution; it might prove as advantageous to destroy these resources as to exploit them.

The Nationalities Issue Today

AN IMMEDIATE DISTINCTION must be made between the Russians and all the other nationalities.

Regarding the Russians, three questions can be asked: What is the state of Russian nationalism? What is the state of the alliance between Bolshevism and Russian nationalism? Can the Soviet régime be re-established on a nationalist basis?

Russian nationalism is one of the most powerful, and one of the most violent, forms of nationalism throughout the entire world. It cannot be compared with anything in the rest of Europe. It is so vehement, that it is accepted by other national groups as an integral part of Russian nationhood,

as though it were some genetic peculiarity. Every cultural achievement on the part of the Russians, however modest it might be, encapsulates an excess of national pride which acts outwardly like a contagion and results in its being blown up out of all proportion in Europe and America. A large proportion of those who dedicate their lives to the study of the history and culture of Russia feel themselves under pressure to convert to this nationalism as though conversion to "Russianism" were a means of access to this civilization, and not in fact the quickest way to become blinkered, by making its passions and its prejudices their own—thus rendering it the very worst service possible. I perceive two principal causes of this exaggerated nationalism.

The first is its association with religion. From the 15th century, soon after the fall of Byzantium, the conviction was expressed in the texts of several monks that Russia was the only free country in which the Christian faith had been conserved in a pure form. This theme, linked to the more ancient one of "Holy Russia", virtually disappeared under Peter the Great, but reappeared under the Romantics, who, in the Russia of Nicholas I, actively sought a principle of absolute superiority. Throughout the 19th century, and culminating at the beginning of the 20th, it continuously reinforced itself with new historical and theological arguments. The Church adopted the habit of confusing the cult of the One True God with that of the Russian Nation. Russian nationalism is unique in Europe for having dressed up idolatry with a complete theology.

The block placed on Russian history after 1917 could be the other reason. On the eve of the First World War, the whole of Europe seethed with nationalist mystique. This mystique, secular in France and semi-religious in Germany, soon evaporated. But in Russia—preserver of 19th century form—it was maintained, under Bolshevism, in a frozen state, though it regained all its old virulence each time it was allowed to return to a normal temperature. The Russians will never get rid of Communism until they get rid of nationalism.

Over the last 70 years, however, the alliance between Bolshevism and Russian nationalism has had a rough ride. Under Lenin it was passed off as a condition arising simultaneously from the extension of Soviet power and from the maintenance of the political arrangements created by the Old Régime. This is why, up until about 1930, the Soviet authorities tolerated an intellectual current which openly gave expression to this alliance. The "national Bolshevism" of Ustrialov, which had its origins in the factions of the pre-revolutionary extreme Right, lent further credence to the idea that the Communist revolution was the Russian national revolution in a new guise. Berdiaev spread this thesis about in the West. *The Origin and Direction of Russian Communism* encapsulated the "concept of Russia" in all its instinctual, obscure and organic aspects. This current of thinking was

suppressed once the Communist Party made up its mind to present itself as master in this alliance, with nationalism merely an auxiliary force which would henceforth be permitted expression only within the framework allowed it by the Party. This explains why, while every republic has its own Communist Party, the Russian Republic alone does not. A Russian Communist joins the CPSU directly, an Uzbek Communist, indirectly. This "negative" privilege means that the CPSU is in charge of the interests of Russian nationalism, whereas the Communist Party of each republic is in charge of suppressing its nationalistic expression. This is a very astute disposition. It makes Russian nationalism less visible.

Shortly before the war, Stalin revived the cult of Peter the Great. Together with militarism, medals, uniforms and the whole panoply of the former militarist monarchy were brought back in again. During the war, Stalin mobilized national feelings on all fronts, including those of the Jews and the Ukrainians, but the Russians took pride of place. The key operation consisted of going into the camps to search for the few surviving bishops and of cleaning up the image of an Orthodox Church which was under strict control of the police. In the extraordinary period between 1945 and 1953, when the country was completely closed to outside and when the USSR became, in the eyes of the world, a "black hole", Russian chauvinism seems to have gone berserk. Ivan the Terrible was canonized. This was the time when all modern inventions, from the bicycle to wireless telegraphy and aviation, were attributed to the legendary Popov. All other nationalisms were suppressed (by military force in the Ukraine and in Lithuania) and the Jews were on the point of being sent off to the camps when Stalin died.

After the death of Stalin, once those elements of his policies which were either crazy or threatened the stability of the state had been brought back within bounds, the Party instituted state nationalism. Dissident elements in the non-Russian republics were periodically purged through the routines of the Gulag and the psychiatric hospitals. The episode about which most is known abroad was the methodical crushing of the Jewish intellectual community. In science and in economic management Jews occupied a superior position. By means of a quota system, dismissals and the enforced dispersal of the élites, the implementation of the official plan was carried out in order to reduce this superior position until it fell to the same proportion as there were Jews in the country—though in reality it amounted to nothing less than a pretext for their elimination. Another feature was the progressive russification of the organs of government. A glance at the nation-by-nation composition of the 27 ruling members of the Politburo and of the Central Committee Secretariat will show clearly that in 1985, when Gorbachev came to power, Russians accounted for 68% and, in 1988, 83%. In the Politburo 10 out of the 13 positions are held by Russians; all the "candidates" are Russian. Not a Muslim to be seen. Shevardnadze is the only non-Slav.

One last feature deserves to be noted, namely, the more systematic use made of the Orthodox Church. The famous Furov report underlines this point and in particular the way in which bishops were selected to carry out a mission of maintaining contact with the Catholic Church and the Ecumenical Council of Churches. The success of this mission was so marked that it was decided to celebrate with great pomp and ceremony the milenium of the baptism of Russia. The Patriarch Pimen was solemnly received at the Kremlin. He promised, along with all the other members of the hierarchy, to address solemn prayers to the Almighty for the success of *perestroika*.

Since it is not possible to become a priest, still less a bishop, without collaborating with the KGB, there was every advantage to be gained from relinquishing certain of the more glaring forms of control which were a blight on *glasnost*; the Church could control itself perfectly well if left alone. Kharchev, in referring to religious affairs, made the apt remark in 1988 that a believer could be more easily and reliably manipulated than a non-believer.

The baptism of Vladimir in 988 had been nothing more than the baptism of a Scandinavian barbarian chieftain in Kiev, following the previous examples of Olaf, Olgerd, Miesco and Stephan in Scandinavia, Poland and Hungary, and, in retrospect, that of Clovis too. It had symbolized the entry of the Russian people into Christianity. Yet the millenial celebrations were turned into a great world-wide political event in which free rein was given to Slavophile imaginations and legend-mongering. The Pope was quite justified in his avoidance of these Christiano-Gorbachevian festivities. But it also became an opportunity to tighten up links with the Russian diaspora. Through their Orthodoxy, émigrés still harboured some yearning for Moscow, for nationalist reasons clearly quite as much as for the undeniably religious ones. Why not make use of them?

It is possible for the régime to base itself on Russian nationalism rather than on Leninist ideology? The question doesn't arise for those who, like de Gaulle, believe the USSR is simply the latest incarnation of Eternal Russia. Even for those who do not believe it, it is nonetheless a moot point.

In 1965 the government became the patron of the All-Russian Society for Monuments and Culture, dubbed Voopik. The vandalism perpetrated under Stalin and Khrushchev, which had been responsible for the destruction in particular of some 400 churches in Moscow alone (Russian churches are quite small and very numerous) aroused indignation. It was Voopik's missions to raise private funds for the restoration of monuments, so often in a pitiful state. It encountered a very ready response and aimed itself at a target membership of 12 million. It was nevertheless not allowed to run its own publishing house and in 1977 the government took the precaution of installing representatives on the society's main committee. It appears that

the restoration of one sole church may so far be attributed to it. The Soviet-Christian-nationalist painter, Glazunov, is an active member.

In 1977 Pamyat, the extremist wing of Voopik, broke away. The prime movers were a photographer, Vasiliev, and an architect, Vinogradov. It is not clear how much importance to attribute to Pamyat. The figures are fantastic: the association has claimed to have 10 million sympathizers. The number 100,000 is more likely. Members, recruited from a wide social spectrum, are in general young. The ideology of Pamyat is both complex and self-contradictory. It is violently anti-Semitic and anti-masonic. It would sometimes like to be neo-pagan, at other times neo-Christian. Sometimes it takes an imperialist stance, while at other times, by contrast, it wants Russia to be freed from non-Russian impedimenta. All its publications that I have been able to read heap praise on Gorbachev and *perestroika*.

The phenomenon of Voopik and Pamyat is a sign that the alliance between Bolshevism and nationalism is less solid than it used to be. And no wonder. This alliance has cost the Russian people the greatest catastrophe in its history. This people, even more than the German people, have cut down in full flight their own demographic future. They live like dogs in a ruined and polluted country. All the so-called "folk" literature (Rasputin, Astafiev, Mozhaev, etc. . . .) bears witness to this. They speak a language that has been impoverished and mutilated. They are cut off from the truths of their history. They are reviled throughout the Communist world. Frustrated nationalism is often a compensation for the resentment generated by enslavement—a nation's way of taking revenge for its defeat.

At this stage we might, however, consider an alternative. Why not reverse the direction of the alliance? Ideology no longer has credibility. Only nationalism still has any life in it. Could one not perhaps promote this to the front rank, liquidate the USSR and restore the pan-Russian empire in its military and political form, retaining some residual elements of Bolshevism? The advantages seem to be considerable: the mantle of oppressive ideology could be thrown to the winds. A return to reality would become possible because Russia and the Russian empire are real things, whereas socialism is the very essence of unreality. Lastly, a little rationality could be injected into an absurd economic system. The country would prosper. It would also increase its power, if only an outlet for the imperialist urge, so strongly ingrained in the minds of the ruling class, could be found in this direction. It could also count on the support of the masses, who hate Europe because it was largely spared their own misfortune, and for whom the prospect of pillaging it or even of seeing it merely reduced to their own level is by no means displeasing. It would not displease the intelligentsia either, at least not a certain part of it.

But such a reversal could not take place, in my opinion, without huge risks. The legitimacy of the régime rests on Marxist-Leninist ideology

which itself grants that legitimacy. A change of legitimacy cannot be effected without revolution. The tensions would be such that any break in continuity of power would cause everything to collapse. Moreover, the new legitimacy would not be strong enough. However intense Russian nationalism might be, it cannot be exported abroad: it would gain no recognition in a world which has passed beyond colonialism, nor amongst the other peoples of the USSR. These would immediately produce counter-legitimacies based on their own nationalisms, which today are constrained by ideology, but which Great Russian nationalism would have no means of opposing save by armed force. Now, 120 or 130 million Russians are not strong enough to impose open and outright national oppression on the 130 million non-Russians of the USSR, to which a further 100 million Europeans of the Eastern Bloc should be added.

This is why the government has not allowed Pamyat to develop beyond permitted limits. In 1972, Yakovlev gave a reminder in a leading article, that one could not reject Western tradition as easily as Pamyat did, since, after all, Marxism had emerged from it. The position of Gorbachev here as elsewhere is inspired by the purest Leninism. He pays lip-service to "Russianism": he deftly controls Pamyat without actually suppressing it, as if at any moment he himself could step in and assume control of it.

In *perestroika* Gorbachev draws a comparison between the USSR and the United States, thereby placing emphasis on this "federation of free republics" which the USSR in principle, is. He finds it quite natural that Russian should occupy the same place in the latter as English does in the United States! Yet at the same time he speaks favourably of the rights of individual nations and warms against any form of chauvinism. The idea is simple: to create a triangular situation in which the Party threatens national and liberal dissidence with the fanaticism within Pamyat, and vice versa, and finally offers the protection of the Party to one side and then the other, which means, in other words, submitting to the Party.

The Non-Russians

THE SHEER MULTIPLICITY of the nationalities (more than 36), their inequality, and their geographical spread requires some simple means of classification. I will adopt the criterion of "critical mass", that is to say, those peoples whose very numbers are such that a revolt on their part would pose mortal danger for the whole of the political apparatus of the USSR as well as for those of its peoples whose numbers place them in a minority. I will deal first with the latter, though I will mention only the leading groups.

The Jews present a special case, which I have dealt with in detail in

Commentary.[1] They total 2 million, of whom 400,000 have applied to emigrate. A festering abscess had formed through thirty years of persecution: Gorbachev seemed to wish to lance it. With wise lack of haste he allowed the most determined and the most celebrated of the "refuseniks" to leave. He hoped to win back the rest and get them to help carry out his plans. They are, in effect, very useful to Soviet science and productivity and by their links with the international community they enhance the image of the USSR held by the rest of the world. Gorbachev therefore suppressed the Numerus Clausus, which debarred Jews from the best Institutes, and it is even said that a yeshiva now functions discreetly in Moscow. He has offered Jews frightened by the extent of popular anti-Semitism the resource of Party protection.

Armenians and Georgians are unalike and have little love for each other, but have been drawn together by a common fate. Their demographic position is strong and has allowed them to repel the traditional waves of Russian emigration. Russians in Armenia hardly account for 5% of the population. These two peoples, which in the 3rd century, were the first to embrace Christianity, are possessors in equal measure of a historical as well as a national consciousness. Both resigned themselves to the Russian yoke, because the Turkish yoke would have been worse. However, for several months now we have been witnessing Armenia in upheaval and its Communist Party adopting, in the eyes of Moscow, the most dubious attitude. Moscow has tried having the throats of some two or three hundred people cut; but the Armenians keep their ranks closed and continue to demand the return of a territory which belongs to them and which Moscow has placed under Azerbaijani administration.

The Baltic countries still have memories of having been free between the years of 1917 and 1939. But they have been more devastated, more frequently subjected to deportation and more colonized than the countries of the Caucasus, and their population has reached stagnation point. In Estonia, only half of the population is Estonian. However these countries keep their memory alive, creeping stealthily towards autonomy, working with increasing efficiency, and are therefore less poor. Now they are acquiring a voice: the Estonians are currently demanding "economic independence".

Only two peoples possess "critical mass"—the Ukrainians and the Turks.

The Ukraine is the key country. In conquering the Ukraine, Russia became a great power. It would remain so today even if it lost its Turkish, Caucasian or Baltic borderlands, but the loss of the Ukraine would reduce it to the level of a medium power, it would become like a larger version of Canada. This is why the Ukraine, having been "stunned", is today under

[1] *Commentary* no. 40, Winter 1987, pp. 669–74.

tight control. The Ukrainian language has been driven down into the lower ranks of society. Kiev, Kharkov and the Donets are profoundly russified. Nationalism is carefully suppressed, while at the same time it is accorded certain gratification: Ukrainians are to be found at the highest levels of government. The situation is, therefore, well in hand. However, there are three blackspots. The whole of the western part (the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnieper) has a memory of having been at one time Polish. The Unia, a product of the Union of Brest, forms the religion, as much alive as it is oppressed, of the western Ukraine. Being an underground movement, it is difficult to monitor. Ukrainians are numerous enough to cause the instrument charged with the job of russianizing the country, the Ukrainian Communist Party, to find itself continuously tempted to Ukrainianize. It has to be periodically purged. Finally, the Ukraine has bases overseas with a faithful diaspora in the United States and in Canada. It also has a potential ally in Poland, depending on political conditions which, though not yet actual, are nonetheless conceivable.

It would take a Bennigsen to talk fittingly about the Turkish zone. Let us just remember several major points. The Turks number 45 million in all. There are already more Turkish and Muslim children born than Russian children. This is producing a steady counterflow to Russian colonizing activity. It is not very nice for a Russian to live in Tashkent or Baku. The Kazakhs, who suffered two massacres (in 1915 and 1933), have regained a majority in the population of their border republics. These peoples are faithful to a form of Islam which is being reinforced by groups of Sufis—the only organizations throughout the whole of Soviet territory which have the approval of the KGB. There are almost no mixed marriages. They do not willingly emigrate beyond the frontiers of their republics, in spite of Moscow's obstinate refusal to alllow them to be industrialized.

These people have remained quiet for a long time. This is not because they have accepted Soviet rule, but because they have felt time was on their side and that there was no need to hurry. They know their own history—a more ancient and glorious one than that of Russia, which, moreover, they at one time dominated. They are also wary of the West, whose corrupting influence on Islam they fear. In the meantime a new event has taken place: the defeat of the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Apart from the intense satisfaction this has produced throughout Soviet Islam we may well soon be seeing some reflection of it in the new balance of power between Islam and Sovietism.

The Nationalities Issue and the Future of the Régime

LET US TRY TO IMAGINE a break or a total collapse at the centre of power, such as was brought about in February 1917. The USSR, there is no doubt whatever, would disintegrate as rapidly as did the Russian empire. The map would look once again as it did in the 17th century. Muscovy, Great Tatary, Ukrainian Podolia and Volhynia, Livonia, Lithuania and Courland would resume their former positions. And most certainly the whole of Eastern Europe would retie the threads of its destiny which were cut in 1939 or 1945. The problem is to gauge whether the nationalities issue as such is capable, as has often been predicted, of bringing about this drastic reversal. There is no clear answer to this.

In actual fact, in a certain way, the latent nationalist conflict serves to consolidate the Soviet régime as much as it undermines it.

The formidable development of the black economy (illegal in the eyes of Soviet law) which, in certain republics, is expanding to the point of marginalizing official economic activity, provides favourable conditions for national mafias to form. By this is meant not only a network of gangsters, which, according to Soviet sources, are sometimes in complete control of important towns, reaching in as far as the outskirts of Moscow, but also a complex set-up involving the organs of justice and the police, that is to say, the local Party, which, for a fee, offers protection to the most prominent of the dealers. These great tentacular mafias are no shining examples of disinterestedness and devotion to the public cause. They are in no position morally speaking to carry the flag of national protest. If it comes to that, it is not in their interest anyway. They need the Soviet system in a general way, if only in order to fleece it. It is in this way that Sovietism has been able to absorb the "alternative economy" and make it contribute to its own stability.

Nationalism is not in itself a vehicle for a political plan. On the contrary, it has helped to confuse matters, since, as Michel Heller has observed, it is the only language in which the population can make any appeal to the Soviet authorities. This means that demands of a serious political nature and outright bids for independence are drowned in a babble of social, academic, economic and ecological claims; the Communist Party can pick out whatever it likes, refusing here, granting there, partial satisfaction. Confused notions of nationalism end up acting as protective padding for the powers-that-be: they prevent people consciously aiming at the real target—Communism—which is allowed to get lost in a fog of instinctively hostile feelings about nationality.

It is quite easy to deflect such hostility in the direction of neighbouring ethnic groups. Any satisfaction granted to the Armenians will enrage the Azerbaijanis and arouse jealously of Georgians. The special privilege of

emigration bestowed, albeit parsimoniously, upon the Jews, does not come without a blaze of anti-Semitism throughout the Union. Any concession made to non-Russians inflames Great Russian nationalism and consequently serves to reinforce the cohesion of the whole country just when it appears to be weakening.

Lastly, the problem of the nationalities necessitates the keeping of a watchful eye on that pillar and foundation-stone of the régime, ideology. The myth of socialism, and the myth of the bonds between peoples which is its corollary, permits the suppression of fringe nationalisms and prevents Great Russian nationalism from overstepping its mark and becoming a danger. The problem of nationality thus strengthens the monopoly of ideology and allows it to run its course. And thus it strengthens the present power-structure as well.

Some Conclusions

WHAT WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING here are techniques of government. The problem of nationality may present the régime with difficulties, but it also provides opportunities for them to be turned to its own advantage. Leninism excels at transforming a disaster in the realm of reality into a triumph in the realm of unreality, and in turn, in the realm of power. But for how long will this be possible?

According to the spirit of Leninism, victory implies destruction. Now, the reality of national feeling is the most indestructible force which the Communist authorities have yet encountered. Up to a certain point, they can fairly easily do away with classes and religions. But in order to get rid of nations completely they would have to destroy them physically, and in most cases this has not proved possible, even for Stalin.

Over the last 30 years, the idea of nationhood has been building itself up again. However ambiguous the mafias within each national group might be, they still reflect that ineradicable drive (even if they use it for their own ends) towards cultural, economic, ethnic, and last of all, national autonomy. Little by little, the nations are gaining points against Soviet centralization. The most tangible proof of this is that the borderlands of the Soviet Union are beginning to get richer, or at least less poor, than the Russian heartlands. This stems from the fact that socialism is less ardently applied and less meekly obeyed there so that its effect of perpetuating under-development is muted. The Russian people, being closer to Moscow, and the "privileged" instrument of socialist power, take the full brunt of this. They feel, therefore, exploited by all these other peoples, who hate the Russians and, in their eyes, are ruining them.

The main danger contained in the nationalities problem may be viewed

as the direct opposite of its principal advantage. For, if indeed it does serve to consolidate the ideological structure of the régime, it at the same time keeps it rigid and incapable of change. Even more than in 1913, any large-scale political manoeuvre or any attempt at reform is all the more perilous because it carries with it the risk of a major outburst. In China, the balance of power between the Han régime and the national minorities is such that the latter may either be wiped out or restored by Han colonization, as were, for example, the Tibetans. The relative homogeneity of China (even though the Han people can in their turn be split into several distinct peoples) allows it a greater margin for manoeuvre than that enjoyed by Gorbachev. The latter, like the hero of *The Wages of Fear*, is at the wheel of a lorry which is liable to blow up. He will be trembling whether he puts his foot on the brake or on the accelerator.

The final danger is for us. Soviet hegemony, for once here comparable to the classical imperial tyrannies of old, can only become more stable by extending itself further. The best method of removing all hope from a conquered nation is to subjugate its neighbour in its turn. In order to hold the Ukraine it was necessary to hold Poland. In order to hold Poland it was necessary to hold Central Europe. Thus one could take the view that the danger of a major explosion and of secession may only be averted through limitless expansion. The threat hanging over the Soviet Régime in the form of the nationalities issue only adds weight to the threat which that régime imposes on Europe.

The latter has a cloudy conscience. But it can take no better course of action than to close its eyes to the nationalities issue, whether this is for fear of displeasing Moscow or whether it is because it is passively waiting for the USSR to break up. Perhaps it would be wiser to revive the diplomatic tradition used with the Ottoman empire, namely, to make public comments about the state of health of the new "Sick Man" and to make serious preparations for his succession. The Wilson doctrine, the right of peoples to manage their own affairs and the condemnation of colonialism could all be progressively applied to the Soviet Union. In doing this, we would risk no more than we already risk, and maybe a lot less.

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Recently the nationalities question has come to the forefront. For the present situation, it would seem that the following points are salient.

In the regions where national movements present a danger, Gorbachev has exercised caution. In the Ukraine, the enduring Shcherbitsky resisted any change within his domaine; but eventually incurred the wrath of Gorbachev for whom sabotage of his policy in the Ukraine had the effect also of undermining his authority at the centre. In Central and Eastern

Europe, Gorbachev confirmed Honnecker, Jaruzelski, Zhivkov and Ceausescu in their positions as pro-consuls and installed the reliable Jakeš. He has succeeded in getting the West drawn in to maintaining order in this area: East Germany is now "co-managed" by the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany; Poland is "co-managed" by the State Department (and Mr Brzezinski), the Vatican and the Soviet ambassador to Warsaw. The Polish Church, Walesa and Gierek have been busy putting out the fires which seemed about to flare up again in 1988, threatening to unmask the whole of Gorbachev's mystification and seduction of the world. Between them they deserve to win the "Gorbachev prize" to be awarded each year to whoever gives the greatest support to the Soviet régime. Gorbachev has shown the same caution towards the Islamic world. Things came close to a purge in Kazakhstan, while he wisely tried to avoid another one in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. When he had to take sides between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, it was the Azerbaijanis who were spared while the Armenians got their throats slit in a pogrom in Sumgait.

In areas where a national movement was unable to attain a critical mass, Gorbachev let it develop just to a certain point: this was the case in the Baltic regions where Gorbachev must for a moment have envisaged creating, as the Chinese did, a "special economic zone": a window on *perestroika*. This was also the case in Georgia and Armenia. But in any case, as in those countries, once a nationalist movement threatened to become irreversible, out of the reach of Party manipulations, Gorbachev himself decided to set an example by teaching them a lesson. The earthquake gave him that opportunity: Gorbachev went himself to help with the organization of the sudden exodus of both Azerbaijanis from Armenia and Armenians from Azerbaijan. Thousands of fearful, destitute refugees found themselves buried in the ruins of Leninakan. The Soviet Army arrived in force, moved into Yerevan, took little part in rescue operations, hardly lifting a single shovel to help, but straightaway arrested the Armenian nationalist leaders and the *ad hoc* committee in Nagorny Karabakh. In short, Armenia was punished and its punishment was meant to stand as a warning example to all the other nationalities. Gorbachev acted just as Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev would have done in similar circumstances. So there we are.

Translated from the French by Belinda McKenzie

Polish Pope, Polish Church and Polish State

Tomasz Mianowicz

WHEN, ON 16 OCTOBER 1978, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, Metropolitan of Crakow, was elected Pope, feelings of hope for a change in the Vatican's Eastern Policy began to stir within many Catholic circles. The fact that a cardinal from a Communist country had been elected the head of the Roman Catholic Church was considered the main factor of the hoped-for change. It was said that the new Pope, who had first-hand experience of actually living in a Marxist–Leninist system, could clearly see all the dangers and pitfalls resulting from the Vatican's *Ostpolitik*—a policy which, having been initiated by Pope John XXIII, reached its peak during Pope Paul VI's pontificate. These hopes were heightened still further by the conviction that in Cardinal Wojtyla's country the Church had traditionally resisted oppression inflicted by state authorities and, what is more, was considered the chief source of society's opposition to totalitarianism.

However, the Vatican's Eastern policy did not change. In the few publications that have dealt with this issue, it is significant that no author offers any logical explanation for this. There were several reasons: the policies of both partners, i.e. the Vatican and Moscow, are characterized by the utmost secrecy, and are thus completely out of step with the way that democratic states pursue their policies. Hence there was particular difficulty over access to relevant sources and documents. In the Soviet case the situation was made worse by the Communist policy of disinformation and propaganda which aimed at confusing the opponent ("partner") and misleading observers of the political scene. However, the main reason for the disappointments and conflicting interpretations was to be found in an obvious fact which was consistently overlooked, namely that the Vatican's policy towards the Soviet bloc had been following the model of relations between Church and State in the Polish People's Republic. The popular Western image of these relations, though, is by no means free from a considerable amount of over-simplification.

Events in Poland during recent years (since the birth of Solidarity) have contributed greatly to a further blurring of the picture. And on the subject of Solidarity, it would be difficult to find another topic in recent history on which so much has been written with so many erroneous opinions being expressed all at the same time. The dubious historical value of the majority of these analyses obviously stems from their authors' deep emotional

involvement in the subject, and from the fear of political repercussions extending beyond Polish borders.

The schematic image of Poland, which is so widespread amongst Western observers, is mainly concerned with the position of the Catholic Church. A version of the unity of Church and society (i.e. "Solidarity") in the fight for human, civic and workers' rights, was adopted.[1]

It is true that the Church in Poland was the defender of human rights. At the same time, the Church always wanted to play the part of mediator between Solidarity and the Communist Party; yet when it came to open conflict, it gave its political support to the state. Most Western observers tended to overlook the fact that during recent years certain totally new actions and phenomena began to occur in Poland. They were actions of support for priests victimized by the Church authorities on account of their Solidarity involvement (e.g. a dramatic hunger strike in Ursus in 1984 in support of Father Nowak); there were serious divergences within the clergy about the policy of the Polish Primate; and on the part of the independent press, there was open criticism of the Primate's conciliatory policy towards the state authorities. Even when they were noted, these facts were disregarded on the grounds that they stemmed from Cardinal Glemp's personality—in spite of his associates' protestations that he was simply continuing Cardinal Wyszynski's line of policy.[2]

The author of the most valuable studies on the subject of Church–State relations in the Polish People's Republic, the émigré Jozef Mackiewicz, commented upon that fixed image as follows:

> As regards the Church in Poland, the truth is that no one wants to know the truth; the real truth is being avoided or replaced by a particular mixture of slogans, tactical half-truths, wishful-thinking and the usual patriotic stereotypes. It is often difficult to decide which is the dominant quality: deliberate ignorance, genuine ignorance or genuine self-deception.[3]

To find the origins of the Vatican's Eastern policy we need to look to the model of Church–Communist Party relations in the Polish People's Republic. For the Vatican's line of policy towards Warsaw is both an immanent and a logical element of Church *Ostpolitik*. Both sides, i.e. Church and Party, plus Western observers, stress the unique character of the Polish situation (the terms used being "the Polish Model" and "the specific Polish character"). Mackiewicz states that since Pope John XXIII, Vatican circles have been referring to Poland as a "testing-ground"

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[1] See W. Hammel, *Die Ostpolitik Papst Johannes Paul II*, Verlag SOI, 1984, p. 16n.
[2] See "Unturbulent Priest", *The Economist*, 25 February 1984.
[3] J. Mackiewicz, "Dla 'dobra Kosciola'?", in *Droga Pani*, London, 1984, p. 293.

for relations between Catholicism and Communism in general.[4] In fact conclusions drawn from "the Polish Experiment" were considered applicable to other Communist countries and had a vital influence upon the attitudes of the universal Catholic Church. They were first presented on 3 February 1952, in an article written by two prominent journalists and Catholic activists, Stanislaw Stomma and Jerzy Turowicz, and published in *Tygodnik Powszechny* (the Krakow Metropolitan Curia weekly). Their article, entitled "The Polish Experiment", referred to the Agreement concluded between the Government of the Polish Republic and the Episcopate of Poland, on 14 April 1950.

On the part of the Episcopate, the Agreement guaranteed full political loyalty to the Communist government, "condemning all anti-state activity", and promising to "combat the criminal activities of underground bandits" (this referred to the armed anti-Communist opposition still active at that time), and to "brand and punish with canonical sanctions priests guilty of participation in any underground or anti-state activity". "The Episcopate," the Agreement read, "will explain to the clergy that they must not oppose development of the co-operative movement in rural areas" (this referred to the collectivization of agriculture).

The Communist government, for its part, declared that it would respect the right to worship, and to religious education in schools, as well as equal rights for the Catholic press and freedom of action for convents, monasteries and other religious associations "within the framework of their orders, and the laws in force".

Stomma and Turowicz interpreted the Agreement as a "practical compromise between the Church in Poland and the Marxist government". According to the two authors, the Agreement, "without eliminating the ideological struggle, will prevent its transfer to the political scene . . . thus promoting co-operation between Catholics and Marxists for the good of the nation". The article itself declared "full loyalty to the state" and "resistance to all political suggestions, whether external or coming from within, which, for any reason, involve anti-state activity".

The authors were right to emphasize the "great historical significance" that lay in the fact that "a direct link between the Christian world and the culture of nascent Communism had been established". However, they were not consistent in their assessment of the situation, since the Polish People's Republic had become, after the war, the largest Catholic country to be ruled by Communists; what is more, it was a country which was practically homogenous in respect of both religion and nationality. It is possible that Stomma and Turowicz wanted to avoid "provoking the authorities". A similar "protective colouring" can be seen in the following statement:

[4] J. Mackiewicz, *Watykan w cieniu Czerwonej Gwiazdy*, London, 1975, p. 235.

"Many dynamic Catholics will certainly prefer the social ideal of socialism to the capitalist concept of living."

The authors agreed—"to a certain extent"—with the imputation that "Catholic opposition to bourgeois revolution and capitalism was a sign of social conservatism, and found its origins in the adherence to the feudal system." Statements of this kind were not quite compatible with ideas preached by Pope Pius XII at that time.

The second part of the article was definitely more significant, as it concerned "setting guidelines of a primary importance for the future of the Catholic Church as an entity". "The Polish Experiment," the authors wrote, "has an importance that goes beyond the sphere of problems relating to one country only, and the result of it will be assessed by the whole Catholic Church." Stomma and Turowicz saw the future role of the experiment as the "baptizing of Communism", which, in practice, was to mean "combining the social programmes of socialism with Christian morality and metaphysics". Their final question was:

> When can we say that the Polish Experiment has been successful in a universal sense? Let us leave this question unanswered for the time being. Any attempt to answer this question in any detail today would be an historical impudence.

Ten years later, Cardinal Montini's newspaper, *L'Italia*, published the following words:

> At the moment, Poland is a Catholic area about which the most promising speculations on the subject of a possible understanding, and also its limitations, between the Catholic Church and the Communist government are being made . . . In this sphere, "the Polish Experiment" is a genuine, original experience, in which guidelines for the Church's attitude towards a socialist society are being set out.[5]

Eighteen months later, Cardinal Montini was elected Pope. He took the name of Paul VI and began to "baptize Communism", which meant a policy of openness towards the Soviet bloc, and ideological openness towards "progress" (*apertura a sinistra*).

When Stomma and Turowicz published their article, it was two years after the Government–Episcopate Agreement had been reached. By that time, it was clear to everyone that the Communists were effectively fighting the Church. Thus the question arises, what brought about the ensuing popularity of "the Polish Experiment"? To answer this question, one has

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[5] Quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *W Cieniu Krzyza*, London, 1972, p. 94 (English translation: *In the Shadow of the Cross*, Contra Publ., New York, 1973).

to look back to what had taken place on the "testing-ground" before the article was published, and also to what happened afterwards.

In Poland, repressive measures towards the Church began in 1948–49, i.e. when the state authorities finally crushed legal and armed opposition. Earlier on, in Poland, as in other countries of the Soviet bloc, a subversive movement was organized by the Communists. (Its prototype was the Living Orthodox Church, created in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution.) Initially, it did not constitute a threat to the integrity of the Church. At that time, the Church enjoyed certain privileges: Catholic newspapers circulated freely, Church lands were not confiscated for collectivization, religious education was taught in schools, while war-damaged and bombed churches were being rebuilt with financial help from the state. However, on 12 September 1945, a supposedly paradoxical event took place: the Polish Communist government broke the existing concordat. It was the only case of its kind in the whole Soviet bloc. The paradox was supposed to reside in the fact that the state authorities lost their right of veto in the appointment of bishops, and the Catholic clergy was no longer bound to loyalty towards the state.[6]

What was most important was what lay behind the reasons for the breaking of the concordat: the state wanted to take advantage of strong anti-German feelings amongst the population, and therefore insisted on the concordat being broken by the Holy See "instructing the Berlin nuncio to entrust the Bishop of Gdansk, Karl Maria Sprett, with the administration of the Chelmno diocese" and by "appointing a German—Breitinger—as Apostolic Administrator of Poznan and Gniezno dioceses, with jurisdiction over Germans". These acts were said to be "in conflict with the interests of the Polish nation and the Polish state".[7]

It was proved that these allegations were, from a legal point of view, groundless.[8] They made good use, however, of deep-seated anti-German feelings which were quite understandable in the Polish situation. They also prepared the ground for the ensuing campaign against the Pope, which was to brand him as "an enemy of Poland and a friend of German revanchists". First and foremost, they signalled the overture for ensuing attacks upon the Church, in which the Church was accused of "betrayal of the Polish raison d'état in the matter of the Regained Territories". The matter of the territories assigned to Poland as a result of the Yalta Conference was to become the main factor used by the Communists to feed anti-German sentiments amongst Poles, sustaining the image of the Soviet Union as a "guarantor of Polish territorial gains", and to divert the attention of Polish society away from the threat of sovietization.

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[6] See H. Stehle, *Die Ostpolitik des Vatikans 1917–1975*, München–Zurich, 1975, p. 235.
[7] The Resolution of the Provisional Government of National Unity of 12 September 1945.
[8] See O. Halecki and J. F. Murray, Jr., *Pius XII: Eugenio Pacelli, Pope of Peace*, Farrar, Straus and Young, 1954, pp. 245–6.

In the case of the Western Territories, the Church took, firmly and consistently, the side of the Polish government, and repeatedly declared this allegiance. The Vatican, however, did not recognize Poland's new borders, because it did not agree with the decisions taken in Yalta which involved the inclusion of Poland's Eastern Territories in the Soviet Union. The German authors of *Kirchen in Sozialismus*, a collective publication, maintain that the reason behind the conflict that arose between the Polish Primate Wyszynski and the Vatican was the question of the acceptance of the Oder–Neisse line in the Agreement of 14 April 1950.[9] According to other sources, however, the cause of the greatest consternation in the Curia of Rome was the unprecedented fact of an agreement signed between the Catholic Church and a Communist government.[10]

The Agreement was signed at a time when the authorities were openly carrying out an anti-Church policy. In 1949, decrees against Catholic associations were passed, hospitals were withdrawn from the care of the Church, religious worship was strictly confined within church walls. In 1950, the process of withdrawing religious education from schools began.

The number of priests put on trial on charges of anti-state activity was growing rapidly, and they were not infrequently sentenced to death. There is no data available on the Episcopate's protests against the sentences. On 13 May 1951, the bishops published the "Pro Memoria" in which they warned priests against involvement in any political activity.

The authorities, on their part, compensated for their loss of the right of veto in the appointment of bishops (following the breaking of the concordat) by passing a decree "On the Appointment of Ecclesiastic Posts" on 9 February 1953. The decree gave the state authorities the right to veto an appointment or to transfer not only senior church officials but also parish priests. Instances of such intervention had taken place before: on 26 January 1951, in the Western Territories, state authorities removed five Apostolic administrators who had been appointed to their posts in 1945 by Primate Hlond who, however, exceeded the Extraordinary powers granted to him by Pope Pius XII. Primate Wyszynski accepted this status quo, and on 18 February 1951, after a talk with the chief Party boss, Bierut, he agreed to grant canonical jurisdiction to "diocesan administrators" elected by the diocesan councils. On 16 December 1951, in his interview with *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Primate Wyszynski stated that the Episcopate and the government were in complete agreement in the matter of the Western Territories. On 26 May 1952, he convened the Chapter of the Archdiocese of Wroclaw, the members of which were chosen in conjunction with the government.[11]

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[9] See G. Barberini, M. Stohr, E. Weingartner (eds.), *Kirchen in Sozialismus*, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1977, p. 187.

[10] See H. Stehle, op. cit., p. 307.

[11] See *Slowo Powszechne*, 3 June 1952.

At the end of January 1952, the state authorities published the new Draft Constitution, based on Stalinist principles. Although the Episcopate declared itself against the separation of the Church from the state, the decision was nevertheless ratified in the ensuing Constitution. Afterwards, *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Issue No. 31, 1952) described the Constitution as the "foundation of the nation's life", giving its approval for the "socio-political reality as defined in the Constitution".

The election was to take place on 26 October 1952. Candidates were to be chosen from only one list, that of the "People's Front". On 19 September, the Episcopate issued the following declaration:

> Polish Catholic society is facing the important task of fulfilling its duty following on from its right to vote. The Polish Episcopate declares that the right to vote involves the moral duty of taking one's vote to the polls.

The Church was carrying out a conciliatory policy, while the Communists' attacks were becoming steadily more fierce. Events started to move fast. In November 1952, the state authorities forcibly removed three bishops from the diocese of Katowice. They were replaced by Father Filip Bednorz of the pro-Communist movement "Patriot Priests", who was appointed Capitulary Curate. On 6 December, Father Bednarz took the oath in the Praesidium of Katowice Regional People's Council, and on 16 December he was formally accepted by Primate Wyszynski who, on 29 November 1952, had been made a cardinal.

December 1952 brought arrests for members of the Curia of Cracow. Priests and Church officials were being charged with "subversive action" and economic offences. The Episcopate's reaction was a statement which read as follows: "Catholics, particularly clergymen, who take part in underground or subversive activities, not only act against the good of the nation, but also cause considerable harm to the Catholic Church in Poland."[12] At the same time, a campaign was being carried out by the press which accused the Church of non-observance of the 1950 Agreement. The Cracow Trial took place in January 1953. All sentences involved long-term imprisonment. In its article "After the Cracow Trial" (No. 5, 15 February 1953), *Tygodnik Powszechny* condemned the defendants.

On 9 February, the state authorities issued the aforementioned decree which gave them the right of approval of all Church appointments, and which committed all priests to pledge "loyalty to the Polish People's Republic". The same date of publication was on the Episcopate's "Instruction for the Clergy" which preached non-involvement in any activity against state authorities and the "present reality".

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[12] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 21–28 December 1952.

The régime's political, administrative and financial sanctions against the Church were growing in strength. On 8 March 1953, *Tygodnik Powszechny* was suspended (it was to be taken over, for a three-year period, by a subversive Catholic organization, PAX). The integrity of the Church was under threat, as many priests were by then joining the Patriot Priests movement, to be subsequently appointed to official Church posts. According to Wyszynski's biographer, the Primate was searching the whole time for a *modus vivendi*, deterring bishops from lodging protests with the government and preaching "restraint" (this was called a "policy of realism" by the author).[13]

On 8 May 1953, however, the Episcopate sent a protest letter to President Bierut—a letter which contained the famous words: "NON POSSUMUS!" The letter spoke of administrative sanctions against the Church, of a compulsory atheization programme, of stringent censorship and the activities of pseudo-Catholic organizations. The question of the imprisoned priests was raised only from the point of view of the Church having no access to any records connected with the investigation and trial, and being allowed no contact with the defendants. The bishops stressed that the Church was consistent in obeying the postulates of the April 1950 Agreement, and expressed their willingness to continue to do so. The letter acknowledged the separation of the Church from the state (only one year before, the Episcopate had declared itself against this division).

However, in comparison with the Episcopate's previous line of conduct, the letter was of a resolute character. The Party was called "the Party", not "the government" or "the state" as before. Words were used that even referred to the Communist Party's hatred of all that was truly Catholic. The Episcopate criticized the oath taken by priests before the state authorities. The letter was primarily directed against the government's interference in the appointment of ecclesiastical posts, and against the decree of 9 February 1953. "We shall not give unto Caesar that which is God's. NON POSSUMUS!"

On 14–22 September 1953, the show trial of Czeslaw Kaczmarek, Bishop of Kielce, took place. Bishop Kaczmarek was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Altogether, over 900 priests, including eight bishops, were in prison in 1953.[14] On the night of 25 September, Primate Wyszynski was arrested. A government communiqué, released to the press on 29 September, accused Cardinal Wyszynski of "breaking the rules of the Agreement" and of "instigatory activity which was creating an atmosphere of unrest". The communiqué stated that the Cardinal was "forbidden to carry out functions connected with his former Church posts". A declaration of the Polish

[13] See A. Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski. Prymas i maz stanu*, Paris, 1982, p. 87n.
[14] See G. Barberini, M. Stohr, E. Weingartner, op. cit., p. 186.

Episcopate, published on the same day, promised to make sure that in future "the contents and intentions of the April 1950 Agreement shall not be abused". It condemned the "regrettable facts which came to light during Bishop Kaczmarek's trial". Michal Klepacz, the new Bishop of Kielce, was proposed by government and subsequently elected head of the Episcopate. Later, he was to become "the friendly collaborator" of the PAX group.[15] On 17 December, the Episcopate "pledged loyalty to the Polish People's Republic" before Vice-Premier Cyrankiewicz.

The Church in Poland thus capitulated. There is hardly any reference in historical sources to the period of the three years that followed.

It should be noted that both those who criticized Cardinal Wyszynski and those who idolized him shared the opinion that it was the Church that was seeking a compromise, while it was the Communists who showed no interest in one.[16] As further good-will was demonstrated on the part of the Episcopate, the government continued to take an increasingly stringent and uncompromising course,[17] while accusing the Church of a lack of good-will at the same time.

In his search for a compromise, Cardinal Wyszynski agreed, in 1955, to have fortnightly meetings with Boleslaw Piasecki, founder of the subversive Catholic organization, PAX. Piasecki, an intermediary between the state authorities and the Primate, acted "under the auspices" of the NKWD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and kept regular contact with the Ministry of Public Security. After 1956, that function was taken over by Jerzy Zawieyski, Chairman of the ZNAK Parliamentary Circle and a member of the People's State Council.

Nowadays, there is a widely accepted opinion that antagonism existed between the Episcopate and organizations founded by Piasecki. This view is not quite correct. Bishop Klepacz fully approved of Piasecki's activities. Primate Wyszynski often talked with Piasecki, who played an important part in preparing the 1950 Agreement.[18] Equally debatable appears to be the conviction that there also existed political disagreement between PAX and circles connected with *Tygodnik Powszechny* and the future ZNAK group. In the early 1950s, the same authors wrote for Piasecki's *Dzis i Jutro* ("Today and Tomorrow"—a paper banned in 1955 by decision of the Congregation of the Holy Office), and for *Tygodnik Powszechny*. In 1951, *Tygodnik Powszechy* was represented at the Priests' Congress where the PAX Intellectuals' Commission acted as the figure-head (the Congress was in fact organized by the internal security police).

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[15] A. Micewski, *Wspolrzadzic czy nie klamac*, Paris, 1978, p. 60.

[16] See J. Mackiewicz, "Dla 'dobra Kosciola'?", p. 295, and A. Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski*, Chapter III.

[17] A. Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski*, p. 133.

[18] See A. Micewski, *Wspolrzadzic . . .*, pp. 46–7.

The events which took place in 1956 and after influenced the way in which the part played by PAX and ZNAK was subject to different interpretations. The way that the "Polish October" and the Church's attitudes were later evaluated was greatly influenced by the very same factors which have dominated the way the Polish situation has been examined and assessed in recent years, these being: certain kinds of emotion; the unwillingness to see certain facts; the conscious or subconscious emphasis placed on other facts; and political scheming.

However, before Wladyslaw Gomulka became the Party chief in the Polish People's Republic, Boleslaw Piasecki published a book entitled *Zagadnienia Istotne* ("Essential Issues") in which he referred to "moribund capitalism" and preached the "victorious building of socialism" on a global scale. Although the socialist world was to adopt fully the secular concept of life, Catholics came to regard it as their ally (since socialism follows and implements an idea of social justice which is, in fact, the basis of Christian doctrine).

> As the socialist state allows for the fulfilment of the religious and cultural needs of believing citizens, the spiritual ministration of the clergy should, directly or indirectly, contribute to progress in the building of socialism.[19]

The Congregation of the Holy Office put Piasecki's book on the Index. PAX was finally exposed, and actions carried out in the West by its representatives (who were "promoting the Polish model of co-operation between Catholics and Socialism") were considerably hindered.

The year 1956 was considered a great triumph for Primate Wyszynski, who was released from his internment on 28 October. He expressed his support for the new First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was regarded as the "creator of the Polish road to socialism". The year 1956 is considered a landmark for the start of the alleged disintegration of the Soviet bloc through the emergence of "national Communisms", which weakened ties with the USSR. Even today, the West seems to pin its hopes on the concept of national Communisms (the most obvious manifestation was in American policy towards Romania). According to Golitsyn, the emergence of "national Communist states" constituted part of the strategic disinformation plan, worked out by the Soviet bloc after Stalin's death.[20]

In the fervour of enthusiasm and hopes which accompanied the events of 1956, several important points concerning Polish Church–State relations were overlooked. On 8 December 1956, a published report from the session

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[19] Quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *Watykan . . .*, p. 214.

[20] See A. Golitsyn, *New Lies for Old*, New York, 1984 (particularly chapters 3–6).

of the Joint Government and Episcopate Commission was released. The communiqué informed the nation that the Decree on Ecclesiastical Appointments of 9 February 1953 had been revoked, adding, however, that the relevant new law "will guarantee the State's influence on the appointment of archbishops, diocesan bishops, co-adjutors with right of succession, and parish priests, in accordance with Church jurisdiction". The relevant decree was passed on 31 December 1956. The obligation to pledge loyalty to the Polish People's Republic was retained. It is still in force today. The text of the oath reads as follows:

> I solemnly declare that I shall be faithful and loyal to the Polish People's Republic, observe her laws, and never undertake any activity which might pose a threat to her well-being.

Thus in 1956 the Church agreed to two conditions which, two years before, had been the very cause of the protest it had lodged with the government. A similar attitude was taken at the time of the 1957 elections (again, only one list of candidates was presented by the Party). Primate Wyszynski supported the elections, even more determinedly than in 1952. Also, in 1954 the Episcopate had issued an appropriate statement concerning the matter of the "elections", but according to Wyszynski's biographer "the Church was forced to do so".[21] The same author maintains that when the Polish Primate arrived in Rome in 1957, he received a very warm welcome from Pope Pius XII. Western papers at that time spoke of "a cool reception". The discord was not only over the agreement with the Communist government, but also about the Episcopate's attitude towards Cardinal Wyszynski's imprisonment. Later, in the Vatican, Wyszynski "defended the Episcopate's integrity".[22]

Also in 1956, Progressive Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (later to be called Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs) began to plan and carry out their activities. It was in these circles that the ZNAK group originated. The new group was close to Primate Wyszynski. This is how a prominent activist, Stefan Kisielewski, formulated the political goals of the group:

> In spite of a quite justified psychological reluctance within our society, the idea of a whole-hearted, sincere and conscious alliance with the Soviet Union and all the other People's Democracy states, and of full solidarity with the whole Eastern bloc, must be encouraged in the most effective way. In spite of the fact that the majority of people in Poland are neither Marxists nor socialists, they must be made to realize that deviation from the socialist economy would lay Poland open to an incalculable disaster. (*Tygodnik Powszechny*, 24 February 1956)

[21] A. Micewski, *Wspolrzadzic . . .*, p. 61.
[22] See Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski*, pp. 170–71.

ZNAK and WIEZ activities (WIEZ was a similar organization) took over the role previously played by PAX, that is, the popularization of the "Polish model" in the West. In France, their patron was Maurice Vaussard who had previously promoted the PAX movement and looked after its activists.[23] ZNAK supported the international policies of the Soviet bloc as well:

> The American global system is slowly disintegrating . . . Our strength lies only in a close alliance with the Soviet Union. (*Tygodnik Powszechny*, 4 April 1960)

This is how *Zycie Warszawy*, the government's daily paper, assessed the role played by ZNAK:

> The work of Kisielewski, Stomma, Zawieyski and other ZNAK activists is removing monstrous misconceptions and prejudiced anti-socialist opinions which exist outside Poland, and is promoting the idea of co-existence. (3 February 1959)

In the West, it was found generally acceptable to consider ZNAK as the opposition (the term "legal opposition" was sometimes used). Jerzy Zawieyski, Chairman of the ZNAK Parliamentary Circle, defined ZNAK's role as follows:

> Our Circle has never been an opposition group; neither does it intend to become one. However, although it belongs to the National Unity Front (which means that it accepts all the basic principles of a socialist state), the parliamentary style of address of its deputies nevertheless differs from the style of speaking typical amongst the majority of other deputies.[24] We realize that the Polish United Workers' Party is the only force capable of shaping the nation's destiny. We give the Party our vote of confidence and wish to co-operate fully with the Party.[25]

A short assessment of the PAX and ZNAK groups was given by August Jan Markiewicz:

> When the Communists entered Poland in 1944, intending to subdue the country, they were faced with a serious obstacle: the Catholic Church . . . The Communists organized pseudo-Catholic groups to carry out the "psychological demobilization of public opinion" . . . One of these groups, PAX, was openly pro-Communist, and quickly lost the confidence of Catholics. The other group, ZNAK, collaborated

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[23] See J. Mackiewicz, *Zwyciestwo prowokacji*, London, 1983, p. 147 (German translation: *Sieg der Provokation*, Bergstadtverlag Wilh. Gottl. Korn, München, 1964; Russian translation: *Pobieda provokacii*, Zaria Publishing Inc., London, Ontario, 1983).

[24] *Zycie Warszawy*, 26 May 1965.

[25] Quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *Zwyciestwo prowokacji*, p. 147.

> in a more discreet manner (which involved staged "protests" against the state authorities), and so it became much more useful for the Communists.[26]

Shortly before Pius XII's death, the Vatican's representative, Alessandrini, criticized ZNAK with the following words:

> Zawieyski[27] would like the Holy See to make a declaration in favour of Catholic co-operation in the building of socialism . . . It is obvious that his words are neither Catholic nor Christian; they are an example of intellectual conformism which is known to have both appeared and disappeared frequently throughout the Church's history . . . What is the difference between Zawieyski's attitude and the attitude of PAX "progressives" which was rejected by Catholics of Zawieyski's kind?[28]

Let us try to answer this question: apart from differences in actual membership (although one must remember that after 1956 many "Paxists" joined the ZNAK faction)[29] and apart from the fact that Piasecki acted on behalf of the security apparatus, the difference was supposed to lie in a rather vaguely defined "ideological autonomy" or "moral independence" which ZNAK was claiming for itself.[30] In a private conversation, Stefan Kisielewski later explained this to me in the following way: "There was no political difference. The only difference was that Piasecki believed that socialism was a creation of the Holy Spirit."

ZNAK's parliamentary career came to an end in 1976, when the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, removed its deputies from the Seym (Polish parliament).

When, in 1957, Cardinal Wyszynski gave his support to the "elections", it was interpreted as an "act of realism" which was intended to have a calming effect upon the nation. However, there were a number of political actions taken by the Primate which benefited the Communists. These actions had nothing to do with the tensions within society; what is more, their scope extended beyond Polish borders.

In 1959, Pope John XXIII renounced his recognition of the diplomatic status of the Polish and Lithuanian governments-in-exile.

> The abolition of the diplomatic status of the governments-in-exile was likely to be interpreted as an actual gesture of recognition of the

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[26] "ZNAK bez maski", *Ostatnie Wiadomosci*, 14 January 1972.
[27] Token Catholic Representative in the Polish Seym, who later committed suicide.
[28] Quoted in *Ostatnie Wiadomosci*, 17 April 1959.
[29] Amongst them: T. Mazowiecki—Lech Walesa's present adviser; K. Lubienski and J. Zablocki—at one time deputies in the Seym of the Polish People's Republic; A. Micewski—Cardinal Wyszynski's biographer.
[30] See A. Micewski, *Wspolrzadzic . . .*, Chapter II.

> Communist governments in those countries. Cardinal Wyszynski was thought to be the initiator of that decision.[31]

In 1964, after the death of Archbishop Gawlina, head of the Polish clergy-in-exile (who referred to the system in the Polish People's Republic as a "godless régime" and a "Satanic intention of God's and Poland's enemies"[32]), Cardinal Wyszynski abolished the independence of the Polish clergy-in-exile from the Polish Episcopate. (Until then it had been under the direct authority of the Holy See.) The change took place in spite of the Vatican's original decision and it signified the beginning of a certain process, namely, Polish political émigrés taking more and more "realistic" attitudes.

At that time, the decision was considered a blow directed at the émigrés, yet the respect that Cardinal Wyszynski enjoyed prevented the Polish press in the West from launching any discussion on the subject. The only comment was an article in an émigré publication by Barbara Toporska:

> The abolition of ecclesiastical autonomy is a blow for political émigrés. In future, it may also turn out to be a blow for the Church in Poland . . . Priests in Poland officially pledge to be "loyal to the Polish People's Republic" and not to undertake anything which might be harmful to the state government. The role of the émigré is to undertake any effort which might help to overthrow the Communist dictatorship . . . What will happen if the Communists start to extort "declarations of loyalty" from the émigré clergy, now that they come under the authority of the Polish Primate?[33]

Although the subject escaped public dispute, the author of the article received many letters from prominent Polish political émigrés. President August Zaleski wrote:

> I would like to tell you—strictly for your personal information, and not for publication—that shortly after Archbishop Gawlina's death, Mr A. Zawisza [the then Prime Minister] went to Rome to discuss the issue of his successor. He held a number of talks in the Department of State and succeeded in convincing Archbishop Samoré, within whose authority the matter rested, that it was imperative to maintain an independent Church organization as a part of Polish life in exile. Cardinal Wyszynski was also in Rome at the time. When Mr Zawisza informed him of the outcome of the talks with Archbishop Samoré, the Primate reacted with indignation. "It shall not be so!" he said, and

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[31] M. Mourin, *Le Vatican et l'URSS*, Paris, 1965, quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *W Cieniu Krzyza*, p. 27.

[32] Quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *Watykan . . .*, p. 286.

[33] B. Toporska, "Z prosba o odpowiedz", *Wiadomosci*, 6 February 1966.

> cut the conversation short. His ensuing talk with the Pope established the present status quo. I am afraid that its effects will be detrimental, not only for émigrés, but also for Poland, and perhaps even for the Church itself.[34]

Soon after his succession to office, the new Primatial Deputy for the Affairs of the clergy-in-exile, Prelate Rubin, refused to say Mass for the Polish officers murdered at Katyn. Later, Pope John Paul II acted in a similar fashion.[35] He raised Bishop Rubin to the rank of cardinal and made him Prefect of the Congregation for Eastern Church Affairs. It is worth noting that the rise of Wladyslaw Rubin's career had been forecast by *Zycie Warszawy* as early as November 1969:

> We have heard about the increasing personal standing of one of our countrymen, Bishop Wladyslaw Rubin, who until now has been Secretary General of the Synod. We are pleased to report that, as his functions grow in scope and importance, this church dignitary—a broad-minded, modern and realistic thinker and patriot—is more than likely to achieve outstanding status in the Holy See.[36]

Cardinal Wyszynski was the initiator of official talks between the government of the Polish People's Republic and the Vatican. As early as 1957, Wladislaw Gomulka had been trying to set up talks for such contacts.[37] In the same year, the Primate visited the Vatican and explored the possibility of talks during his audience with Pope Pius XII who, however, did not agree to enter into talks with the government of the Polish People's Republic. The first official meeting did not take place until 27 April 1971, with Archbishop Casaroli as the representative of the Holy See. During the present pontificate these contacts have gained in strength and frequency.

I have devoted so much attention to Cardinal Wyszynski because he was the actual originator of "the Polish model", and an overall assessment of the Catholic Church's role in Poland proceeds from the assessment of Wyszynski's approach. After the Church had given its support to Edward Gierek, a Polish author (i.e. living in Poland), published the following opinion in the émigré monthly, *Kultura*:

> The régime sees the Catholic Church as an institution to be either fiercely fought against, or used as a channel in which to divert "lurking dangers" which pose a constant threat to the Communist system in Poland . . . The way the Communists assess the situation is, in fact,

[34] A letter from A. Zaleski to B. Toporska, 2 February 1966.
[35] See J. Mackiewicz, *Katyn—Ungesuhntes Verbrechen*, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983, pp. 227–8.
[36] Quoted from Radio Warszawa, 11 December 1969.
[37] See A. Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski*, p. 168.

> nearly perfect for their purposes. They use it as a permanent alibi, which permits them to hide behind the Church, whenever the political situation in the country calls for such a masquerade. The enormous reserves of social energy among the people who are actively engaged against Communism is thus wasted . . . The Church in Poland has become a factor which, in a critical situation, seems to be saving the Communist system. In opposing the system, the Church—like everything else—succumbs to the principle of collaboration.[38]

The Church in Poland was consistent in its policy of non-involvement in activities that might be a threat to the Communist government. It supported—more or less consistently—government policies in the international forum. In the 1970s, the Church took the dissidents' side and protected them from reprisals, but kept itself apart from the opposition. This attitude has never changed, even though after 1956, the Church did not act under coercion. For the past thirty years, Church–state relations have followed the same, repetitive pattern: concessions are given to the Church whenever a new Party Secretary needs its support; once the new government is firmly established, the Church's influence is again restricted. It seems that over the years the Church has lost more than it has gained, the gains being mostly tactical gestures on the part of the government.

Jozef Mackiewicz assessed this problem in the following way:

> The Polish Episcopate is not a passive instrument in the hands of the Communist Party, as are episcopates in other subjugated countries and the Patriarchate in Moscow . . . The Polish Episcopate is trying to protect the Church's interests, its spiritual mission and Christian moral values, and so it "fights" using all the legitimate means at its disposal. That is, in the best way it can. The crux of the matter lies in this very interpretation . . . of the means considered "legitimate" by the Episcopate . . . .
>
> By cutting itself off from political opposition, the Episcopate renounced all ideological opposition. And as the means for its "fight" to protect the Church's rights and interests, it chose a policy of compromise, concessions and the search for a *modus vivendi* with the Communist Party (calling it euphemistically "the state" or "the government").
>
> Thus, compromises and concessions became the *price* which the Church pays for the "saving of Catholicism". As this kind of bargaining involves, as a matter of course, not only political and ideological values, but also moral concessions, deviation from the so-called "whole truth"

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[38] A. Zabrzeski, "Patologia Opozycji", *Kultura*, March 1972.

> . . . and other, morally disputable, aspects, the question arises: is not the *price* paid for the saving of Catholicism too steep?[39]

The limits of political concessions made by the Church in Poland (and later by the Universal Catholic Church) were never clearly defined, whereas dogmatic and moral limits were always rather flexible. However, the opponent consequently stuck to Lenin's principle: the intractable, final limit of all compromises, agreements, thaws and *perestroikas* must be the retention of power in the hands of the Communist Party.

It became generally accepted that Cardinal Wyszynski should be regarded as one of the "Invincibles", together with Cardinal Midszenty, Cardinal Stepinac and Archbishop Beran. However, Wyszynski's biographer describes his attitude as "fundamentally different" from that of Cardinal Miszenty.[40] Hansjakob Stehle writes:

> Wyszynski is different from Midszenty, just as the situation of Catholics is different in both countries . . . Wyszynski would never utter the words used by Midszenty in Vienna on 7 February 1974 when he was talking about his trial, which had taken place 25 years before: ". . . it took place in a country which, in 1945, had been given a travesty of freedom at the Yalta Conference."[41]

Cardinal Wyszynski practised a policy of compromise and political bargaining. How, then, is one to assess the value of an agreement between the Catholic Church and a Communist state—an agreement which was introduced into most recent history by a Polish primate? Here is the answer:

> One has to realize that there exists another "modern world" in which notions such as law, state and freedom have different meanings. This is the world built upon the principles of dialectical materialism ("diamat") . . . An agreement between the Church and a diamat state is binding for the Church, but by no means so for the state when its aim—the subjugation of the Church—has been achieved. The state sees such an agreement only as a practical means of disarming the opponent, without binding the state in any legal way.
>
> On the other hand, the opponent, that is the Church, is duty bound to honour its obligations. And so, no agreement with a diamat state will ever guarantee the safety of the Church.[42]

The author of these words was Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski. Such a

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[39] J. Mackiewicz, *Watykan* . . ., pp. 254–5.
[40] A. Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski*, p. 160.
[41] H. Stehle, op. cit., quoted in A. Micewski, *Kardynal Wyszynski*, p. 161.
[42] S. Wyszynski, speech at the Fourth Session of Vatican II, quoted in Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, *Un évèque au service du peuple de Dieu*, Paris—Fribourg, 1968, pp. 79–80.

discrepancy often appeared between his words and his actions. He wanted to create the impression of an unyielding attitude towards the state authorities, while at the same time giving political support to the government of the Polish People's Republic, even after the Stalin era. He was involved in contacts between the Vatican and Moscow.[43] However, it was necessary to have a different image for the benefit of society, and Wyszynski knew how to provide it. Stefan Kisielewski recounts that in the summer of 1970, Church circles began to spread the information that on the 50th anniversary of the victory over the Bolshevik army ("Miracle on the Vistula River"), a mass pilgrimage would take place, and Cardinal Wyszynski would preach a sermon. But three days before the due date, the Primate announced that there would be no sermon, as he had to be elsewhere.[44]

The last few years, especially since the suppression of Solidarity, have witnessed an unprecedented rise in the Church's popularity, and the strengthening of its position with relation to the state authorities. *Trybuna Ludu*, the organ of the Polish United Workers' Party wrote:

> Co-operation between the state and the Church will be further promoted due to the Church's eventually recognizing the consistency of state policy in matters of religion. The Church must have realized that the policy of the Polish People's Republic towards Church matters does not threaten its vital interests, but on the contrary, has allowed the Church to become the most flourishing Church in the world.[45]

Father Professor Bochenski speaks of three tactical policies used by the Communists towards the Church:

> Communist policy towards the Church has two objectives: firstly, to use the Church for promoting the Party's goals (in this case those relating to foreign policy, such as peace propaganda) and Communist doctrine itself; secondly, to reduce Church influence to a minimum. These two objectives are not always compatible: the more the Church is made use of, the more freedom it seems necessary to concede to it . . . There are three typical policies:
>
> (a) The Party thinks there is no chance of making use of the Church. The Church should thus be destroyed.
>
> (b) The Party sees possibilities in making use of the Church, but the Church opposes the idea. In this case, measures must be taken to overcome the Church's opposition.

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[43] See J. Mackiewicz, *W Cieniu Krzyza*, pp. 145 and 151.

[44] S. Kisielewski, interview for Radio Free Europe, 2 February 1988. Another example of Cardinal Wyszynski's dealings is given in J. Mackiewicz, *W Cieniu Krzyza*, pp. 143–4.

[45] M. Jaworski, "Kosciol in panstwo. W poszukiwaniu wspolnego mianownika", *Trybuna Ludu*, 23 April 1987.

(c) The Church is prepared to co-operate. The Party will support it.[46]

The strengthening of the Church's position does not affect the process of moral de-Christianization, typical of the Communist system and evident in the everyday life of the citizen. Churches packed with the faithful are the result of society's search for an alternative—an escape from the "psychosphere" imposed by the system. It cannot be denied that in recent years, the majority of political demonstrations took place after mass, but these events were against the Church's wishes and the priests always called for the crowd to disperse. In 1984, the Episcopate issued a circular which prohibited the carrying of banners other than religious ones during pilgrimages (this obviously meant Solidarity banners). The fact that the faithful used worship in order to demonstrate political opposition to the system disturbed the "symbiotic coexistence" which had been established between state authorities and the Catholic Church.

The balance of this bi-polar system was thrown out when a third political force emerged—Solidarity. (A dissident movement in the 1970s, it was at first protected by the Church against political sanctions, and did not pose a threat to the political status quo in Poland.) Already on 15 August 1980, when strikes reached their peak, Polish Primate Wyszynski called for a return to work. When Solidarity was legal,

> young workers' union activists . . . did not take into account the fact that the Church had long since accepted a compromise between action and principles, and that it did not need a third force . . . Thus, after 13 December 1981, the Church chose the known evil, especially as it was camouflaged by military force, and the whole operation of the suppression of Solidarity was carried out under the guise of an impending Soviet invasion. Only the youth and naivety of interned Solidarity activists (and those of them who managed to escape persecutions for a time) could explain the hopes that Primate Glemp and other bishops would speak out for the murdered union and that their defence would be unequivocal. Once again the Church, which had endorsed the bill, proceeded to settle the régime's accounts and was given its share of privileges.[47]

Jozef Glemp, Cardinal Wyszynski's pupil and secretary, has consistently pursued Wyszynski's policy line. In the light of the current situation, concessions made by the present Primate are more evident. The author quoted above, writes: "The sufferings of present-day society posed less

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[46] J. M. Bochenski, G. Niemeyer (eds.), *Handbuch des Weltkommunismus*, Freiburg–München, 1958, quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *Watykan* . . ., p. 236.

[47] S. Maj, "Autokraci i kompromisy", *Archipelag*, 1986, No.7–8, pp. 7–8.

danger than the possibility of disturbing the status quo, i.e. the informal agreement between the Communists and the Church—this was Primate Wyszynski's idea which Cardinal Glemp also adopted."[48]

The paradox lies in the fact that the leadership of Solidarity—the "third force" on the Polish political scene—adopted the Church's line in dealing with the state authorities.

> The tragedy of both Solidarity and Walesa—with Walesa's artless, simple-heartedness enhanced by the political naivety of his advisers [some of whom are also Primate Glemp's advisers]—lay in their attachment to the Church and a desire to incorporate the movement within the Church structure and to identify their interests with those of the Church.[49]

The style of political declarations is strikingly similar:

> We support—as we have always supported—a sensible *modus vivendi* and sensible co-operation for the good of our country. We believe—and have always believed—that reaching an agreement will be an advantage to both sides.[50]

This is what Stanislaw Stomma, ZNAK's parliamentary deputy said in the Seym in 1961. In recent years, Lech Walesa's political *leitmotiv* has been almost identical.

In 1987, Pope John Paul II, co-author of "the Polish Model" and one of the architects of conciliar "contemporarization" of the Church, made his third visit to his native land. The West saw the visit as an expression of support for Solidarity, and indeed, the Holy Father commented emphatically upon the values of the de-legalized union. Yet the visit also meant the strengthening of General Jaruzelski's international position (not the first gesture of this sort: the Pope received Jaruzelski in the Vatican before his trip to Poland).

The visit was later assessed by a Catholic journalist from Poland as follows:

> For the first time, the people's mood and their faith were dramatically at odds with what John Paul II had to say to them. It seemed that the Holy Father's homilies brought only disappointment to those people patiently waiting for hours to have a glimpse of him and to hear him speak. The words went past people's minds and hearts; they were directed at some other nation.[51]

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[48] Ibid., p. 10.
[49] Ibid., p. 11.
[50] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 8 January 1961.
[51] M. Zielinski, "Inny kraj", *Kultura*, November 1987, p. 109.

Joint actions, undertaken during the Pope's visit in order to prevent demonstrations by the political opposition, became a symbol of "the Polish model", in which the Church has the spiritual authority ("the reign over souls"), and the government—political power.

> Another factor which contributed to the change of atmosphere was the intermingling of Church security forces with the militia. It led to situations which some people found deeply shocking. Even passive attendance of Church security forces at the confiscation of Solidarity banners was very painful, especially as in some churches the main task of the security force was "to keep guard against the display of provocative banners".[52]

It is tempting at this point to draw up a rough estimate of the influence of "the Polish Experiment" upon the attitude of the Universal Catholic Church towards the Communist world. The Church underwent its deepest crisis of the whole century during the time that Paul VI was pursuing and strengthening the policy of ideological and political openness towards the Soviet bloc. The number of practising Catholics and vocations fell, the Church was losing its authority, internal dissention began to affect various national Churches (after Vatican II, an open conflict evolved within the Church in Latin America). The situation of Catholics in none of the other Communist countries resembled "the Polish model". Its influence was only visible in an agreement signed on 14 September 1964 between the Vatican and Budapest (despite the opposition of Cardinal Midszenty, the Hungarian Primate): state authorities had the right of approval in the appointment of bishops who had pledged loyalty to the Communist government. In Asian and African countries, incorporated into the Soviet bloc in the 1970s, Catholic Mission Churches were abolished.

The effect of "the Polish Experiment" upon Latin American countries was thus described by Barbara Toporska:

> Improved relations between the Episcopate (Wyszynski) and Gomulka and his successors were connected with the offensive that the Communists launched in the countries of Latin America which were Catholic and desperately backward in every social respect (one has to add: through the fault of the Church which had—de facto—ruled there for centuries). There was enough "fertile soil" within society for Communist slogans to germinate, as long as people could be persuaded that there was no threat to their Catholic faith. This is where the Polish "testing ground" came in.[53]

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[52] J. J. Lipski, "O wizycie papieza", *Kultura*, September 1987, p. 101.
[53] B. Toporska, letter to the author, 17 April 1984.

Jozef Mackiewicz believed that "Wyszynski began to promote *Ostpoliti* even before the Vatican did so. He had, in any case, pioneered this concep in clear opposition to the then policy of Pope Pius XII himself."[54] Thi policy, however, based on the idea of "the Polish model", has not brough any gains to the Church outside Poland. This is in fact because in essenc the practical realization of this policy model takes place on the basis o nationalism. The resulting political options are not always compatible wit the universalism of Catholic outlook. Polish Catholics—those who hav got entangled in political games with the state authorities—did not seem t care very much about the Silent Church. During the debates of Vatican II an exhibition depicting the situation of the Church in Communist state was organized. Jerzy Turowicz, editor of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, wrote:

> In the pavilion housing anti-Communist "Comitati Civici" exhibits the section devoted to the so-called Silent Church struck an unpleasan note: a mixture of true and false information with a biased and one sided presentation contributed to a badly distorted image. Polis bishops sent an official letter to the organizers, stating that the exhibitio presented facts out of their context of time and place which resulted i a distorted image of reality.[55]

An article published in *The Atlantic Monthly* called Jerzy Turowicz a "her of our time".[56] Turowicz himself said: "We are not free to write everythin we think, but we have never been forced to write anything we don think."[57]

John Paul II—at one time spiritual patron of *Tygodnik Powszechny*— understands the nature of totalitarianism: during a talk with journalists o his way to Chile, when comparing the situation in Chile to the situation i Poland, he made a definite distinction between an authoritarian dictatorshi which is subject to evolution, and the totalitarian system which is base upon inflexible principles. Yet the policy of John Paul II, even more tha that of Paul VI, is based upon the conviction that for the Church's interest "the Polish model" is the best. Only ignorance of the true nature of th model can account for the consternation which John Paul II's late encyclical, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, caused, especially in the USA. In th encyclical, democracy (which he calls "liberal capitalism") is put on a equal footing with Communism ("Marxist collectivism") and is criticize in exactly the same way. According to the Pope, both blocs sho "imperialist tendencies". The new encyclical is a further proof that th

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[54] Ibid.
[55] *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 16 December 1962.
[56] J. De Lacy, "Someone from Cracow", *The Atlantic Monthly*, November 1986.
[57] Ibid.

Vatican has accepted the fact that Communism is there to stay; a fact that was proclaimed 30 years ago in the Seym of the Polish People's Republic by Catholic ZNAK deputies. It is worth quoting Barbara Toporska who, in 1969, wrote the following words:

> Why won't the Church ally itself with the "free world", with democracy, which it persists in referring to as "capitalism", just as the Communists do? . . . The simplest and the most ominous answer would be—far-sightedness. The Church has traditionally allied itself with those who have power. The Church is trying to protect its interests and to find the most bearable *modus vivendi* with those who are on the winning side.[58]

P. Nichols, in his book *The Politics of the Vatican*, quoting Church sources (unofficial, as usual), expressed a similar opinion:

> Basically, Rome would recognize every Communist state without reservation, providing it was willing to guarantee freedom for the Church. There are few prelates in Rome who are naive enough to believe that Communism can be overcome . . . The objective is to secure the best possible position for the Church.[59]

And from another unofficial Church source came the following spiritually uplifting opinion: "The Church has come through a great many things. It will outlast Communism." But Communism, being a system based upon a degenerated form of religion, i.e. ideology, is ontologically as "strong" as Christianity. Moreover, it has political power and the most efficient police system in the history of mankind.

In 1966, a Communist writer, Putrament, closely connected with the ruling élite, spoke thus at a meeting of the Polish Writers' Association:

> What is the specific character of the Polish situation? I think that the really significant element of the Polish situation is the co-existence of Communism and Catholicism. It is the only country in the world where such a large number of Catholics live within a Communist system, i.e. where the Communist Party is the ruling power. This has tremendous significance for the whole of mankind. The results of the Polish Experiment are likely to be indicative for predicting the future of the world.[60]

A historian is not interested in the future. His task is to establish—to use

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[58] B. Toporska, "A faryzeusz idzie mimo zadumany . . .", *Wiadomosci*, 1969, No. 47.

[59] P. Nichols, *The Politics of the Vatican*, London, 1968, quoted in J. Mackiewicz, *W Cieniu Krzyza*, p. 75.

[60] Quoted from Radio Warszawa, 18 April 1966.

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the words of Leopold Ranke: "Wie es eigentlich gewesen ist." It is impossible to understand the Vatican's Eastern policy without examining the history of its "testing ground" in Communist Poland. And that has not yet been written.

Translated from the Polish by Anna Plank

Mr Stalin, I presume?

Michel Heller

"THE NAME OF STALIN has been written into the history of Russia for ever." Thus Vasilii Grossman, in his book *Forever Flowing*, begins the chapter on the Great Leader of All Nations. The following chapter of his book, still not published in the USSR, begins: "After the death of Stalin, Stalinism still did not die." Despite being written more than a quarter of a century ago, those lines have not lost any of their relevance, for Stalin remains at the centre of the Soviet era, past as well as present. Historians stumble over him when thinking about the possibility of restoring memory. He is spoken of when victims of represssion are being rehabilitated. Every programme for every *perestroika* has been inseparably linked with him, the creator of that ideal model of socialism from which they now seek, but fail to find, a way out.

Burying the Genius of All Times and Nations has proved impossible, even after his body has been dragged from its grave and burned. On 17 December 1917, Maximilian Voloshin wrote of Dmitrii the Imposter: ". . . my body rose from the grave and lay whole upon the bank. And the ground would not take me. And water refused to flow near my corpse. They cut me up, burnt me, collected the ash, loaded a cannon, and fired me from the four gates of Moscow towards the four corners of the earth . . ." Voloshin concludes his poem "The Emperor Dmitrii" with the surprising lines: "Thus, troubling Rus with my wondrous fate, being for a quarter of a century dead but inescapable, I ruled over hard times and disasters. And I shall return after three hundred years."

Dmitrii was indeed an imposter, but what was Stalin? The General Secretary only attracted the attention of biographers in the late 1920s. Possibly the first attempt at a biography was the essay by the Russian writer Mark Aldanov, written in Paris in 1928. In 1931 a large biography came out, written by Sergei Dmitrievsky, a Soviet diplomat who defected to the West. In 1931, the professional biographer Emile Ludwig (author of *Wilhelm II*, *Mussolini*), visited Moscow and was the first person to be granted an interview with Stalin. In 1935 two biographies came out in Paris, one by Henri Barbusse, which was quickly forgotten, and one by Boris Souvarine, which to this day, in its enlarged 1977 edition, remains the best biography of the Genial Secretary. After that, one biography followed another, all having one thing in common: their place of writing and publication—always the West. Back in the Leader's homeland he was being written about ceaselessly: in songs, in novels, and in research. But there were no biographies—not counting, of course, a comparatively small book printed

in nice, big, thick letters: *Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. A Short Biography*, published in an edition of forty million copies. The story of how its subject edited the manuscript personally, adding here and there "genius", "great" and so on, is wonderfully told in *The First Circle* by Alexander Solzhenitsyn. His mere conjectures were later actually confirmed by documents.

In its last issues for 1988, numbers 10 to 12, the journal *Oktyabr* printed the first Soviet political biography of Stalin, called *Triumph and Tragedy. A Political Portrait of I. V. Stalin.* So far only the first volume, about 600 pages in length, has been published. It covers the life and work of Stalin from his birth in 1879 in the family of Vissarion Dzhugashvili to the end of 1938, when "senseless terror reached its limit, threatening the functioning of the very system which was on the brink of the most appalling ordeals".[1] The title of the biography is not altogether clear. What the author means by "tragedy" is obvious. But it is not at all clear what "triumph" he has in mind—is it the personal triumph of a leader whom history has condemned, as the author himself recognizes? Or is it the triumph of socialism, which got built "anyway", but which the author claims was "the wrong one"?

The vagueness of the title is a faithful reflection of the confusion and vacillation of the book's content, as well as its tentativeness, its ambiguity, and the absence of a clear picture of what really took place in the past. All these features of the first Soviet "political portrait" of Stalin are displayed in the choice of author. Dmitrii Volkogonov is not an historian, although he has since recently become head of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR. He is a Colonel-General and holds a doctorate in philosophical studies. He has been in the army for the whole of his life. He graduated from the Tank School and the Lenin Military-Political Academy. After 1971 he served in the Principal Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Fleet, reaching in 1984 the position of deputy director to General Alexei Epishev, head of the Administration since 1962 and one of the pillars of orthodox Soviet ideology. Volkogonov's books include *The Psychological War. The Subversive Actions of Imperialism in the Area of Social Consciousness.* In 1982 General Volkogonov affirmed that "throughout the entire history of opposing societies, the army has been and remains today exclusively an instrument of war, whereas under socialism it has turned into an instrument of peace".[2] At the time of this announcement Soviet forces were subjugating Afghanistan for the third year in a row. In 1987 Volkogonov insisted: "We do indeed recognize military-strategic parity with the West, but there is not, and cannot be, any spiritual or moral parity."[3]

[1] Dmitrii Volkogonov, "Triumf i tragediya. Politichesky portret I. V. Stalina", in *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 166.

[2] D. A. Volkogonov, "Ugroza miru—mificheskaya i realnaya", in *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 12, 1982, p. 88.

[3] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 41, 7 October 1987.

Triumf i tragediya is interesting for many reasons. First of all, it is the first book on Soviet history that the age of *glasnost* has given birth to. The cancellation of last year's history examinations in schools indicated the high point of general confusion, with the map of the Soviet past completely covered in "blank" (i.e. bloodstained) spots. Soviet ideologists are now beginning to come to their senses. The age of new textbooks on literature, on "scientific Communism", on the political economy of socialism, on history, and so on, is beginning. Volkogonov's book is the first example of the "new" history. The book is remarkable particularly for the total absence of footnotes referring to previous biographers of Stalin. Both Isaac Deutscher and Assad-bey are only mentioned once. Nevertheless, when he needs to, Volkogonov is not ashamed to draw on books published in the West.

The Colonel-General and philosopher-author of *Triumf i tragediya* has written a history of the times, a psychological portrait of the main protagonist and the many others who had contact with him, and the philosophy of the cult of personality. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Volkogonov's work—and this is a most important feature of the age of *glasnost*—is the complete absence of anything new about the Soviet past or about Stalin. The book includes only what is already known to Western researchers and has already been published. Obviously, though, a great deal of *Triumf i tragediya* will, for the Soviet reader, be new, unexpected and sensational. But this is only because everything has been kept from him and he has always been lied to about the past in a persistent, systematic, chronic way. The absence of real discoveries, new facts or documents, is all the more surprising since Volkogonov had an opportunity for which many an historian would have given his right arm: to work in Stalin's archives.

More than thirty years ago Ignazio Silone wrote that the job of lifting the burden of lies from Russian life in the Soviet period and reconstructing the real course of events would occupy generations of historians. He wondered how many generations the job would need. For even if they managed to look freely into the official sources, he added, what guarantee was there that the documents would still be there? In a conversation with Silone, Palmiro Togliatti, who was well acquainted with the labyrinthine corridors of the Kremlin, dismissed such questions as naive, observing with irony that important decisions were never minuted, and the corresponding instructions were never written down.[4] Volkogonov confirms that many documents do not bear Stalin's signature (although very many of the lists of persons condemned to death do so), and that Stalin issued orders in which he confined himself to one word: "Agreed". However, many

[4] Ignazio Silone, Foreword to *Archiwum rewolucji*, Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1965.

documents are preserved. Volkogonov does not use them to answer the questions which remain incompletely clarified. In listing some of them, Silone wrote: "Khrushchev, for example, officially confirmed that Kirov's murder was a provocation. But what were the circumstances that surrounded the setting up of that shameful scenario, and who took part in it?"[5] Volkogonov provides the answer that in the archives there are no materials about Kirov's death.[6] It is, however, known that in accordance with a decision of the XXth Congress, a Central Committee commission investigated the matter and collected several volumes of material. Khrushchev had no reason to destroy those documents, as he had done with the lists signed by him of people condemned to execution. Volkogonov is exceptionally evasive and sparing with information on the murder of Trotsky. The reader only learns that "Stalin gave Beria the most sensitive tasks. Thus, Trotsky, the 'leader's' most implacable personal enemy, was finally physically removed, not without the help of the People's Commissar."[7] An article by the historian N. Basetsky, which appeared after Volkogonov's book, adds to the history of Trotsky's murder a detail that is well known to all Western researchers: the operation was set up by NKVD Colonel Leonid Eitingon, who recruited the murderer's mother, Caridad. The murderer's name was Jackson-Mornar-Mercader. But even this article does not say that after his release Mercader was accorded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; the author confines himself to the mysterious sentence: "One can only guess at his (Mercader's) fate."[8]

It would be unfair to say that *Triumf i tragediya* has absolutely no new information. The reader learns, for example, that all his life Stalin was an ascetic, and that after his death "he was discovered not to have any personal belongings except for a pair of lined felt boots and a patched sheepskin coat in the peasant style".[9] There is interesting information about Stalin's library and the fact that it contained Marx, Engels and Lenin, Kautsky, Plekhanov, Trotsky and Bukharin, but not Kant or Hegel. It is interesting that Stalin read Aulard's history of the French Revolution and developed a fondness for Robespierre and Couton, and that he read Napoleon's "Thoughts", marking the following passage with a thick line down the margin: "It was in fact in the evening at Lodi that I started to believe in myself as an unusual man and became imbued with an ambition to perform great deeds which hitherto had seemed fantasies to me."[10]

The portrait of Stalin painted by Volkogonov is well known, with the

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[5] Ibid.
[6] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 51.
[7] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 157.
[8] N. Vasetsky, "Likvidatsiya", in *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 4 January 1989.
[9] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 47.
[10] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, p. 46.

entire palette of colours, each one darker than the next, borrowed from Trotsky. All the epithets, up to the beginning of the irresistible rise, are very familiar: "errand boy", "insignificant functionary", "political extra", "inconspicuous walk-on", "functionary of ideas".[11] The author of *Triumf i tragediya* insists on Stalin's "catechistic thinking",[12] stressing that for ten years the young Dzhugashvili received a religious education, which "led to the formation of an immutable and dogmatic way of thinking". Volkogonov concludes that Stalin "was a believer all his life", first in the Christian postulates, and then in the Marxist ones. In the end he "favoured faith, not truth".[13]

The causes, however, of both Stalin's success and his triumph, which turned the "insignificant bit-player" into the Leader and Teacher of all progressive humanity, remain less than completely understood by Dmitrii Volkogonov, who cannot bring himself to abandon Marxist analysis, though he is in any case unfamiliar with any other methods. Stalin came to power because he wanted power—that is Volkogonov's conclusion. Stalin had a serious approach to the matter and studied books on "the technique of absolutism" closely, but above all he "created and used an obedient state and party apparatus without which he was a nobody".[14]

Dmitrii Volkogonov concurs fully with that greatest of discoveries of the age of *glasnost* and the "filling in of the blank spots of history", namely that the struggles of the *diadochs* after Lenin's death had the character of a personal struggle for power. Stalin won because "his actions were governed by a limitless thirst for power which, to the very end, he was unable to quench".[15] Power for its own sake—thus we return to the explanation given by George Orwell in *1984*.

Volkogonov, however, is in need of a theory, a politico-philosophical explanation for Stalin. And he finds it in "Caesarism". He vacillates by talking about the "cult of personality", "*vozhdism*" ("the principle of One-Man Leadership"), and "the cult of *vozhdism*", but then he announces that these terms are synonymous: "the cult of personality, *vozhdism*, Caesarism".[16] In the chapter entitled "The Attributes of Caesarism", the reader discovers some astonishing things. I have already observed that Volkogonov is not an historian but a philosopher. Possibly the educational establishments frequented by him did not offer a subject by the name of Roman History. Still, what the author of a political portrait of Stalin has to say about the author of the *Gallic Wars* rivets one's attention. Having

[11] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, pp. 23, 24, 30, 31, 44.
[12] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, p. 7, No. 11, pp. 60, 63.
[13] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, p. 7.
[14] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 151.
[15] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 78.
[16] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 78.

announced that "the cult of *vozhdism* can be called the Caesarism of the 20th century", Volkogonov goes on to say that Caesar, being a servant of the people, gathered all the power, both spiritual and secular, to himself, and in order to do so he "created" a new social stratum, the patrician class, a variation of the old bureaucracy, which became the main instrument of his power.[17] Yet if Volkogonov had so much as glanced into the *Malaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* he would have discovered that Caesar had nothing to do with the "creation" of the patricians, and that they were not a "variation" of the bureaucracy. But the author of *Triumf i tragediya* has found out something else that is important: Caesar relied on *nomenklatura*! That Stalin followed his example was only natural in a country "which had lived for centuries under the protection of the tsar's crown".[18]

This "Caesarism" is really a most excellent discovery by Volkogonov, and one which has been borrowed from him by many Soviet commentators. It allows one to draw a distinction between Lenin and Stalin, and to disregard the role of Lenin's party, which entails the cult of the leader's personality just as surely as clouds bring rain.

The underlying aim of *Triumf i tragediya* is to defend Lenin, to represent him as the author of a plan which at one point is described as a "synthesis of democracy, humanism, and justice".[19] Later we again read: "The Leninist concept of socialism is democracy, humanism, and social justice."[20] The builder of this wondrous socialism was, however, constantly hampered by illness, death, and the disobedience of his heirs who refused to obey his testament. Denouncing the "cult of One-Man Leadership" and "Caesarism", Volkogonov writes of "Lenin's titanic intellect" and "the genius of the April Theses".[21] Lenin "always reflected the interests of the people",[22] and so on and so forth. Volkogonov informs us that Lenin's ideals were "man's maximum attainment of the greatest degree of freedom within the framework of social necessity",[23] and a total rejection of "the use of force against man."[24]

Volkogonov's basic technique, when he is distorting the course of events connected with Stalin, is silence. When defending Lenin, he resorts to a variety of lies. For instance, he writes that the "famous resolution" about the disbanding and banning of factions, which was adopted at Lenin's insistence in March 1921, facilitated the "rallying of the Party and was in

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[17] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 74.
[18] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 74.
[19] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 45.
[20] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 63.
[21] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, p. 122.
[22] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, p. 24.
[23] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, p. 93.
[24] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 107.

no way directed against dissent or the conflict of opinions".[25] He writes a blatant untruth when he says: "While Lenin was ill, an unusual action was undertaken on the initiative of the GPU and with Stalin's support: 160 people representing the nucleus of Russian culture (writers, professors, philosophers, poets, and historians) were sent into exile abroad."[26] Documents published in the complete collected works of Lenin leave no doubt that Lenin himself initiated those expulsions. Volkogonov quotes with great pleasure from Lenin's speech of 2 February 1920: "Terror has been forced upon us by the Entente. . . Immediately after the taking of Rostov we refused to use the death penalty . . ."[27] Volkogonov does not mention Lenin's letters of February and May 1922 (when the Entente was already a thing of the past), addressed to People's Commissar of Justice Kursky and demanding that he should include terror in the first Soviet Criminal Code. Volkogonov indignantly quotes a note from Stalin to his colleagues in the Central Government, saying: "You can be assured that we shall spare nobody . . .",[28] but perhaps he forgets to specify that Stalin was replying personally to Lenin's telegram which proclaimed that "it is essential to crush these pathetic and hysterical adventurers mercilessly everywhere. So act mercilessly against the Left SRs and keep me informed more often." Lenin uses the word "mercilessly" twice. And it is probably not accidental that that telegram was first published on 21 January 1936. Lenin was, so to speak, blessing Stalin from the grave: the first "great" Moscow show-trial, of Zinoviev, Kamenev and others, was already in preparation.

Dmitrii Volkogonov's logic is irreproachable: Lenin wanted things to go well, even very well, and he did everything he could to that end, but it was his comrades who let him down. In this logical construction, whose topicality is evident, there is just one weak point. How did it happen that the genius Lenin, builder of the Party, leader of the victorious revolution, who had shown the path leading straight to heaven on earth, turned out to have such comrades? Volkogonov gives a character sketch of each member of Lenin's "gang" in turn and, to do him credit, he fails to find any outstanding personalities among them, apart from two: Stalin and Trotsky. In this fact, undoubtedly, resides the novelty of the book. Yet the appearance of Trotsky in the pages of the Soviet press, his political if not yet official rehabilitation, is connected not so much with the desire to fill in an enormous "blank spot" in Soviet history as with the fact that the "demon of the Revolution", as Volkogonov elegantly describes him, is indispensible for the "unmasking" of the "angel of the Revolution". Trotsky is necessary for the "unmasking" of Stalin. The political portrait of Stalin in Volko-

[25] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 58.
[26] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, p. 72.
[27] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 131.
[28] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, p. 35.

gonov's book is in reality a dual portrait. With systematic persistence, Volkogonov develops the thought that Stalin was a Trotskyist, although he recognizes that Trotsky never ceased to be a "personal enemy" of the General Secretary. The men Lenin called the two "outstanding leaders of the Central Committee" were, in spite of their enmity, twins sharing the same goal—power. "And if Trotsky had defeated Stalin," Volkogonov speculates, "who knows but that our people might have been confronted with a dictatorship of a no less Caesarist type?"[29] Trotsky was not only the most important source of Stalin's ideas (Volkogonov tells how Stalin studied the works of his enemy closely), he goaded Stalin on, provoking him to deeds of terror. According to Volkogonov, Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*, written in 1936 and passed to Stalin in 1937, was the last straw for the leader and inspired him to launch total terror, including the destruction of the officer corps of the Red Army. That is an indication of how Lenin's two pupils reacted to each other.

Judging by the hints dropped throughout the first volume of *Triumf i tragediya*, it is easy to foresee that in the second volume Stalin will acquire another twin—Hitler.

Dmitrii Volkogonov's book is consistently topical, with the author often entering into debate with readers who have seen chapters of *Triumf i tragediya* in newspapers and have written to him defending Stalin. He warns of the danger of a rebirth of "Stalinism". What is there to stand in its way? After all, on Stalin's death, Beria, who "understood nothing of Marxism, and had not read Lenin",[30] was preparing to seize power. He was only able to do so because "the system of the day had absolutely no way of preventing the replacement of one dictator by another".[31] In the event, however, the Party leaders prevented him, shaking in their shoes. What about now?

Triumf i tragediya comes to the reader after the appearance of Anatoly Rybakov's *Children of the Arbat* and *1935 and Other Years*. Both Rybakov and Volkogonov—the novelist and the philosopher—are against Stalin and Stalinism and think that today's General Secretary is able to put a stop to it. Both authors employ similar techniques: Rybakov inserts historically factual passages into his novels, Volkogonov often invents Stalin's thoughts, getting inside his mind and "knowing" his dreams: "He often caught himself thinking . . ."[32] "Stalin, in his soul, called homage for the late Plekhanov 'liberalism'."[33]

There are more Soviet books about the former Great Leader of All Nations on the way. The Kazakhstan magazine *Prostor* (Nos. 7–9, 1988),

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[29] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 92.
[30] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 156.
[31] *Oktyabr*, No. 12, p. 155.
[32] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, p. 94.
[33] *Oktyabr*, No. 10, p. 30.

published V. Uspensky's novel *Tayny Sovetnik* ("The Privy Councillor"), of which *Izvestia* writes: "Literally the entire text of the novel is permeated with an affectionately reverent attitude to Stalin, whose criminal nature, however, has today become universally known."[34]

Perhaps, though, not everybody will believe in Stalin's "criminal nature". The possibility cannot, in any case, be excluded that in the Soviet system there might one day arise another ruthless dictator.

[34] *Izvestia*, 3 January 1989.

Émigré Russia

Michel Heller

THE DRY TITLE of this amazing book, *The Russian Emigration. Journals and Collections in the Russian language 1920–1980. General index of articles*,[1] conceals a whole world. Marc Raeff of Columbia University opens his foreword with a fact: "The end of the civil war, in 1921, witnessed the formation of two Russias: Soviet Russia and Émigré Russia." He adds, with all scholarly detachment: "In culture, and particularly in literature, the latter was as active as the former." Only about three years ago, such an assertion would have provoked in Soviet Russia a storm of resentment, indignation, and categorical condemnation. After all, until recently it was known for a fact that the world's first socialist state could be abandoned only by those who were inveterate enemies, and that all those who went over the border cut off their roots and lost their creative potential.

Nowadays there is no need to dispute the "Marxist truth" that the artist belongs to the state and the Party. When Soviet literature reached its nadir, permission was granted to turn for fresh inspiration to the Emigration, both foreign and internal; and the forbidden literature, which Osip Mandelshtam called "stolen air", is now destined to save Soviet culture from oxygen-starvation.

Russkaya Emigratsiya is an amazing book for two reasons. For a start, the sheer volume of the work is impressive. A similar book in the Soviet Union would have required the labour of a scholarly institute, with a dozen employees, a directorate, and a Party committee. By contrast, this book, compiled in Paris by staff at the Turgenev Library, mentions on the cover only eight names including the principal editors, T. L. Gladkova and T. A. Osorgina. Here are a few statistics which will offer a sketchy idea of what was involved: 45 journals and 16 collections published between 1920 and 1980 were considered, making a total of 1,384 volumes; 25,600 articles and short reviews by authors from three generations of émigrés were brought to light, with the name-index containing 4,000 names. This enormous task took over ten years in all.

The second reason why this book is amazing is its content. Some ten years ago the Institut d'Études Slaves issued two catalogues of Russian periodicals of the European Emigration covering 1855–1940 (ed. T. A. Osorgina), and 1940–70 (ed. Anna-Maria Volkova). Those extremely valuable books list the names and repositories of periodicals in Russian.

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[1] *Russkaya Emigratsiya. Zhurnaly i sborniki na russkom yazyke 1920–1980. Svodny ukazatel statei*, Paris 1988.

This new book enables one to find out exactly what was printed in those post-revolutionary Russian periodicals. In addition, the coverage has been extended from Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Prague and Munich to include New York, Toronto and Tel-Aviv.

The compilers of the "General Index" list their entries in alphabetical order of author. One of the advantages of this approach is that it reveals the extraordinary wealth of émigré Russian culture. We meet the names of writers, philosophers, economists, politicians, historians and publicists, who would bring honour to any country. Three Emigrations let their talents flow to foreign shores: the first, after the revolution, was a cross-section of pre-revolutionary Russia with its many parties, its European links, and its recent experience of a flourishing "Silver Age"; the second was the war-time Emigration, the victims of collectivization and the terror; and the third was an offshoot of the Soviet world.

In the "General Catalogue of Articles" they all stand shoulder to shoulder in alphabetical order, starting with "A", the author of an article in *Chisla* (1930), and ending with I. Yakhot, who published an article in *Novy Zhurnal* (1979). No less interesting is the fact that periodicals which survived for many years stand side by side with those which did not last long and others which, in spite of all the difficulties, are still being published. The 61 periodical names read like a potted history of the Russian Emigration: from *Almanakh Medny Vsadnik*, (Berlin, 1922) to *Ekho* (Paris, 1978–80). Apart from standard publications like *Volya Rossii* (1922–32), *Sovremennye Zapiski* (1920–40), *Novy Grad* (1931–9), *Grani* (began 1946), *Kontinent* (began 1974), we find familiar titles such as *Vestnik russkogo studencheskogo khristianskogo dvizheniya* (since 1925), *Novy Zhurnal* (since 1942), but also completely forgotten ones: *Blagonamerenny* (two issues in 1926), *Zveno* (1927–28), *Vstrechi* (1934).

Each periodical and collection opens its treasures to the reader of the "General Index". Historians are familiar with the phenomenon of an old text later acquiring new meanings which it did not have on publication, but which make it become a historical source for the time when it was written. The text acquires new significance when placed alongside others written before or after. Merely leafing through the "Index" is enough to reveal the topics which came up year after year, decade after decade—all the eternal questions of Soviet history. For instance, in the very first years we find Nikolay Bezpalov's "Confession of a member of the GPU staff" (*Volya Rossii*, 1924). There follow "confessions", "stories" and "recollections" by members of the staff of the NKVD, the MGB, the KGB. The Soviet economy, agriculture, *kolkhoz* affairs, everything which the Soviet leaders are today discovering with astonishment, and which Soviet citizens are discovering with horror, has long since been known to the authors of innumerable articles on the economy who were at liberty to consider the reality of Soviet life.

History, philosophy, economics and sociology are represented in the émigré Russian periodicals by names and thinkers without whom there would be no Russian scholarship: Nikolay Berdyaev, Lev Shestov, Sergei Bulkagov, Nikolay Fyodorov, Aleksandr Kizewetter, Dmitry Chizhevsky, Nikolay Valentinov-Volsky . . .

Culture is exceptionally well-represented in the periodicals. The traditional argument about whether there are two Russian cultures or one, and which is better, or more important, or more genuine, would seem to be on the wane. The "General Index" answers at least one of those questions: culture and literature are one, though only within the pages of émigré publications. For it is only here that the best things written in Russian were and still are being published. Émigré periodicals have always carefully monitored events in Soviet literature, but the bosses of Soviet culture have never recognized the existence of a literature which they did not control.

The "General Index" can also be read today as a list of headings of material due for imminent publication in the Soviet periodicals. The Soviet editors need not worry, every single page of the "General Index" contains interesting and valuable material. A few names will suffice: V. Nabokov, M. Aldanov, V. Veidle, G. Adamovich, O. Mandelshtam and M. Osorgin; and here are some indispensible contemporaries: A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Maksimov, J. Brodsky, A. Belinkov . . . the list of genuine "masters of culture" is virtually endless.

I am convinced that nobody will now be able to manage without this book. It is needed by researchers, historians, everyone with an interest in the Russian and Soviet past, the merely inquisitive, and editors of Soviet journals. Just in case, however, there are any complaints, the compilers of the "Index" have given it a Latin epigraph, meaning "We have done our best, let those who can do better, do so."

We will probably have to wait an extremely long time before anyone can do better. This is a wonderful work and an unusually valuable contribution to the history of the Russian Emigration and of Russian culture.

Masonic Conspiracy? Again?

Eugene Beshenkovsky

MASONIC "CONSPIRACY"* and its role in the Russian revolution has once again become a popular subject. It is discussed in any serious monograph dealing with the February revolution, and in a quickly growing number of articles. However, very few original sources have been discovered and there is serious concern about the reliability of the data found in the contradictory statements of would-be Freemasons.[1] Most of the "revelations" came from the Russian émigré sources in the late 1920s and 1930s, when members of different political parties, who had lost their cause, their country, and their relatives and loved ones, started a full-scale war defending their pre-revolutionary activity, blaming each other for failure. It was a good time for creating fake memoirs, diaries and historical documents, either published or deposited in the archives as historical evidence. It was a time when forgeries became a means of political struggle. Some of them, such as the Okhrana letter enlisting Stalin as a police agent, are known to be fake, while others have yet to be exposed.

N. Berberova's book could have been an important addition to the scholarly verification of existing accounts because it is based on archival documents, a rare case in the studies of 20th century Freemasonry.[2] The author (together with Professor Nathan Smith) was granted permission to use the archives of the Russian émigré lodges, which are kept by the Grand Orient of France, as well as the collections of B. I. Nikolaevsky, A. Kerensky, N. Volsky, and V. Maklakov kept at the Hoover Institution and at the University of Texas.

The book consists of four major parts:

- A general overview of the history of Freemasonry in the 20th century, based on archival documents and the author's recollections.

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* Nina Nikolaevna Berberova *Lyudi i lozhi. Russkie masony XX stoletiia* (Men and Lodges. Russian Freemasons of the 20th century), Russica Publishers Inc., New York, 1986, 299 pp. $38.00.

[1] Leopold Haimson, "The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905–1917" (Part Two), *Slavic Review*, Vol. 24, pp. 13–17. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The February Revolution: Petrograd, 1917*, Univ. of Washington Press, Seattle, 1981, pp. 195–7. Barbara T. Norton, "Russian Political Masonry and the February Revolution of 1917", *International Review of Social History*, 1983, 28 (2), pp. 240–58. Barbara T. Norton, "Russian Political Masonry, 1917, and Historians", *Russian History*, Vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 83–100. Nathan Smith, "Political Freemasonry in Russia, 1906–1918. A Discussion of the Sources", *The Russian Review*, Vol. 44, no. 2 (April 1985), pp. 175–86.

[2] Masonic archives are traditionally closed to the uninitiated, and access to them is very difficult.

- A list of members of the Russian Masonic lodges, mostly members of émigré lodges associated with the Grand Orient and Grand Lodge of France.
- Archival documents: a collection of extracts from the correspondence of Kerensky, Volsky, Kuskova and Bebutov related to the pre-revolutionary stage of Russian Freemasonry.
- A brief overview of Soviet writings on the subject, and an extensive bibliography of published and unpublished sources.

Thus, it has the appearance of a scholarly monograph. But this is deceptive. It is not written by a professional historian, and it lacks the main quality which is essential for a scholarly monograph—reliability. It begins with the statement that the author cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data, because most of the documents that were used were handwritten and the author had difficulty in reading them (Berberova, p. 9–10). Naturally there is no assurance that whatever was finally "deciphered" is accurate and actually represents the meaning of the original. This statement alone could make a book unsuitable for a review in a scholarly periodical, but in this particular case the review is necessary because the book has already been announced as "the first full-scale work on Russian Masons of the 20th century".[3] The reviewer has some difficulty in agreeing with this statement. The author has never been a Freemason and knows very little about Masonic rituals, statutes and goals. The techniques of using and presenting documents in the book are deplorable. The sources are cited incorrectly on many occasions, with original documents abbreviated and altered. Take, for example, the comparison of the "famous" E. D. Kuskova letter to N. V. Volsky in which she "admits" the existence of a large Masonic conspiracy in pre-revolutionary Russia.

Berberova's citation:

> 3. *Tsel masonstva—politicheskaia, rabotat v podpole na osvobozhdenie Rossii.* (p. 215)

Aronson's citation:[4]

> 3. *Tsel masonstva: politicheskaia. Vosstanovit v etoi forme Soyuz Osvobozhdeniia i rabotat v podpole na osvobozhdenie Rossii.* (p. 138)

Berberova:

> 4. *Pochemu vybrana byla takaia? Chtoby zakhvatit vysshie i dazhe pridvornye*

[3] Nathan Smith and Barbara T. Norton, "The Constitution of Russian Political Freemasonry (1912)", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, Band 34, 1986, Heft 4, p. 501, note 15.

[4] Aronson, Grigorii, *Rossiia nakanune revoliutsii*, New York, 1962, pp. 138–41.

> *krugi . . . Kniazev i grafev bylo mnogo. Veli oni sebia izumitelno: na Kongressakh nekotorykh iz nikh ia videla. Byli i voennye—vysokogo ranga.* (p. 215)

Aronson:

> 4. *Pochemu vybrana takaia forma? Chtoby zakhvatit vysshie i dazhe pridvornye krugi. Na prostoe nazvanie politicheskoe oni by ne poshli.* (p. 138)

> 5. . . . [half a page omitted by Berberova] *Liudei vysshego obshchestva (kniazev i grafev, kak togda govorili) bylo mnogo. Veli oni sebia izumitelno: na kongressakh nekotorykh iz nikh ia videla.* (p. 139)

A citation from Lenin (Berberova, p. 224, which according to Berberova is taken from [Lenin's] "*Sobr. soch.*, M., 1970, t. 31, s. 12–21") is in reality a compilation of two paragraphs found on pages 13 and 16. On p. 52 there is a quote from Melgunov, stating that Verkhovskii was a "*podozritelnyi avanturist, kotoryi probiraetsia v Napoleony*", which is in fact an incorrect quote from Melgunov's wife's diaries. On pp. 24–5 the name of one of the first Russian lodges is given as "*Severnaya Zvezda*" (Northern Star) but the original document displayed in the seventh illustration of her book has a stamp where the name of the lodge clearly reads "*Poliarnaya Zvezda*" (Polar Star). The story of pre–revolutionary Freemasonry in Russia (pp. 19–26) is based on the phantasmagoric memoirs of Kandaurov, who was not in Russia at the time and was supposed not to know much about developments there. Unfortunately, Kandaurov's memoirs (a typescript!) remain unpublished because Berberova once again had difficulties in reading them (p. 176). With a few quotations from sources (pp. 27–62), Berberova explains all the failures of the Imperial and Provisional governments as the direct result of Masonic conspiracy. She does it in the best traditions of the notorious newspaper *Dvukhglavyi Orel* and anti-Masonic histories such as Vasilii Ivanov's book *Ot Petra Velikogo do nashikh dnei. Russkaia intelligentsiia i masonstvo*, Kharbin, 1934. For some reason Berberova calls it an *ukazatel literatury* (p. 273).

The chapter related to the fate of Freemasonry in the Russian Emigration could have been excellent, because so little is known about it, and so many new sources have been opened up for scholarly inquiry. Unfortunately, Berberova does not say much about this either. We can learn from her description that there exist four big boxes of documents, which were catalogued by both Berberova and Smith and put into 17 archival boxes. There were also personal papers which consist of 30 folders arranged alphabetically. However, we are not given the slightest idea of what is in these boxes. Much can be imagined from the known samples of Masonic

documentation: there could be minutes of meetings, speeches, songs, rituals, lists of lodges and lists of members—invaluable sources for the description of the history of the lodges, their activity, the subjects of their discussions, etc. What we have instead is the author's sporadic reminiscences about documents seen during a couple of visits to Paris. The chapter begins with the same "unreadable" Kandaurov. From p. 65 to p. 76 there is a short story about Russian Freemasonry starting a new life in France. We find descriptions of several buildings and learn that in one of them there was a Turkish bath, that Freemasons were instructed not to discuss Soviet politics and purges, that Lenin eliminated 50% of the Freemasons and that Stalin finished the job, that there was a special bag for collecting dues, that one of the Masonic symbols—the triangle—has existed for a thousand years, and that making compromises is one of the principles of Masonic behaviour. We also learn, without any indication of sources, that there exists a powerful World Masonic Council which influences the politics of the world, but was unable to prevent World War II. On pp. 77–9 there is a translation of an anonymous French ritual, which is presented as a complete translation without changes, but is in reality simply a table of contents. On p. 80 we are told that no dictionary of Masonic terms exists,[5] and that this is why the author is providing the reader with her own explanations.

Factual information about the number of activities of Russian lodges before World War II sharply contradicts the data presented by Berberova. For example, the lodge "*Zolotoye Runo*" which, according to N. Svitkov,[6] was founded in 1926 and did not exist for more than a year, according to Berberova existed from 1927–31. Berberova does not distinguish here between "*Zolotoye Runo*" and and another lodge, "*Jupiter*", which was its successor.[7] The list of "Grand Masters" of "*Astrea*" is also completely different from N. Svitkov's data based on the official documents of the Grand Lodge and the Grand Orient.

Thus, the factual information presented on the history of Russian lodges in Emigration cannot be relied upon without thorough verification.

According to Berberova the real heart of the book is the biographical dictionary of Russian Freemasons, which occupies pp. 106–66. It is presented as the result of many years of research (pp. 8–9), but the findings are nevertheless unreliable. It is a hastily compiled list of names (often without any biographical data) of those whom the author "caught" as Masons.[8]

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[5] In fact there are several, and at least three of them are listed in Berberova's own bibliography attached to the book (p. 282).

[6] N. Svitkov, *Masonstvo v russkoi emigratsii*, 2nd ed., San Paulo, 1964, p. 40.

[7] Ibid. p. 41. Svitkov's data is based on the four-volume publication listing lodges associated with the Grand Orient and the Grand Lodge of France. Information provided there is known to be generally reliable. Nathan Smith, op. cit., p. 159.

[8] The list itself is a clear continuation of an excellent bio-bibliographical dictionary compiled by Tatiana Bakunina, but it lags far behind in quality. (Tatiana Bakounine, *Le répertoire*

More reliable are the names extracted from the clearly Masonic sources and the archives of the Grand Orient of France. The problem is, however, that there is no guarantee that the names are in fact taken from Masonic sources and not from somewhere else. Here are several examples: N. P. Kiselev, whose name supposedly appears among the archival documents, could not be found there since he had never been to Paris. The real source in this case is S. P. Melgunov's memoirs (a much less reliable source), where he calls N. P. Kiselev a "half Mason".[9] Kerensky, whose name was also supposedly found in the Paris Masonic archives, could not have been found there because he did not belong to Freemasonry in Emigration. Many items entered in the biographical dictionary as found in the French Masonic archives actually come from published sources which have been known for half a century.

Fortunately we have an opportunity of checking the accuracy of the dictionary because some of the original lists are given among the illustrations, as well as reproduced in the B. Elkin article.[10] For example, E. I. Kedrin: date of birth is not given, though it is found in the document, date of initiation is erroneous, his affiliation with "Polar Star" is not shown, etc. Kandaurov's article is given as the source of this information, though similar accounts can be found in Bebutov's memoirs and in original documents published by Elkin. Paris archives are given as a source of information on the architect Pavel Makarov, though in fact the date also comes from Elkin. The source of information on Iu. Antonovsky, L. I. Lutugin, Okunev, Zhikharev, Aleksandr Borozdin and N. Pavlov-Silvansky, according to Berberova, is an oral account by Maxim Gorky, but in fact once again Elkin is the source. Information of Kalmanovich and I. Sakharov was supposedly provided by family members. But this turns out to be not at all the case, it is Elkin again. Many entries with information supposedly taken from Masonic archives in Paris bear close resemblance to the lists of Freemasons published by the Vichy government in 1941 for the purposes of persecution.[11] On several occasions two Soviet archives are given as sources—the State Archive of the October revolution in Moscow and the State Historical Archive in Leningrad. It is difficult to believe that the author has ever seen the original documents, because she has not visited Russia since the 1920s. For many entries the only source of information is given as "BIB" which means that one is to consult the bibliography at the

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biographique des franc-maçons russes (XVII-e et XIX-e siecles), Brussels, les editions Petropolis, 1938; 2nd ed. Paris, 1967.)

[9] S. P. Melgunov, *Vospominaniya i dnevniki. Vypusk I (Chasti pervaya i vtoraya)*, Paris, 1964, p. 144.

[10] Boris Elkin, "Attempts to Revive Freemasonry in Russia", *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 44, 1966, pp. 456–72.

[11] A sample of the list can be found among the illustrations in Berberova's book.

end of the book. The Bibliography consists of more than 300 titles and there is no way of finding out which of them to consult.[12] Furthermore, the name of S. Poliakov-Litovtsev is entered twice, once under his pseudonym and once under his real name. There are two Count Bobrinskiis with the same first name, Aleksei. One of them is definitely Petr. Several individuals identified in the documents as Freemasons do not appear in the dictionary. For example, N. A. Morosov, one of the leaders of the "*Narodnaya Volia*", who was a member of the "Polar Star", does not appear in the dictionary, and nor do Dimitriev, Bulat, Golm, Drosiak, etc., etc.

Thus, this biographical dictionary of Russian Freemasons is compiled in such a way that it cannot be used for scholarly purposes. All oral accounts supposedly coming from Maxim Gorky, relatives, and friends have to be discarded at once. All information supposedly taken from archives has to be checked with the originals.

The archival documents published in the book are mostly letters related to Kerensky's "Masonic" conspiracy, supplemented by Prince Bebutov's memoirs about his role in reviving Freemasonry in Russia. All the new documents have been discussed in a recent Nathan Smith article,[13] which came to the conclusion that "the newer finds do not include any sensational revelations" (p. 158). We fully agree with this statement. More than that, the newer finds raise more questions than they provide answers. First of all, the published texts have to be verified against originals. They are abbreviated and might be erroneous since N. Berberova was unable to read the handwriting. Second, the authenticity of Prince Bebutov's memoirs has yet to be established. What was found by Berberova in the archives of B. Nikolaevsky is not an original, but rather a copy whose original (if it ever existed) could have been altered. It has suspicious mistakes, both factual and chronological,[14] as well as highly improbable stories like M. Margulies' initiation in prison.

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[12] The bibliography itself is full of mistakes and items completely foreign to the subject, which are never cited in the book. Articles by Griunvald and Velskii listed as published in the newspaper *Vozrozhdenie* (Revival) on May 14 and 25 are not found there. Several titles are listed as cited by somebody else and were probably never used. A manuscript listed by Smith and Norton as "Untitled History of Freemasonry" appears in Berberova's book as "United History of Freemasonry", etc., etc.

[13] Nathan Smith, op. cit.

[14] E. I. Kedrov could not invite Bebutov to become a Freemason because he was initiated later than Bebutov. The name of the Petersburg lodge is given as "*Severnaia Zvezda*" instead of "*Poliarnaia Zvezda*". Comparison with original documents published by Elkin shows that Bebutov's account is mistaken on too many occasions. He was initiated on 20 April 1906 and not on 27 April as he states. The Moscow lodge "Osvobozhdenie" was founded in November 1906 and not in January 1908 as stated in Bebutov's memoirs. Furthermore, Bebutov is not listed among the founding members. Bebutov also "reveals" in his memoirs that he gave 10,000 rubles to the notorious Azef to kill Nicholas II and then 300 rubles to Burtsev to show Azef's real identity (Berberova, p. 112). There are too many mistakes for the story to be true.

However, the authenticity of the documents is not the only concern in this case. There are other questions:

1. If there was political Freemasonry in Russia with a printed constitution hidden in a book entitled "*Italianskie ugolshchiki*" ("Italian Carbonari"), published in 1913 by a mysterious Evgraf Sidorenko, which, according to Berberova, was in fact compiled by Kerensky, Nekrasov and others (p. 26), then:

(a) How was it possible that none of these would-be political Freemasons had a single copy of it?

(b) How could Kerensky (one of the authors!) misspell the title when asking his correspondent to locate the book? (Smith and Norton, op. cit., p. 501).

(c) How could E. Kuskova, a supposedly active participant, not remember the book at all? (Berberova, p. 213).

(d) How could the so-called constitution of Russian political Freemasonry not contain any political statements, and also be published in 1200 copies? (Smith and Norton, p. 501, note 16, and pp. 509–17).

(e) How could the participants, who supposedly gave an oath of absolute silence, break it in numbers, giving testimonies to "profanes" like Nikolaevsky, Dan, Volsky, etc.?

2. There is new, startling evidence in Berberova's book which has not been discovered by any of those who had previously discussed the subject, and which is not appreciated by Berberova either. One of the "founders" of Russian political Freemasonry V. P. Obninsky[15] revealed the existence of his "secret" organization in his book *Novyi stroi*, published in Moscow as early as 1909 in a run of 17,000 (sic!) copies.[16] He revealed there, according to Berberova, that "Russian Freemasonry, which had been sleeping in its grave for almost a century, had been resurrected to a new life. It left in the grave all external attributes [of Freemasonry] such as rituals and mystical books, and appeared as an emancipated political organization, which under the slogan 'freedom, equality and brotherhood', united almost all political groups and parties, united to overthrow the existing régime."[17] This statement raises more questions:

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[15] Obninsky, according to Melgunov, invited the latter to become a Mason, and, according to N. Smith and B. Norton, op. cit., he was also the real compiler of the constitution hidden in the Evgraf Sidorenko's book.

[16] *Knizhnaya Letopis*, 1909, no. 19706.

[17] Berberova, p. 145. Another item of contemporary(?) evidence which has never been discussed in the historiography can be found in S. P. Melgunov's diary. In the entry for 26 April 1915 he writes that he had a long talk with Kerensky about the contemporary Freemasons, who wanted to create political unions under a Masonic banner. The idea came from Kiev. There were several Bolsheviks among the Freemasons. Obninsky and Urusov had invited Melgunov to join, but he refused. Obninsky and Urusov also told Melgunov that they refused to accept V. Bobrinskaya because she was an anti-Semite. (S. P. Melgunov, op. cit., p. 193). The story is too good to be believed. The diary contains several elements suggesting that it is

(a) How could a secret organization exist, recruit new members, and have meetings and conventions, when its existence was revealed and made known to the police?

(b) How could a member of a secret organization who made its existence known remain an active participant and recruit new members?[18]

Could we suggest that Obninsky's declaration, which was perfectly well known to Melgunov, Kerensky, Kuskova and to most of the political activists of the time, was the real and the main source of information for all later statements about the existence and ideology of Russian political Freemasonry?

The sources which could provide more reliable information on this "murky" story might still exist. Two folders containing documents of "*Poliarnaya Zvezda*" and "*Vozrozhdenie*", which used to be in the possession of Boris Elkin, can still be found. They could provide additional data on the relations between the Russian lodges and the Grand Orient of France before the revolution, which according to Elkin were not "smooth".[19] Another source of information has yet to be explored—police and Okhrana files on M. M. Kovalevsky, V. P. Obninsky, Prince Bebutov, N. Bazhenov, S. Efremov and several other real members of "*Poliarnaya Zvezda*" and "*Vozrozhdenie.*"

Thus, N. Berberova's book, which has the appearance of a scholarly monograph, shows itself to be a literary mystification. Nevertheless, it raises many questions. The time has probably come to answer them.

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a fake. The original does not exist. S. P. Melgunov supposedly deposited it in the Prague Archives, which were later seized by the Soviet Army. The memoirs which accompany the diary (and which also contain a chapter on Freemasons) were supposedly written in a Soviet prison—hardly a convenient place for recollections on Freemasonry. The number of juicy stories about Rasputin inserted in the diary make it resemble a famous forgery of the 1920s—the diary of Vyrubova, which was produced by Melgunov's friend P. E. Shchegolev. Finally, it is difficult to believe that Melgunov took his memoirs and diaries with him when he left Russia in the early 1920s because his papers were seized by the Soviet secret police and are kept now in Soviet archives (*Lichnye arkhivnye fondy v gosudarstvennykh khranilishchakh SSSR. Ukazatel*, Moscow, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 444; Vol. 3, p. 259).

[18] Obninsky's statement appears less startling when instead of using Berberova's quotations, we consult the original. In fact, Obninsky states that reactionaries from *Novoye Vremia* suspect the existence of political Freemasonry with the described programme, but he denies the existence of any Masonic activity in Russia. V. P. Obninsky, *Novyi stroi*, Moscow, 1909, p. 359.

[19] Elkin, op. cit., p. 467.

The Founding of the Comintern: Letters from Souvarine to Zinoviev

Introduced by Branko Lazitch

GLASNOST HAS by now managed largely to penetrate into the history of the Soviet Union but will it, I wonder, manage to penetrate into the history of the Communist International as well? The question needs all the more to be asked since the Soviets feel that they have been challenged on this subject by at least two of their sister Parties—the Yugoslavian League of Communists and the Italian PC—in response to which they have even made several mouth-watering promises.

Up till now, the history of Soviet Russia has been one huge fabrication, substantiated each year by the publication of yet another great quantity of books. The history of the Communist International, on the other hand, has been non-existent, pure and simple. In 1969, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Comintern (the Communist International), there appeared in Moscow a collective work on its history; since then, for two whole decades, not one further work or one document from its archives has been published, those stored in Moscow being closed to historians.

The only un-edited documents relating to the history of the Comintern come from archives kept by a few high-ranking officials of the Comintern, such as Jules Hubert-Droz or Angelo Tasca (A. Rossi). These documents have for the most part been made public earlier, either by the various Institutes (the Feltrinelli, in Amsterdam) or by publishers (such as La Baconnière, in Switzerland). This is not the case of the Souvarine papers, which up till now have not been published at all.

Boris Souvarine, one of the founders of the French PC, went to Moscow for the Third Comintern Congress which began on 22 June 1921. At the close of this Reunion, he stayed on in Moscow as representative of the PCF in the Comintern, and he was immediately elected a member of the three ruling bodies: Executive Committee, Secretariat and Praesidium (the latter comprised only seven members). From this date onwards, he continued to sit on these three ruling bodies, a privilege extended to only two or three other European Communists. Souvarine served his time working in the headquarters of the Comintern and took part in the regular weekly meetings of the leadership presided over by Zinoviev. During this time, he made several trips abroad on political business—for example, he visited Berlin in 1921 and Paris in 1924.

These two letters, which are here being published for the first time, date from this trip to Paris in 1924. The first letter of 6 January was written at a particularly bad moment in the history of Soviet Russia and of the Communist International. In the case of Soviet Russia, these were the last days of Lenin, who was to die two weeks later, on 21 January. For the Communist International, it was the time of

defeat of the revolution in Germany (October 1923) which took all the leaders of the German CP back to Moscow in order to analyse, from 6 January onwards, "the lessons of the German October". And last of all, it was a time of crisis for Soviet Russia and for the Communist International together, for yet another reason: the Stalin–Zinoviev–Kamenev "Troika" had taken up arms publicly against Trotsky.

This is precisely the theme of Souvarine's first letter to his superior, Zinoviev. Already two days earlier, on 4 January 1924, Souvarine had published an article in The Communist Bulletin, *the journal he had founded in 1920, defending Trotsky—not so much on account of his ideas, but in order to protest against the disloyal methods employed by the "Troika" in its battle against him. In this article—and it was the first time anything like it had appeared in the Comintern press—Souvarine took it upon himself to draw attention to the role of a Bolshevik virtually unknown outside Russia, Stalin. The lines devoted to Stalin have an almost prophetic ring. Even the word "brutality" is already there: ". . . We are all aware of what we owe Stalin, of his merits and of the part he has played in the history of the Party. But precisely because we do know all that and know Stalin to be straightforwardness itself, even to the point of brutality, we must say to him in plain words: anyone who thinks he is able, before the international proletariat, to separate the names of Lenin and Trotsky, is making a mistake. For the whole of international Communism, for the entire thinking and fighting working classes and certainly also for the Russian proletariat, these two names are inseparably linked, being together the expression of everything that revolutionary Marxism has produced in the way of first-rate thinkers as well as activists . . ."*

Souvarine's files do not contain Zinoviev's reply, but judging by the tone of his second letter one can deduce that this correspondence only served to exacerbate Souvarine's position. Souvarine wanted to argue with Zinoviev, whereas the latter wanted to overcome him politically, and he was to succeed in this two months later. Indeed, when Souvarine wrote his first letter to Zinoviev on 6 January, the French leader was able to boast that the majority of the PCF supported his ideas. But by the time Souvarine wrote his second letter, on 20 March, he was already beaten; the leaders of the PCF had come out against Trotsky and Souvarine, and the latter had resigned from the Politburo. Souvarine attributes this shift in the balance of power to the part played in Paris by two secret emissaries of the Comintern: Guralsky (Lepetit) and Comrade M., alias Manuilsky.

As for Souvarine, first of the senior leaders of the Comintern publicly to defend Trotsky, he was judged to be "beyond redemption" by the "Troika". His political fate was to be sealed at the forthcoming Fifth Comintern Congress; five days before it opened, the enlarged Executive Committee of the Comintern met on 12 June 1924, with "the Souvarine Affair" at the top of its agenda. The Congress ended with the passing of 25 resolutions, of which the last concerned "the Souvarine Affair". It came out in favour of "meeting the demand for the removal of Souvarine, tabled by the delegation of the French Communist Party to the Fifth Congress of the Communist International".

To Comrade Zinoviev, Moscow.
Paris, 6 January 1924

DEAR COMRADE ZINOVIEV,

For some time now I have been wanting to draw your attention to the way the discussions going on in the Russian Party appear to the outside world.

It seems as if Russian Comrades, carrying on their quarrels in public as they do, have completely overlooked the fact that the whole world is watching them, ready to pounce on the slightest hint of weakness. All sorts of things have been spread across the pages of *Pravda* which could just as well have been reserved for private meetings. Making them appear in *Pravda* could never be of any help to the Party cause and has only served to feed the counter-revolutionary press throughout the world.

The first lesson to be learned, in my opinion, is that *Pravda* should publish only articles which are *impersonal*, that is to say, which might contain the sharpest of criticism, but never to such an extent that the outside world begins to think a power struggle between personalities is going on.

Of course, one could take the view that it is rather convenient for the world's bourgeoisie to continue to be deceived about the Russian Communists. But we should not forget the working class, which becomes uneasy and loses its faith in the Revolution whenever it sees the most respected Communist leaders exchanging blows.

Another matter which Russian Comrades seem to have lost sight of is that for workers in other countries, the idea of the Russian Revolution is absolutely inseparable from the names of its main leaders. Attacking Trotsky's authority, for example, tarnishes the prestige of the Russian Revolution. Even if Trotsky deserved the attacks aimed at him, it is tactically bad to forget that, all round the world, Trotsky is one of the leaders of the Revolution, and one of the key figures in the International.

In France, particularly, and in our Party, to which Trotsky has personally rendered great service, the workers are completely at a loss when they see their Russian Comrades, and eminent and respected ones at that, treating with contempt a man whose name for them is synonymous with the Russian Revolution, *and even with Bolshevism*. This must seem strange to old Bolsheviks who are steeped in the struggles within the Party and who constantly keep the political origins and peculiarities of Trotsky's role in mind, but that is how it is: for the French workers, Trotsky *is* Bolshevism, *is* the Revolution, *is* the Communist International. This is what must never be forgotten when things are written or said which may get into *print*.

These are matters for consideration in international politics, not in the domestic politics of the Russian Party. Comrade Lozovsky has upbraided

me in a friendly way for having made some remarks on the Russian debate that sound favourable to the opposition. But simply considering certain criticisms to be justified does not in any way mean one is taking sides. The Russian Central Committee similarly never loses any opportunity of making criticisms, and it was Lenin who set the example. Kamenev has pointed out that the Central Committee has agreed with Trotsky on many points. It is therefore impossible to put Comrades, especially foreign ones, into special categories, when they are only trying to find their own way by looking for the best in the Russian Party.

In France we would not claim to be against this or that member, or tendency, of the Russian Party. We have the highest regard for all the members of the Central Committee, to whom we owe everything, even if we do judge one or other of them to be wrong on one issue or other. The personal admiration I hold for Comrade Trotsky certainly does not prevent me from thinking that he committed an error by publishing his letter after he had voted for the resolution of the Central Committee. I have never been a partisan of the "Workers' Opposition" but I have found some good ideas in it, which moreover, the Party has taken up, and which it would have been a mistake to throw out *en bloc*. None of these things comes anywhere near to being understood by ordinary people in France. What people want to hear about here are ideas, projects, theories and plans.

Now you see why I have carefully avoided publishing anything in *The Bulletin* which has a specifically "Russian", or personal, ring to it. I have not published a single opposition article, preferring to produce analyses from which I could cut out anything that might bring the Party into disrepute.

I wrote the articles on Trotsky because, *for the French general public*, they are articles on *general ideas*; only in the Russian Party do they pick up certain allusions or implications which for the French reader do not exist.

This is the idea I have been guided by. I too have agreed with the Central Committee on most points, and have criticized the opposition fairly sharply, but I have also defended it against the accusation of forming a faction, which is to say, of setting up a rival power base. I have considered it my duty to defend the Party as a whole from unjust accusations that have arisen as a result of conflicting tendencies. This is what I have explained this week in one of the articles in *The Bulletin*.

When I saw that the discussions were taking a nasty turn, and what kind of reverberations they have had in the Western press, I thought I ought to shout "Watch out!" to the Russian Comrades by publishing an article in *l'Humanité* ending with a certain phrase which I sent to them by telegraph. I am sure you understood that. I was merely wanting to draw your attention to the repercussions of your arguments abroad. It goes without saying that I am the last person to believe that this is the right point for the International to intervene.

All this is in order to explain to you the meaning of things which may perhaps appear in a false light from such a distance, especially since you may not have had time over the last few months to read our press. I believe that Comrade Lozovsky will explain our preoccupations to you in person. Despite the fact that life in Russia did not permit us to become very intimately acquainted, nevertheless you know me sufficiently well to realize that I say what I mean. During my stay in Russia I protested many, many times against plenty of things which seemed to be contrary to the interests of the Revolution; many times over I intervened in disputes, though not always successfully; and still now, there are many facts which I feel are unacceptable both in the Russian Party and in Soviet life in general. But all these defects are part of a Revolution to which I belong wholeheartedly, as I never for a moment forget. I hope soon to have the opportunity of talking with you in person, at the forthcoming extended Executive Committee.

With fraternal greetings,

B. Souvarine

P.S. I am sending a copy of this letter to Lozovsky and Pascal, so as to keep them in touch with my current point of view.

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To Comrade Zinoviev, Moscow
Paris, 20 March 1924

DEAR COMRADE ZINOVIEV,

Your letter touches on questions already so complicated that I have little hope of fully explaining what I mean in a letter. We have to be able to talk together properly, and soon. I am in a hurry to get to Moscow in order to renew contact with the Executive and with my Russian Comrades and I would already be on my way were it not for this lawsuit I am involved in, which has great importance for *l'Humanité* and for the French Party. While I am waiting, I will try to give you a résumé of my point of view.

I cannot accept your arbitrarily branding me as an advocate of "factionalism". In this sort of matter it is not enough simply to state something, you have to provide actual proof. I understand, of course, that in a debating situation, unjust accusations get hurled back and forth and one tries to weaken one's opponent by attributing intentions he does not have. I understand all this, which is to say, I can see how it happens—but yet I can't approve of it. However, surely you cannot be seriously maintaining that my attitude is factionalist?

I would prefer to assume that you have not read my articles, since you will

have had more important things to occupy you. But if you had read what I have written on the Russian question, you would know that I thoroughly approved of the resolution of the Central Committee on 5 December and that I disapproved of the way that a certain element in the opposition has raised the question of confidence in the current Central Committee. As I have said to the French Party leadership, and as I have written, I consider that the present Russian Central Committee, with all its qualities and all its faults, represents almost the best possible selection of experienced militants in the Party. I think that it is all a matter of putting into practice the resolution of 5 December, with the collaboration of all forces in the Party.

What I don't approve of is the war being waged against Comrade Trotsky and those suspected, rightly or wrongly, of "Trotsky-ism". It is not that I feel I must rush to the defence of a Comrade such as Trotsky, who knows perfectly well how to defend himself. Nor is it that I have turned into a "Trotsky-ite", because a French activist has plenty to do within his own Party and the International without letting himself get mixed up on top of everything else with some trend within the Russian Party. But I reckon that the blows aimed at Trotsky hit not so much the latter as the Party itself, as well as the Revolution and the International.

You have lived through the struggles with the Russian Social-Democrats and you find it difficult to abstract yourselves from your twenty-year period of formation; you are inclined to identify your historical group with the Party and with the Revolution. And you consider Trotsky not so much an intruder—since you cannot but recognize his immense services—as, nevertheless, a man apart, unassimilable and even, up to a certain point, dangerous, because his personal qualities give him the power to pull Bolshevism off course. This is an attitude of mind that I know extremely well and am well able both to explain and excuse to Comrades who might not understand it. But you cannot expect men who have stood back from your quarrels to share your way of thinking on this, or your distrust, or the habits of mind that have become second nature to you.

I repeat: much as I understand the reasons for your current antagonism—and of course I regret it—it would be ridiculously offensive for a French Communist to start intervening in your own conflict and, instead of seeking an objective resolution to a controversial issue, end up hardening the very historic subjective positions which ought to be softened. It seems as if anyone who does not unreservedly support your line of argument, your conclusions or your very polemic, you regard as a political adversary. It is already enough of a mistake to be trying to raise this issue at the international level just as it has been raised in Russia.

As far as I am concerned Trotsky became a disciple of Lenin, if not because he deserved it from being a member as the others were, then at least because of his own revolutionary merits. He has taken part in Lenin's

work and he should carry on making contributions. Putting him down in front of the Russian, and world-wide, proletariat is no way to ensure that he will be carrying on. Trotsky has not been without failings in his life, but nor has anyone else, and that includes Lenin. The main thing is that he should have generally followed a revolutionary line, and so he has, which is in itself sufficient reason for his name to remain inseparable from the history of the Revolution. Lenin was not afraid of saying "I have made a mistake" or "we have made mistakes". Now everyone wants to shout: "Trotsky has made a mistake." This is not in keeping with historical truth nor does it show a fair appraisal of the role of a revolutionary leader. Not only has Trotsky not made any more, or less, mistakes than anyone else, but he has, moreover, shown clear-sightedness at all the decisive moments of the Revolution. It may well have happened that, at Brest–Litovsk and the debate on the unions, he was in disagreement with Lenin, but so were many Leninists too. The only man who could presume to be his superior, namely Lenin, was always highly appreciative of his collaboration and never missed an opportunity of telling him so.

When today I study the problems which have to be resolved in order for the Revolution to proceed further or when I read the writings of Trotsky and note with appreciation the solutions he advocates, I can only find them to be in keeping with the spirit of Bolshevism. I am deeply convinced that Lenin would have approved and would have taken them very seriously. But in any case, I don't have any preconceived opinions on the subject and if I did come across any arguments against Trotsky's ideas in the critiques produced by yourself, Kamenev or Stalin, I would not for one moment hesitate to correct my point of view. But working through your arguments, I find none. I do find personal attacks, though, and largely inaccurate reminders of the past and more or less arbitrary interpretations of Trotsky's ideas. But I don't actually find you refuting any of Trotsky's more precise considerations and propositions.

Like you, I have read Trotsky's pamphlet, but I have failed to find what could have provoked such a violent attack from your side. It is not accurate to say that Trotsky has set the young against the old; that he has talked of liquidating the "old guard"; that he has defended the right to form factions; that he wants to undermine the control of the Party over the State; or that he is seeking to divert the Party in a different direction from its present one. You yourself made a profound observation: that Trotsky has never managed to found either his own party or his own faction. You know as well as I do that he is almost isolated, and that his fight concerns getting accepted whatever concepts he considers to be in the interests of the Revolution; it does not concern currying favour with some group or other, or having some petty ambition to get power. You know as well as I do that Trotsky is not out to form a faction, yet at the same time it is impossible

to conceive of any faction containing both Trotsky and, say, Chliapnikov. The "workers' opposition" or "democratic centralism" did not come into existence yesterday; the Party has never been frightened of them and has always known how to recognize what was right and sensible in the ideas of these opposing groups and has called on them to collaborate in practical work. Only a passion for political in-fighting can explain how all the various shades of opposition and criticism have come to be embodied in the Central Committee. But how can the International be persuaded to adopt the same attitude?

What should come first and foremost is solving the present difficulties of the Revolution. In your report to the Executive, I can find only a few lines devoted to the concentration of industry or to state planning. I don't think you have refuted Trotsky's ideas. Maybe you have some other excellent reasons for your position which you have left out of your report; but until I know what they are I shall continue to consider Trotsky's propositions as logical and meeting the needs of the situation. All this is not a question of tendency; it is solely to do with considerations of a completely practical and utilitarian nature. I had not realized that Trotsky was supposed to have proposed concentrating industry in an absurd manner while he failed to take account of political considerations. I also had not realized that he was supposed to have claimed it possible to build the Soviet economy according to a rigorously prepared plan. Making such allegations may perhaps be convenient for the processes of debate, but it does not bring a solution one step closer.

It is currently fashionable to accuse of pessimism those who do not believe that all is for the best in the best of all Soviet republics. I will never admit that merely to consider difficulties with a will to overcoming them is proof of pessimism. If one gave in to this habit of labelling anyone who refuses to bury his head in the sand as a pessimist, Lenin would have to be permanently considered a pessimist; yet in actual fact there has never been a greater optimist. For my part, I am concerned only with resolving present difficulties, and that is all; in order to resolve those difficulties one has to face up to them as they are. So, when I look at the report of the Commissar for Labour, produced for the last Soviet Congress, I find that it announces an unemployment figure of around one million. And if I turn to Lunacharsky's report, I find he mentions eighteen million illiterate adults in the RSFSR alone. Here are straightaway two facts which merit attention and demand solutions. I am not a priori in favour of Trotsky's solution. I am for whichever one that seems the best and if it should come from Zinoviev, I would adopt it without hesitation. Why do you think my preference for a solution should be based not on its value but on a mindless sympathy for its instigator? To my mind the big issue which requires a solution in Russia today is production and I am willing to share any ideas which seem to help

improve or increase production. There is nothing "factional" in this.

As regards the internal affairs of the Party, I absolutely approve of the Central Committee's resolution. Furthermore, I find it remiss not to have given a clear definition of what it means by "faction". This accounts for my agreeing with the article by Krylenko in which he demands such a definition. I know quite well that it would be difficult to take up a formal, legal stand on this, but even so, we have to know what the Party considers legitimate, or not, in this area of ideas. A good illustration of the need for this definition is shown by the way all reasoned argument becomes poisoned by accusations of "factionalism" flung hither and thither. These accusations are the crude weapons of debate and they do not advance the task of the Party at all.

You will be writing back that I ought now to recognize my mistake in my assessment of the situation of the Party in Russia, in which the opposition element would only amount to one per cent. But I, on the contrary, do not believe I have committed any error and I hold my opinion absolutely independently of the percentage of votes received by the opposition. I will never be able to understand what you actually mean by "opposition", as long as you fail ever to define what opposition you are referring to. I cannot allow that I am not able to approve of this or that idea of Trotsky's without being forced into arbitrary solidarity with Chliapnikov, Sapronov or Radek. Even if one of them obtained 90 per cent of the votes at a conference it would not make me approve of a point of view if I disapprove of it. And even if Trotsky did not receive one single vote at a conference, it would not prevent me from regarding as right what I do regard as right. This is not a question of arithmetic. Besides knowing the way the Party is organized I also know the rough value of numbers, and they have little importance. If, for example, prior to the conference, Trotsky's ideas had been supported by only one single person—you—that would have been enough to bring a change in the course of events. I have by no means lost hope that you might come round to Trotsky's point of view on the precise questions of concentration of industry and the Plan, or that he might come round to your point of view again on these particular issues, which are the only ones that interest me. I will not permit myself to believe that the two main leaders of the Revolution are irreconcilably opposed over the very questions on which the health of the Revolution depends. I wait to see fresh progress and fresh revolutionary conquests made, not by a certain percentage of votes at a conference, but by agreement between those chiefly responsible for it. And I think that my own hopes of the two of you coming to an agreement echo the deepest feelings of the entire Party.

You upbraid me for "not saying clearly that I support a specific faction of the Russian Party". Yet I cannot say things which are not true! As I

have said before, and now repeat, it is impossible to conceive of any faction which could accommodate the whole range of diverse and irreconcilable elements coming from those who, from their various points of view, have criticized the Central Committee. And again as I have said before, and now repeat, the proposals put forward by Trotsky for solving the current difficulties appear to me all the more commendable in view of the fact that the Central Committee has itself adopted the main essence of them. Kamenev has declared that he did not attempt to justify the publication of Trotsky's letter, since the Central Committee had agreed with him on virtually all its points. I also think, along with the Central Committee, that Trotsky is right on almost all points and that there is nothing "factional" in this. As for Trotsky's letter being published, insofar as I am able to form a judgement from a distance, I do think this was inopportune, but it really is a secondary issue.

You also say in your letter that I say things which are "too elementary" in calling your attention to the dangers in your arguments. Allow me to show you that you are wrong about the meaning of my reflections. I have in no way presented myself to you as a pacifist wielding an olive branch. I know you have not been arguing for the love of argument. What I am saying is that criticizing ideas is one thing, and discrediting a leader of the Revolution is another. What I am saying is that you think you have put down an opponent, when in reality it is the Party that you have put down as well as its standing in the International and amongst the working classes. This is not at all what you intended. But whether you like it or not, Trotsky's name is inseparable from the Revolution, and one cannot aim at one without striking the other.

And since it appears to be so much a question of optimism and pessimism these days, I will tell you quite bluntly that I read your report with the greatest apprehension and disquiet or, if you will, with the greatest pessimism. What you are claiming is that the Central Committee and the opposition are currently further apart than the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were in 1903. If that is not opening up the prospect of a split please tell me what is! And do you believe that one can contemplate such a prospect without fearing for the future of the Revolution? For my part I have done my utmost, within limited means, to ensure that any eventual intervention by the International would be inspired by a concern to prevent the irreparable occurring, to remove all danger of a split, and to bring together forces temporarily disunited. I do not regret anything I have done. Time will tell whose view was correct.

You have sent over to us several Comrades whose job it was to correct the "errors" of our leadership of the French Party. They have fulfilled their task with ease . . . You seem to be in some doubt as to whether I have greater illusions than yourself about the powers of orientation or the

steadfastness of a good number of our French Comrades. But by what means have the majority been displaced? By means which will cost the French Party dear, believe me. If you are "optimistic" on this subject, the repercussions will provide material for reflection.

You have given the support of the Executive to one faction, a real faction this time, not the ghost of a faction like the one that is stirring in Russia, but a faction which has in your eyes the single merit of siding with the Central Committee in Russia. It matters little to you that this faction is devoid of any theoretical substance and is recognized by one and all to be totally impotent on the practical level. It matters little to you either that it is completely ignorant of the Russian question and that it has taken your side purely out of factional self-interest. You did not hesitate to give it an authority which has always been and always will be its failing, since it is an authority which is both fake and futile. Have you thought out the inevitable consequences?

Firstly, I doubt whether the prestige of the Party or the International will be much enhanced once it becomes known that Treint and his friends represent the "Old Guard of the Bolsheviks", while Monatte, Rosmer and myself are now no more than "Mensheviks" (as we are being called these days). All sorts of hardened Social Democrats, semi-reformed anarchists and a rag-bag of confusionists have rushed to Treint's side to turn themselves into an "old guard". I cannot imagine the Russian Old Guard being greatly flattered by the comparison.

Next, this re-grouping of French Comrades will throw the rank and file of the Party into disarray and will disorientate the working class. You are making the workers, who cannot absorb questions relating to Russian affairs, take stands not over the activities of their own militants in the movement, or over propaganda or action, but over what they perceive in differences of opinion prevailing in Russia. What good will come of this? Can you not see that the workers can have no understanding of all that and will be put off a Party which engages in arguments which seem to them Byzantine and hermetic in nature.

The Party at the moment is flowing in two separate directions, not knowing why, not knowing how. Most of its members are motivated not from having seriously studied or assessed current issues but from personal sympathies and resentments and all kinds of other considerations alien to Party interests. How can the level of the Party be raised above all this?

The Party's attention, which ought to be focused on present and future struggles in France, has been diverted by particular problems which, though interesting enough in themselves, can, I repeat, never be absorbed by the mass of the people; they are problems which can only really be solved at the top. The Party is on the brink of a new crisis, and the worst one yet—one where most of its members do not understand what is happening. The

leadership has passed to a bunch of incompetents, solely because they claim to be representatives of the "Old Guard". I cannot see anything to be gained from this by the movement; on the contrary, I can see only too clearly, without so-called "pessimism", the difficulties that will result.

I am not even talking of the intrigues and manoeuvres which surround this crisis, the wild talk which is creating the current atmosphere and which, whether you like it or not, certainly does affect opinions and poison discussion and infest reports. Here we find some troublemaker spreading it through all quarters that Trotsky has threatened the Central Committee with his troops. There, someone else is irresponsibly claiming that the Russian opposition wants to hand Russia over to foreign capitalists and crush the Revolution. It is this sort of talk spreading through the Party like wildfire which exerts the greatest influence, not complicated explanations and pseudo-intellectual theories. Once people start treating their neighbour as a "Menshevik", in other words a counter-revolutionary, collaboration becomes impossible. All this has to be taken into account; we are not sitting in libraries all day long, and before we even open our mouths, we know exactly what is going to happen to each and every word.

How, moreover, can the level of discussion be raised when representatives of the Executive are themselves helping to lower it? Guralsky came over, ostensibly to talk about the situation in Germany, which took him all of ten minutes before he got on to the real purpose of his visit, to denounce a vast international plot to crush Bolshevism. According to him, Trotsky in Russia, Brandler in Germany, Rosmer in France (on account of his discussion with Lozovsky on the English question) and I myself (because of my so-called "Trotsky-ism") are setting up a revisionist conspiracy. There is no need to point out the absurdity of this product of a fertile imagination. None of the French has ever supported Brandler . . . except Treint. Rosmer is absolutely in agreement with the Executive on the English question and has been quicker to criticize the faults of the German Central than even the Executive itself. And the same goes for me . . . This shows the arbitrary manner in which militants have been sorted, classified and catalogued and by which the most artificial sort of crisis has been provoked. If I tell you that, as an example of the kind of argument he uses, Guralsky has compared Trotsky to Danton (who was guillotined for having betrayed the revolution, after making a pact with the enemy and receiving money from the monarchy) you will have some idea of the quality of intervention he makes.

"We have been leaning to the Left for long enough," says Guralsky, "now it is time to lean to the Right." So, first to the Left, then to the Right but nobody has any clear idea of who is on the Left and who is on the Right. Is this how one runs a Party or an International? The German Left has become the model on which the whole International is to be based. But what about the decisions of the International? What about the United Front?

The latest novelty seems to be "the United Front from below" or "despite leaders". But this is no novelty, it is Renoult's view, and it's already three years old. How on earth do you suppose the workers will be able to make anything out of all this?

Guralsky, with his Treint faction, has worked hard and has drafted theses against the "de-Bolshevization of the Russian Party" and in favour of the "Bolshevization of the International". Let us suppose for a moment that Guralsky, who for years has shared responsibility for all the faults of the German Party, did have some authority for denouncing the "de-Bolshevization" undertaken by Trotsky. Do you then think it is possible for Treint (not to mention certain of his followers who have been notoriously discredited), with his well-known tact and political flair, to attack the Menshevism of Trotsky without us laughing out loud?

And then, what is your criterion for classifying people on the Right—currently in the firing-line? Is it enough to be lacking in understanding, ignorant, stubborn and irresponsible to become a model of "Leftism"? When I think back to Lenin's interventions at the Third Congress, I cannot see any way in which the would-be "Leftism" currently in fashion conforms to "traditional Bolshevism", of which French champions are, to say the least, an unexpected new element.

In actual fact, you have courted the worst of dangers in allowing the illusion to flourish that Bolshevism can be represented by parrots and monkeys, that is to say, by people who repeat its phrases or ape its gestures without any understanding of the *spirit* of Lenin's words and deeds. And it will not be long before it is your turn to become a "pessimist" regarding traditional Bolshevism, as interpreted by Treint. There is more to Leninism than is contained in *An Infantile Disorder*.[1] Anyone who thinks himself a Bolshevik after learning a few phrases of that book by heart is a very poor disciple of Lenin.

Comrade M. has succeeded Guralsky in the factional work you consider (with reason) bad in the Russian Party and excellent in the French. He has clearly had some difficulty in subscribing to all the idiocies contained in the Guralsky–Treint theses. He has done everything in his power to improve the text of the section on "pure Bolshevism". But insofar as he has been elected by a majority of the ruling Committee, it suffices to show that the Party is in good hands; but if Bolshevism can find no champions apart from those who have just joined in in the way they have in France, it must be very sick indeed.

You will be writing back that Treint has made mistakes, and so have I. I could add that you have, too, but this would get us no further. Everybody makes mistakes. But it's a question of knowing what they are. I won't do

[1] *"Left Wing" Communism—An Infantile Disorder* by V. I. Lenin, 1920.

you the injustice of comparing your mistakes to Treint's. Allow me to say that mine have nothing in common with the eccentricities and ravings of the individual to whom you have handed over the Party. No parallel should be drawn between large matters and small, between irredeemable errors and insignificant ones.

What is more, I have not the slightest intention of setting myself up against the current leadership of the Party. I find it on the contrary an excellent thing to be pushed to one side and to watch as you go through this experience. You have need of the experience, and far be it from me to try and prevent it. You can count on me not to place any obstacles in the way for the Party leaders. I would feel it a disgrace if I did anything similar to the sabotage carried out by Treint after the Congress at Lyons, which, with the help of the Executive, has worked so well for him. I will get on quietly with my work, free now from inept accusations of dictatorship and authoritarianism, which have so generously been bestowed on me.

I am quite sure that what will finally be decisive in the Party's gaining a following are not artificial alignments over Russian issues, but the work being done by us in France. Now, have you any idea of what we are doing in France, where we have got with it, and what results we have obtained? Have you any idea of the state of the French Workers' Movement? I doubt it, because if the answer were "yes", you would have looked twice before plunging the Party into a new crisis. The experience would be edifying for you. I believe you are more responsive to fact than accessible via argument. I will wait, therefore, with patience, for the facts to emerge.

And I beg you to believe that I have not changed in the slightest over the last three months. I am exactly the same as the person who, until recently, enjoyed your confidence. But something has changed in the International and I am still in the process of trying to understand why . . .

With fraternal greetings,

Boris Souvarine

Translated from the French by Belinda McKenzie

How Stephen Cohen Re-Thinks the Soviet Experience

Lev Timofeyev*

IN THE BOOK UNDER REVIEW,[1] Stephen Cohen, for reasons best known to himself, considers it necessary to conclude with nothing less than a political lesson. Leaving aside the question of what value there is in finishing an historical book in this manner, we should take a closer look at exactly what he is recommending us to understand:

> The lesson of history is that cold-war relations abet conservative and even neo-Stalinist forces in Soviet officialdom and that Soviet reformers stand a chance only in conditions of East–West détente. Our own cold warriors have always insisted that détente must await the reform of the Soviet system. But that ill-conceived policy serves only to undermine the reformist cause in the Soviet Union. It results in an inadvertent but perilous axis between their hard-liners and ours, an axis whose first victims are the advocates of Soviet reform. Thus, the struggle between the friends and foes of Soviet reform is also a struggle between the friends and foes of détente—in the Soviet Union and in the West. In the nuclear age, no more important lesson can be learned from the study of the past or the present (p. 157)

This "lesson of history" so strongly contradicts the well-known facts of recent years, that, after reading his closing words, we are forced to start the book all over again; for the text has suddenly taken on a new, special meaning, and it has done so by arousing a purely technical interest: how exactly does one construct an argument, as Cohen does, so as to lead to a conclusion which flies in the face of obvious facts? He starts off by announcing the need to revise the whole of Sovietology, which at various times has been in *a thoroughly bad way*, or bogged down in *the continual repetition of intellectual stagnation*. This stagnation consists in the fact that underlying Sovietology there is the conviction—which is totally unacceptable to Cohen—that, from the October revolution onwards, there has existed an unquestionable continuity of ideas, ideas on which the Soviet state is founded, and which, whilst undergoing purely existential changes,

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* This review of Stephen Cohen's *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917*, first appeared in the Moscow independent magazine, *Referendum* (No. 3, 1987). It was re-published in *Russkaya Mysl* (No. 3710, 5 February 1988).

[1] All quotations and page-numbers in this article are from the original book published by Oxford University Press, 1985.

have remained, since Lenin, Stalin and all the succeeding Soviet leaders, in essence unchanged. Stephen Cohen is of the opinion that such an approach to the study of Soviet history needs to be revised, so he offers up his own personal view of things.

Pastoral Symphony

COHEN'S CONCEPT OF HISTORY lies in the fact that, while examining the actual historical events in our country (NEP, collectivization, Stalin's state terror, the post-war and post-Stalin periods), he decisively and uncompromisingly separates "bolshevism" as a state ideology from every single historical fact which might stain that ideology. First and foremost he wants to set as far apart as possible the two cocnepts of Bolshevism and Stalinism, indeed to contrast them so sharply that it is the conflict between them, the constant struggle between these two principles, which forms the content of the historical process.

According to Cohen the result of the October revolution, which took place under the banner of Bolshevism, was such that by the end of the 1920s the position of Russia was socially and politically quite promising. War Communism, which according to Cohen could in no way be called a Bolshevik policy, was just an irritating deviation, and was replaced by "genuine Bolshevism" in the form of the New Economic Policy.

> NEP brought also a new, more conciliatory politics. The Communist Party maintained its dictatorship, but the Soviet party-state of the 1920s was limited and relatively tolerant, allowing a greater degree of social, cultural, and intellectual pluralism than has ever existed since in that country. As in economic life, the excesses of statism and coercion were deplored. Social harmony and class collaboration, rather than strife and terror, became the principles of NEP (p. 76).

Suddenly (though we shall see later that it was not so suddenly after all) this pastoral symphony of "Bolshevism with an angel's face" is invaded by the demonic theme of Stalin:

> . . . Stalin's new policies of 1929–33, the "great change" as they became known, were a radical departure from Bolshevik programmatic thinking. No Bolshevik leader or faction had ever advocated anything akin to imposed collectivization, the "liquidation" of allegedy prosperous peasants (*kulaks*), breakneck heavy industrialization, the destruction of the entire market sector, and a "plan" that was in reality no plan at all, only hypercentralized control of the economy plus exhortations. These years of "revolution from above" were, historically and programmatically, the birth-period of Stalinism (p. 62)

Where did it come from, this accursed Stalinism? Where did it derive its power to overcome so easily the pastoral idyll of "Bolshevism"? Here is the explanation:

> A knowledge of the traditions and political culture of pre-revolutionary Russia can help us to understand a lot from the personal world-view of Stalin's autocratic aspirations . . . to the social basis of Stalinism as a system. . . . From the very beginning, and in the course of its darkest periods, Stalinism enjoyed real support among the people, although the nature and strength of such support altered with the years.

So this, then, is how, step by step, one concept is replaced by another both in Cohen's narrative, and, supposedly, in the mind of the reader. The beautiful, morally and socially attractive idea of "Bolshevism" is made to stand in contrast with demonic Stalinism, and is linked in its deepest roots with the murky pre-revolutionary Russian past. Is it not that very past itself which prevents the bright dream of mankind—"Bolshevism"—from being realized?

These two political tendencies, two versions of state policy—the historically promising "Bolshevism" and the (according to Cohen) "doomed" pre-revolutionary political tradition forming the social basis of Stalinism—are locked together in a struggle which has lasted up to the present time. This struggle is particularly obvious within the ranks of the governing party itself:

> Even a spectrum of political outlook inside the Soviet Communist Party, for example, would require at least four categories: authentic democrats, reformers, conservatives, and neo-Stalinist reactionaries. (p. 130)

Take away the, in this context, comparatively unimportant word "Stalinist" and you will see that this revelation concerning structure is applicable to literally every human community, from a football team to humanity at large. Nevertheless, having laid bare his structural discovery at the beginning of his book, in the section where he analyses the political situation in modern Russia, Cohen stays completely faithful to it. The reader is thereby left in no doubt that it is the reformists who personify the "Bolshevism" so attractive to Cohen, while it is the Soviet die-hards of today who speak the language of neo-Stalinism, or of 19th century Slavophilism, or both. It is this "Bolshevism", in its reforming guise, which Western policies should be supporting, for it would appear that:

> At each of (those) turning-points in Soviet political history, a crisis or serious worsening in East–West relations played a crucial role in the defeat of moderates and reformers inside the Soviet establishment. (p. 157)

There then follows that concluding paragraph with which this review begins and which in fact supplies a straight answer: under no circumstances should one approach Soviet policy from a standpoint of firm moral principle: presumably, therefore, at the beginning of the 1980s, one should have taken a lenient view not only of the colossal expansion of Soviet armaments, but also the invasion of Afghanistan, and the famous banditry with the Korean airliner. How else are we to understand Cohen? Does he not mean that only a policy of appeasement along such lines would enable the genuine "Bolsheviks" to overcome the sinister heritage of Tsarism: in other words Slavophilism combined with Stalinism? We are to suppose that, had it not been for the pernicious policy pursued by Reagan, we would have heard Gorbachev's speeches about *perestroika* back in Brezhnev's time. So in fact it turns out to be the accursed cold-warriors who have prevented the genuine "Bolsheviks" from having their day sooner.

Take It or Leave It

AFTER BRIEFLY SUMMARIZING Cohen's ideas, the reviewer now finds himself in something of a quandary: this should be the moment to consider what analysis of the historical facts has enabled Cohen to deduce his "lessons of history"; then we should examine both the facts themselves and the analysis. I have the impression, however, that Cohen has not troubled himself with an analysis of facts. His method of exposition is, so to speak, confined to the nominative case: he types out the first thing that comes into his head and you can just take it or leave it.

For example, here is a passage where Cohen says, of the Soviet administrative élite under Stalin, that it was:

> more akin to the traditional tsarist *soslovie*, an official privileged class that served the state—in this case a resurgent Russian state—more than it ruled the state. (p. 66)

And that is all; he needs no facts or proof. It seems to go without saying that a civil servant is always a civil servant, whether under Tutenkhamun, a Russian tsar, or the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—the civil servant is never identical with the state, he is never intrinsically a power-wielder, he is merely the mechanism for realizing an idea at the heart of the state structure. Yet even if this were the case, there are ideas and ideas, and surely they vary from Pharoah to Russian autocrat to our own day?

But historical fact interests Cohen less than superficial linguistic parallels between states and functionaries. Whether it is the second secretary of the provincial committee or a deputy governor as in Saltykov-Shchedrin, for Cohen they are all one and the same socio-historical fact. What goes for

Joseph Stalin goes for Alexander II—you take it or you leave it. Moreover Cohen announces that:

> Alongside the great factories, cities, and schools, there developed, for example, a tsarist-like political autocracy, a medieval-like leader cult, the semi-serfdom of collectivized peasants, and the widespread use of virtual slave labour. These systemic aspects of Stalinism were *imposed* anachronisms [Timofeyev's emphasis] having more to do with the Russian past than with Western patterns of modernization . . . (pp. 66–7)

And there you are: that's it—just like tabling a resolution. No facts, no analysis. Yet there we have been, naively imagining that Stalin's dictatorship was the organic outcome of that most basic of ideological concepts, dictatorship—and what a concept!—it being merely the slogan on the banner under which the Bolsheviks created their revolution. Dictatorship of the proletariat is dictatorship by the party which is personifying the proletariat, and dictatorship by the personality which is personifying the party is the highest degree of personification of an idea. Does a *professional* historian not differentiate, even conceptually or by definition, between autocracy and dictatorship? Do a dictator and an autocrat embody one and the same idea of the state? If that is so and if Cohen is correct, how are we to link Tsar Alexander II (or any other Russian autocrat) with the "quasi-medieval personality-cult" of Hitler, of Mao Zedong, or of Khomeini, or of the plentiful supply of other present-day dictators personifying ideas of one sort or another?

Furthermore, if Cohen is right, what *are* the links between Catherine the Great's organization of serfdom, Stalin's collectivization, the ambitions of Owenites and Fourierists, "Vera Pavlovna's Fourth Dream", and the realities of a modern Cuban or Khmer village?

This might be the moment to say that for all Cohen's claims to be *re-thinking*, that is, giving fresh consideration to the Soviet experience, his interpretations belong to the clichés of a rather well-known school of thought. The writers of this school, in some cases not without reason, draw bold parallels between the historical facts of the most widely separated eras, for example the tyrannies of Ivan the Terrible and of Stalin. These parallels are interesting if they are able to demonstrate to the reader that the psychology of society operates in a similar way in completely different historical conditions, but the trouble lies precisely in the fact that the similarity of psychological mechanisms is accepted as proof of a wider similarity, and this leads to unfounded conclusions about direct continuity in Russian political life, virtually from Ivan the Terrible himself up to the present day.

Writers of this tendency (which it would not be too erroneous to call the State-Political school of thought) generally proceed from one and the same

premise: the political idea of Communism (here one usually finds some personal assessment of the idea) has been distorted beyond recognition by Russian socio-political reality. Unable to be realized in its pure form, it gave birth to a political monster in the form of the Soviet state, which is merely a continuation of the Russian state.

Did We Ever Have a Society?

WE HAVE, HOWEVER, to consider a particular factor which is missing from Cohen's book but which certainly ought to be found in any book attempting to re-think "the Soviet experience", and this is the concept of public opinion in its widest sense. The concept is absent from this book for the simple reason that Cohen fails to detect the presence of public opinion in our life. The opinion of the Party appartus is there, in the form of the conservatives and reformists already mentioned. But what about opinion in society at large? Cohen seems to mention it only once, when he allows himself a blasphemous sentence about the alleged *popular* support for Stalinism. What support does he means? What does Cohen understand by the *people*? Can he mean that the dispossessed peasantry, at that time the majority of the population, supported Stalin? Can he mean the millions of relatives of those who had perished in the terror? In any case, what "support" exactly does Cohen mean, what facts show what form the "support" took? No, we have forgotten that in this book we should not bother to look for facts: they are simply not there. Still, the fact that for Cohen public opinion can only occasionally be glimpsed in some ghostly outline while the rest of the time it is totally invisible, should not divert us from that most urgent of questions: whether at each stage in the 70-year history of the Soviet state there really was any public opinion at all. Not only is that answer extremely important, it also seems at least as important to know whether there ever was, and is now, even any "public" as such? Or does that consist only of Party officials—either conservatives or reformists, as the case may be?

We seem to have reached the key questions, but we have only got this far because space has permitted them to be put to readers for their own independent appraisal, allowing them to draw their own conclusions about the book under review.

First question: the October revolution was a seizure of power by a party intending to establish a specific, complex doctrine through socio-political and economic practice. The soil for the establishment of this doctrine, and its building materials, were Russian society as it actually was at the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s. So, what were the political, social, cultural or economic areas of public life that accepted the doctrine

without resistance? How were support for the doctrine, or resistance to it, expressed?

Second question: it is generally considered that the political life of society depends only on the kind of public opinion that is expressed explicitly, verbalized. But opinion can also be expressed through conscious acts—strikes or demonstrations, or even acts that are not fully conscious, like the desire to make a less than total effort at work, when working conditions and pay do not meet workers' expectations. In this context does not the establishment of NEP seem less a victory for common sense within the Bolshevik party than a victory for common sense within Russian society as a whole, which had rejected Communist doctrine in its form of War Communism, for being no mere whim, but the high-handed thrust of a consistent attempt to realize the idea of Communism, even if it meant abolishing the family?

Third question: Communist doctrine was undoubtedly a complex matter. Take the family, for example: within the traditional peasant family the principle of "honour thy father and mother" was opposed by other principles embodied in the Pioneer-hero, Pavlik Morozov. But looking at our own families today, can you really say that in the area of family life Communist doctrine has got the better of Christian moral traditions?

Fourth question: is today's low labour productivity in Russia not a natural reaction by the common sense of the public to the senseless organization of the economy and the unsatisfactory socio-political situation?

Fifth question: is it, in principle, possible to implant permanently in the socio-political system of any country any theoretical doctrine which conflicts with public common sense?

Sixth, seventh, and further questions: do we in fact have a society as such, with public opinion and public common sense? Does not the historical process in essence consist in the conflict between public common sense and feelings aroused by the imposition from outside of an ideological doctrine? Here I have in mind that specific conflict, and not internal Party intrigues between "genuine" and "false". Bolsheviks who have been obliged to calculate their strategy in the context of that conflict.

These questions, which arise from the unsatisfactory nature of Cohen's book, do not enable one to construct a theory or even objections to Cohen. The answers to them may do so, however. If readers are interested enough to offer answers, we may then have reason for returning to Cohen's book and to the social problems that have been touched on. For without those answers, it is impossible to make a sensible assessment not just of the Soviet experience but indeed of modern politics as a whole.

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